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ABSTRACT
ACQUIRING THE TOOLS OF GRAND STRATEGY:
THE US NAVY'S LCS AS A CASE STUDY
Sean P. Murphy
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
Grand strategy is about how states allocate resources and employ these resources to
achieve desired political conditions. In examining the match between desired ends and available
ways and means, an often-overlooked subject is how the specific tools of grand strategy are
forged. One of these tools is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a Major Defense Acquisition
Program (MDAP) that started in 2000. LCS remains a controversial and often unpopular
program with many stakeholders to this day. This study examines how the means of grand
strategy, in this case a new ship class, are acquired. It also looks at how these means are
employed (ways) to achieve the desired outcomes (ends) and the feedback loop between means,
ways, and ends. The initial portion of the study examines how the U.S. Department of Defense
and Department of the Navy formally acquire systems or “systems of systems.” The second
portion of the study examines the design, construction, and fielding of the LCS class or the
attainment of Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The final portion analyzes the design,
construction, and introduction of the LCS into the fleet in terms of the three models used by
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision; the Rational Actor Model (RAM),
Organizational Behavior, and Governmental Politics – Models I, II, and III respectively. The
hypothesis is that individual personalities may have more influence than any of these models
account for and that instances of individual impact may offer more nuanced insights into these
models of state behavior. This study reveals that the process of evolutionary acquisition and
spiral development caused increased risk in the time-line for achieving Final Operational

Capacity (FOC) of LCS. It also provides insight into the reaction and adaption of a large
organization to changes in its environment. This study does not however reveal strong evidence
to support the hypothesis of individual personalities significantly influencing decision making or
action taking compared to organizations in Models I-III. The details of individual participation
and internal deliberations are obscured by security and proprietary rules which privileges models
I and II in the analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This work started out as an investigation of the research question, “Do the government
decision models presented by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision, sufficiently explain
government behavior?” The hypothesis is the individuals have more impact and influence in
government decisions and outcomes than the three models give them credit for thus making the
three models insufficient for explaining and predicting outcomes. The U.S. federal acquisition
process and more specifically the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process serves as an
excellent physical proxy for comparing the theoretical constructs developed by Allison. While
acknowledging that if one strictly adheres to the tenets of international relations one must
examine the overarching international system or structure, there is value in analyzing at the subsystemic or national level. There is also value in looking for a more nuanced explanation of state
and national government behaviors, choices, and decision making if we attempt to un-pack the
so-called “black boxes”1 that are used to represent a “state” or a “government.” These entities,
while functioning and examinable as unitary wholes are really only theoretical constructs
representing the parties, interest groups, and above all the individual people who actually form a
state or a government. In trying to determine and define the scope of individual influence and
impact on government decision making, in this case the acquisition of a weapons system, the

1

Steve Yetiv. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making in the Gulf Wars, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2011), 12.

2

goal is not to prove or disprove the applicability of Allison’s models but to identify other
variables that might be significant in the design of these models and reveal the scope of their
power and influence within the model structures.
The first chapter of this dissertation serves to introduce readers to both the structure of
the work and the literature addressing the concept of “Grand Strategy.” The overarching
philosophical intent from the beginning of this research was to look at how the tools of grand
strategy are chosen by a state, with a narrowing focus on case studies or a case study to examine
this procurement in terms of policy but also in terms of the basic process. The intent was to go
from the macro level which even though it remains below the traditional international relations
systemic level remains important, after all the international system is made up of individual
states. Moving down the ladder of abstraction, we will begin to examine both the strategic
drivers that become important variables in the equation of selecting tools to fit intended
strategies and the governmental process that control and drive the acquisition of weapons
systems.
The basic outline of this dissertation starts with the introduction to the basic organization
by chapter and an examination of the literature addressing grand strategy in Chapter One. To
steal a phrase from my Army training brethren, “Tell ‘em what you’re going to tell ‘em. Tell
‘em. And tell ‘em what you told them.” The goal of the first chapter is to tell the reader what the
author intends to tell them. It is also an attempt to explain the focus of this dissertation, going
from the macro-level of IR to the micro-level, the purchase of the “tools” of grand strategy and
one tool, the LCS. Why LCS? One of the major reasons for the focus on this acquisition program
and the sole case study for this dissertation was the acrimony and sheer bad-blood that this ship
class has engendered in the American naval community. A wide variety of writers, in and out of

3

uniform, former and current sailors, waxed and waned generally in derogation of the entire idea.
The comments, papers, stories, and articles were very much more often than not harshly critical
of the LCS both as a concept and once launched as actual physical platforms as well. There was
a constant shadow of stories regarding engineering casualties, failures, crew training issues,
equipment failing, and most damning of all, the increasing lag in the development of the warfare
mission modules. In short, LCS has been one of the most contentious Navy acquisition
programs ever and presented an opportunity to present a more academic and thus potentially, a
more objective assessment of the system than was available in other sources.
The second chapter focuses on and provides an analysis of the market factors driving and
limiting the acquisition of the common good known as national defense. This section explores
the issue of monopsony, the legally required process that both serves to form and to distort the
market for the good known as national defense, and by way of comparison, provides some
insight from the national defense market in the United Kingdom (UK). It also focuses on the
actual government procurement system and the two major instructions within the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Navy (DON) that govern acquisition; Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02, “The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS),” 07 Jan
2015 and SECNAVINST 5000.2E, “Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System,” Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1 September 2011 respectively.
Chapter Three addresses the other ‘market forces’ driving national defense as represented
by the changing strategic landscape and encapsulated in the Navy’s strategic guidance

4

publications starting with “…From the Sea…”2 and tracing the development and evolution of
these documents to the current day. This chronological analysis also examines several key
studies, papers, and books that informed and influenced the decision to acquire the LCS. These
included Vice Admiral Art Cebrowksi’s network centric, distributed platforms or
“Streetfighter,”3 Wayne Hughes books on fleet tactics,4 and several engineering studies, most
notably the “Sea Lance” study from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey,
California.5 It also looks at the government solicitation which included concept of operations
(CONOPS) that forms such a cornerstone for the entire LCS program.
Chapter Three is also in many ways an analysis of the actual Request for Proposals (RFP)
that the government issued informed and influenced by the author’s experience and background
as a commercial contractor bidding in response to packages like the LCS solicitation. There is
some significant value in this review because this was a very different methodology for ship
procurement from previous solicitations for of warships like the SPRUANCE or OLIVER
HAZARD PERRY classes. There is also an analysis of the Navy’s “Open Architecture”
standard6 which is important because of both its impact on the nature of the design for LCS but

“…From the Sea Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century: A New Direction for the Naval Service,”
(Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 1992) U.S. Navy white paper, available online at
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt. Accessed 10/09/2016 at 1013 EDT.
3
Wayne Hughes and Arthur Cebrowski, “Rebalancing the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125, No.
11 (1999): 31-34.
4
Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986). -----.
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2000).
5
LT Howard Markle, USN, Team Leader, LT Rick Trevisan, USN, LT Tim Barney, USN, LT Karl Eimers, USN,
LCDR Garrett Farman, USN, LTjg Ahmet Altekin, Turkish Navy, LT Ricardo Kompatzki, Chilean Navy, LT Chris
Nash, USN, Technical Report NPS-ME-01-001, “Sea Lance Littoral Warfare Small Combatant System,” Naval
Postgraduate School: Monterey, CA, 2001.
6
“Design Guidance for the Navy Open Architecture Computing Capability.” Naval Surface Warfare Center
Dahlgren: Dahlgren, VA, 01 October 2002.
2
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also the importance of software in weapons systems which it serves to highlight as this
requirement was included in the solicitation package from the Navy.7
The fourth chapter is a narrative analysis of the LCS class’s road from the award to the
two leading bidders to the achievement or non-achievement of its Initial Operating Capacity
(IOC). This chapter serves to highlight the persistent and consistent “bad press” that the LCS
received and that at least in the author’s opinion indicates more than merely residual resistance
within and without the Navy to this concept class of warships. This chapter also serves to place
the fielding of the sea-frame (a concept borrowed from the aerospace acquisition field – the
standard term there being air-frame) in relation to the development and slow fielding of the
mission modules. This capability gap provides some justification for the bigotry against the
entire program but is also reveals the very real engineering challenges of developing mobile and
removable equipment packages that can be swapped out to meet changing warfare mission
needs.
Chapter Five turns back to the field of international relations in a more traditional venue
and re-engages with the question of the applicability of Allison’s models to government
decision-making. The three models, Rational Actor Model (model 1), Organizational Behavior
model (model 2), and Governmental Policies model (model 3) are introduced, numbered for
simplicities sake, and applied to the LCS acquisition. The analysis was seeking to determine the
accuracy of fit for the model as applied to the actual process of program acquisition for the LCS.
The analysis revealed that, in general, the government’s and the Navy’s predicted behavior from
each of the three models was in line with the observed behavior during the LCS acquisition. The

7

LCS Solicitation, N00024-03-R-2309, Section J-10-1, dated 10 February 2003.
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chapter also served to neither proved nor disprove the basic dissertation hypothesis that
individuals had more impact than organizations on government or bureaucratic decision making.
There was no, what this writer has labeled the “Smoking Gun,” revealed.
The sixth and last chapter serves as a summary and discusses what exactly this study
reveals. There are two major findings for consideration, one in the federal acquisition field and
the second in the strategic planning realm. The acquisition issue that was revealed is the risk that
Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development can create if there is a long lag time between
developing a carrying frame i.e. the LCS hull and associated organic systems and the weapons
and sensors this frame is designed to carry i.e. the mission modules. Having a sea- or air-frame
with some built in capabilities may not suffice to meet the full range of intended and required
capabilities for which the system was procured. This equates to risk in the military doctrinal
world. The other issue is the inherent challenge of designing systems for both the current and the
predicted operational environment.8 Several naval case studies focused on the systems acquired
and employed by various navies in the twentieth century, how effective these systems were, and
how appropriate to the operational and strategic situation that obtained they proved. These case
studies reveal how difficult it is to accurately predict the operational environment and how
quickly it changes under the stress of combat and competition. In turn, this serves to highlight
the importance of flexibility, adaptability, and dependability for weapons systems to remain
effective in the operational environment.

“The JFC's operational environment (OE) is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that
affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas of the
air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and other factors.” Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations” (Washington, DC:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 January 2017), Chapter 4, Paragraph 2(a). Available online at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=27&pubId=646#. Accessed 12 September 2017, 0800 EST.
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GRAND STRATEGY
In order to avoid the trite introductory question “What IS Grand Strategy” and launch
into the lengthy discourse required for definition, let us instead looks at grand strategy by
applying a framework applied in later chapters of this dissertation; that of ends, ways, and
means. In this case means stands for the money or resources, ways stands for how the money is
spent or resources expended, and ends represents the desired outcome or end-state. With these
terms of reference, we can now turn to grand strategy as the application of ways and means to
achieve desired ends. Various authors have offered definitions of grand strategy and while there
are some very good ones available the following is offered as our working definition for this
review of the competitors. Grand strategy is the planning and execution process through which a
state having determined a desired outcome, generally one prejudiced in favor of the
aforementioned state’s interests, aligns means to ways (money to systems in the LCS case) in
order to effectively and hopefully, efficiently gain that desired end. This is sufficiently generic
enough to apply to desired political, military, economic, or diplomatic end-states. It may not
however be sufficiently detailed to ascribe the moniker “grand” to a given strategy. This is true
to an extent because both means and ends are loosely defined by intent. This is partly due to the
nature of this dissertation, we are trying to examine a case involving one of the tools of grand
strategy, a ship to be overly simplistic, and not say for example, the idea of “containment” as
practiced by the United States from 1948 until 1991. This provides some justification for a
certain level of simplification.
The other issue in terms definition is that under the sobriquet of grand strategy we often
find an extreme focus on the military means that are applied in certain ways to achieve the
desired strategic end-state. This unfortunately, rather than over simplifying, overly restricts the
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fields where grand strategy can and ought to be applied. Grand strategy for a state should imply
the entire gamut of state capabilities from military to economic that can be used to attain a
desired goal. The goal can range from triumph in a war as already mentioned, to the upset of a
mercantilist economic system and the substitution of a capitalist free market in its place.
However, at the core of the concept of grand strategy I would argue, lies the idea of maintaining
the existence of a state. Grand strategy is in essence what a state does in order to guarantee its
own continued existence, from balancing to band-wagoning. But what we are looking at
specifically in this dissertation, if not this chapter, is the resources and their application in the
military sphere in contrast to the political decisions and theoretical constructs that form the basis
for a given grand strategy or strategic vision.
One item of interest that surfaced in looking at the literature on grand strategy or strategy,
at least written by U.S. based authors most frame the issues in terms of ways, means, and ends.9
This is likely due to many of these writers being involved in the DoD process of Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), especially the programming and budgeting
steps of this process. The U.S. DoD has a distinct and pronounced tendency where strategy is
involved to base the desired strategic end-state10 on the force structure and funding for it that is
available. This tends to bias or privilege analysis towards trying to match the desired end-state to
the means in terms of budget dollars available. This is not surprising, but it does differentiate
between the policy planner field and that of the academic scholar, there is a rather distinct
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border-land between the two especially because of the fiscal and actual physical considerations.
The point to this excursion is to highlight some of the biases that scholars may bring into the
discussion and to note that some of the literature is not directly addressing grand strategy from
the IR perspective but from the foreign policy and military planner perspectives.
Robert Art, in A Grand Strategy for America presents a set of eight strategic alternatives
or policies from which the U.S. could choose.11 These options range from outright dominion to
isolationism to off-shore balancing. Each of these has its own pros and cons but all are
predicated on protecting U.S. national interests by keeping latent threats latent and reducing or
outright removing threats to U.S. interests.12 Art examines each strategy in terms of
effectiveness and efficiency in terms of cost. His analysis led him to conclude that the best grand
strategy, based on the strategic landscape in the early 21st century was selective engagement.13
He was also careful to note that this strategy was appropriate at the time but not at all times.14
This could be considered a watered-down version of the strategies linked to the liberalinstitutionalist school of IR theorist like Keohane, Ikenberry and Nye; more on these scholars
and their thoughts on grand strategy or how their thoughts apply to grand strategy in the
following sections.
In contrast, taking Christopher Layne as the most persistent of its advocates, some
scholars argue in favor of off-shore balancing.15 He has been joined by noted scholars in the
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field John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.16 The main argument of these advocates is that
offshore balancing by reducing the U.S. presence overseas would significantly decrease the size
of defense budgets. A ‘Policy Analysis’ paper from the Cato Institute provides some broad cost
estimates and specifics in advocating for U.S. withdrawal from overseas bases.17 The most
recent major work in this school is from Barry Posen and is entitled Restraint a New Foundation
for U.S. Grand Strategy.18 As the title suggest, Posen argues that the U.S. ought to restrain itself
from enforcing the so-called “liberal hegemony” and instead work towards selected engagement
with key allies and coalitions, if only to repress nuclear proliferation.19 He takes a slightly
different path from Art however in that selective engagement is important but Posen’s real key to
success for the U.S. is control of the global commons.20 His is a more maritime, and maybe
cyber-, oriented strategy.21
In direct contrast to the offshore balancers, at least one author argues directly against it as
a strategy if not in favor of other specific approaches. Hal Brands, a strategist at the U.S. Army
War College, pointed out the limits to offshore balancing.22 His conclusion is that the concept of
offshore balancing is oversold on its potential benefits and its risks are understated. The telling
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point he makes about withdrawing from overseas locations and intervening only when critical
U.S. interests are at stake is that this will require significant air and maritime forces.23 And even
the “reduced” ground component would still require cutting edge (hence expensive) technologies
to be effective against threats.24 So, it would seem difficult to identify where the savings would
be realized. To amplify this point, the last time the U.S. applied offshore balancing, before the
Second World War, the lack of overseas bases or presence equated to extremely high physical
entry costs, in the form of amphibious assault, air, and maritime campaigns to gain access into
the geo-political theaters of that conflict. He goes on to note that while withdrawing U.S. forces
from overseas if often portrayed as “removing” these forces from the reach of terrorism, that
does not mean that terrorists will cease trying to attack U.S. military targets, it may actually
increase the likelihood of another terrorist attack on American soil.25 Now withdrawal to
balance offshore would get us “out of peoples’ faces” in places like Okinawa where the U.S. may
not be popular but in other locales the U.S. military population can be welcomed and certainly
the money they bring into foreign “garrison” towns is welcomed – if only in lamenting its
absence as some Bavarian locations have done since the Army garrison there drew down.26
All of these perspectives can be classified as realist or neo-realist in their orientation.
Harkening back to Hans Morgenthau, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, their conceptual
focus is on an anarchical global system where there is no overarching authority governing the
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relations between states.27 It is an international system ‘red of tooth and claw’ where only the
fittest and most powerful prosper and survive. Ultimately, international relations boils down to
relative strength and the competition is about maintaining a state’s relative power against the
most powerful or most dangerous (classical realist vs. neo-realist) potential foe. Balance of
power becomes the key to maintaining relative power relations in the realist theoretical construct
and offshore balancing just by its name highlights this focus. The notion of husbanding power
and resources by remaining disengaged and only intervening when critical national interests are
at stake is a rational course of action with more than a little appeal to isolationists, America
“firsters,” libertarians, and fiscal conservatives but as Brands pointed out, it can have some steep
costs and unanticipated consequences.
In contrast to the realists/neo-realists, another school of thought, much more along the
lines of the liberal or liberal-internationalists advocates for a more selective engaged grand
strategy with strong overtones of collective security. While he did not exactly address grand
strategy, Robert Keohane has persuasively and persistently provided analyses and arguments that
favor the role of the liberal world-order to include important and influential roles for
international institutions like the United Nations and the former Global Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) now known as the World Trade Organization (WTO).28 Joseph Nye is another
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scholar in this school who in fact wrote a book Power and Interdependence with Keohane.29
While not directly addressing grand strategy this book does serve to highlight the increasing
inter-connectedness of the global economy and global politics both of which call into question
one of the foundations of state grand strategies, specifically sovereignty. The author’s analysis
reveals a potential weakening of individual state powers which are becoming constrained by
interdependence among states and between states and international political and economic
institutions.30 If we try to frame their analysis and arguments in terms of U.S. grand strategy,
they would argue in favor of the liberal world order as established in the post-Second World War
by the U.S. and bolstered by the resurgent western European industrial democracies and Japan in
the years after 1950. This would be very much in opposition to offshore balancing because the
U.S. would have to remain engaged politically and though maybe a stretch theoretically, engaged
physically i.e. militarily with overseas allies and coalition members. One could characterize this
as the benevolent hegemon fostering free markets and democracy of one flavor or another across
the globe. John Ikenberry is another leading scholar in this theoretical school.31 In Liberal
Leviathan, he too makes an argument in favor of the benevolent hegemon but with a slightly
different spin. The hegemon both enforces the rules but as the global order is joined by more
and more states, the order itself constrains in some ways the hegemon creating trade space for
rule-making that may not directly benefit the leading state. While not intended to slight Messrs.
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Keohane and Ney, Ikenberry seems to have remained engaged in the on-going academic and
policy debate about the correct world order.32
There is also the constructivist school of international relations who have weighed in on
grand strategy albeit again not directly. As Alexander Wendt might point out, the very concept
of grand strategy, defining the resources or capabilities to deploy in support of it, and the threats
against which it is designed is very much a constructed dialogue.33 There is a lot of discussion
and dialogue that goes into the formulation and even the basic definition of grand strategy. And
especially in the American case there is a definite process if we can let the National Security
Strategy and National Military Strategy stand as proxies for the concept of grand strategy. While
this school of analysis tends to be focused on the state level, often national security and again by
proxy extension grand strategy, is not solely formulated within a given state. There are after all
the threat(s) against which the strategy is designed. There are also the allies, friends, and
neutrals that have some impact if not direct input into strategy formulation. While there does not
seem to be significant constructivist writing on the topic of grand strategy there is definitely a
place at the table for members of this school to analyze and discuss the topic to reveal concepts
and theory of both value and interest to the field of IR.34

THE RETURN OF GEO-POLITICS?
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The study of how geography impacts the foreign policies of states seems to have fallen
out of favor since the end of the Cold War. Other factors like demographics and economics
remained apparently valid factors for political science equations but standard geography had
fallen off of the table so to speak. Perhaps the bitter legacy of classical geopolitical theorists like
Mackinder, Haushofer, and Spykman as embraced by totalitarian regimes, notably the Nazis,
made geography a distasteful factor of consideration by scholars. The ideas of space, of
geography, and of physical position had fallen out of favor as significant factors in IR with the
growth of “globalization” and the shrinking of the world through the Internet and the rapidity of
modern communications. Giving rise to terms like “glocalization” and phrase like “distant
proximities,” globalization seemed to confirm the ‘end of history’ and a new homogenized,
conglomerated, flattened world.35 However, it would seem that the reports of the demise of the
old-world concept of geography and its impact on international politics were exaggerated or at
least a bit premature.
While he was not the first to begin resurrecting the idea of geopolitics Henry Kissinger’s
stature as a practitioner of geopolitics and diplomacy guaranteed that he would at least get a
hearing.36 Another noted commentator on international relations and foreign relations, Walter
Russell Mead, noted that the disappearance of old-fashioned geo-politics occurred only in the
minds of Western scholars and policy wonks. As he put it, Westerners enjoyed a “false sense of
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security” after the collapse of the Soviet Union.37 It seems that the critical school and its
adherents are also dis-interring geopolitics and maybe putting a Marxist or neo-Marxist spin on
them.38 While Klinke and his compatriots are not commenting directly on grand strategy, their
focus is mostly about the dialogue and relations between Russia and the European Union, this
literature is indicative of the re-emergence of geopolitics in a more traditional sense in scholarly
circles. A much more traditional piece on Russian grand strategy and geopolitics is from Milan
Vego of the Naval War College.39 He provides a detailed discussion of the specific steps,
policies, and political backing for the Russian regimes geopolitical focus and strategy. His
conclusion is that this iteration of Russian geopolitics is not the existential issue as it was under
the Soviet Regime but will cause tension between Russia and the West.40 A somewhat more
recent entry into the debate is from Stefan Auer who examines the role of geopolitics in the
Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine.41 While his theme is less focused on details and more on
actions than Vego, he is definitive in declaring that geopolitics as influenced by the Nazi
geopolitical theorist Carl Schmitt form an important part of the Russian government’s intent and
explain its actions towards Ukraine and internally for that matter.42
In a larger and longer discourse, and with a maybe surprising liberal flavor to some of his
specific policy recommendations, Thomas Barnett examined U.S. grand strategy from the
military’s perspective. In his book, The Pentagon’s New Map, Barrett argues for a bifurcated
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national security policy and/or grand strategy that treats member states of the “Core” differently
from those of the “Gap.”43 This is not unreasonable considering how the U.S. treats individual
states in the normal course of diplomatic and political relations; some states are more equal than
others, at least in the eyes of the U.S. His take on grand strategy focuses on the lack of economic
development and thus opportunities in the “Gap” mostly formerly third world countries clustered
in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. He argues that the lack of connectedness and the
lack of opportunities breed extremism and resentment against the “Core.” The “Core” is
represented above all else by the United States but includes Europe, Japan, China, and the
industrialized democracies of the world.
Another entry into the debate about geopolitics comes from a surprising source, a
European and in fact British scholar. James Rogers authored an Egmont Paper for the Royal
Institute for International Relations entitled “A New Geography of European Power?”44 His
discussion of the geopolitical and grand strategy interests of Europe and by extension the
European Union focuses on a ‘Grand Area’ approach aimed at a permanent European presence.45
The rationale is to avoid crisis management and instead practice a civil and military ‘forward
presence’ thus reducing the need for sporadic intervention.46 It sounds remarkably like the
underlying premise that has justified U.S. and especially U.S. Navy strategic force distributions
since the end of the Second World War. The two major differences from Barnett’s approach is
that Rogers does not divide the world into a core and a periphery but focuses his ‘Grand Area’
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around the Europe, North Africa, parts of West and East Africa, and the Middle East to the
borders with India, the central Asian petroleum sources (like Kazakhstan), and part of the
Indonesian archipelago. 47 The contrast with Barnett’s map of the “non-integrated gap” is
distinct if not striking. It may reflect a lower level of hubris, the EU is not concerned with the
entire globe, but it also may reflect a bit more concentrated thinking on those areas, resources,
and trade routes that really are crucial to the continued health and well-being of the EU’s
member states. It may also reflect an honest assessment of the reach and capabilities of the
military forces available to European states with which they can impact the ‘Grand Area.’ It
remains however very interesting that a graduate of Aberystwyth University and a practicing
scholar in the EU offered such a traditional study of geopolitics and the interest of the European
powers. It would be inferential and probably wrong to call his references to the “civilian power”
and the “passive” use of military power as window-dressing to appease other European scholars
but there is a distinctly traditional, maybe even old-school imperialist flavor to his analysis.

CONSTRUCTIVIST GRAND STRATEGY
With more than a passing respectful nod to the constructivist school of international
relations, we can easily see that grand strategy can be defined as a mutually constructed
discussion or idea. It changes based not only of the international system of relative power but
also on how the states, governments, and individual people involved in grand strategy at the subsystemic or national level change. “The grand strategy of the Soviet Union was…” or “the grand
strategy of the United States under [insert presidential administration here] is…” are example of
how at least recently some scholars and writers have framed the issue of grand strategy.
Scholars can trace changes in the grand strategies of individual states and even governments
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based on the identity of those Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo members
who showed up atop Lenin’s Tomb indicating who was in or out of power or as various national
security experts in U.S. administrations have come and gone since the 1950s.
Paul Kennedy cites B.H. Liddell-Hart as a significant strategist in the pantheon of
strategic thinkers and points out how Liddell-Hart’s vision or concept of strategy was
constructed.48 His concept was based partially on his First World War experiences in France and
partially on his post-war researches into the “British way of war.” While Liddell-Hart settled on
what in the military sense is basically a tactical, maybe operational level concept, the indirect
approach,49 his was a constructed vision likely informed and influenced by post-war writers like
Jellicoe, Haig, and Churchill and his fellow military theorists like Douhet and J.F.C. Fuller. This
is admittedly a hypothetical postulation, but it is very doubtful that Liddell-Hart conceived of the
indirect approach and the British way of war totally out of whole cloth like some Athena newsprung from his Zeus-like head.
On a slightly different note, there is a lively discussion among constructivist and/or postmodern geographers that has some bearing if only tangentially to the idea of grand strategy. The
discussion is generally focused on the nature of identities and how both state and individual
identities are constructed. In a guest editorial in Political Geography, Nick Megoran points out
that geographers need to re-engage with political scientist and IR scholars regarding the revival
of geopolitics or what he terms “neo-classical geopolitics.”50 This fits in with the previous
discussion regarding geopolitics and at least one aspect of grand strategy as a broader concept.
This is also true of a piece by Thomas Diez where he discusses the idea of the “other” based on
48
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Frantz Fanon’s pioneering work51 and the role “otherness” plays in the development of EU
integration.52 The linkage here is that the revival of geopolitics is making the development of a
European identity more challenging which in turn makes the development of a coherent EU
grand strategy that much more difficult. The last constructivist works to address look at the roles
of individuals, in keeping with original research intent of this dissertation but focusing on how
their identities and roles are constructed and not on their individual impact on grand strategy.
The first article by Edward Lock investigates ‘strategic culture’ and looks at how strategic
culture impacts behavior, by states and individuals within the process. It also examines how
strategic behavior shapes the identity of the actor who engages in this behavior.53 The
application of this sort of analysis could represent another opportunity to look inside the “black
box” of grand strategy and understand who and how it is created for a given state. The last article
by Merje Kuus looks at the role of intellectuals in the “production of geopolitical discourses.”54
He looks at how intellectuals as individuals contribute to foreign policy discourse and how these
in turn, reflect a certain culturally concept and indemnity. As with Lock’s analysis this
potentially allows scholars to examine the role of the individual in the development and
implementation of grand strategy for a given states.
The challenge with the constructivist, post-modern, or critical schools is that much of the
dialogues as evidenced above are very much sub-systemic and even sub-state level in their
studies. Again, there is value in examining the role of the individual or state and how the
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identity of the individual or state are developed through dialogues, cultural perceptions, social or
organizational mores but it remains related to grand strategy at several removes from the
overarching concept and the broader nature of grand strategy. In some ways, one is forced to
tease out nuances and details in order to effectively apply a constructivist analysis to grand
strategy. There is however a very interesting case study to do by applying constructivist
approaches; the development of nuclear strategy as it relates to the U.S. and USSR in the 1960s
and 1970s. Looking at how each state’s identify was constructed by interactions between them,
between them and their allies, and within each state could offer some great insights into strategic
development and strategic planning. Examining how dialogue and identities affected the arms
control negotiations or just how did the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) develop
and how did it come to be a shared idea? These are some interesting questions that constructivist
scholars could successfully engage with the tools and analytic framework of their school.

NAVAL STRATEGY
Though it might be best termed a sub-set of grand strategy, the final section of this
literature review will look at the naval or maritime strategy. This is in keeping with the ultimate
focus on a naval platform and how it fits into strategic planning and execution at several levels
that may or may not have informed and influenced grand strategy. While historical writers like
Mahan, Corbett, and Gorshkov55 remain influential, more recent scholars like Norman Friedman,
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Geoffrey Till, and John Hattendorf have made significant contributions to the field.56 Much of
the specific U.S. Navy strategic documents will be addressed in Chapter Three where we
examine the strategic landscape that drove the Navy towards the concept of LCS. There are
however two more recent debates that are of interest and provide insights into the on-going
debate about naval power and its role in grand strategy.
The first of these debates was born in the ashes of the Cold War and addresses the
question of the venue in which the U.S. Navy is most likely to fight. The demise of the Soviet
Navy and the apparent rise in failed states seemed to indicate that the Navy would be mostly
employed in the coastal waters and maritime chokepoints of the world as opposed to fighting a
fleet on fleet engagement in the blue waters of the open oceans. Steven Kosiak, Andrew
Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, writing for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessment (CSBA) argued that the Navy should re-orient away from forward presence
operations in the Mediterranean and instead focus more on the Persian Gulf, South and East
Asia.57 As Frank Hoffman writing in Naval Institute’s Proceedings points out however, the
authors’ focus on transformation as a key to continuing over-match and reducing force structure
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in view of increasing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) are potential points of critical failure. 58
Another set of entrants into the debate focused on the changing nature of warfare and the
increase threat that this change, called swarming, represented to conventional forces especially in
the littorals.59 Both John Arquilla and Sean Edwards focused on the impact of an apparently
disorganized group or ‘swarm’ attacking from various directions against a traditional, linearoriented foe. 60 There has not been much refuting of this definition of the threat or how
dangerous it is. In fact, this writer worked on and reviewed several classified U.S. Navy tactical
studies to address this threat as recently as 2013. The interest and research into swarming and
countering it continues.61 The challenge in focusing on swarming though is that it tends to focus
on one or two geographic areas and one or two potential foes. The main geographic areas are the
Persia Gulf and somewhat more specifically the Strait of Hormuz, and the other geographic
region from the Navy’s perspective is the South China Sea. The two states of interest are Iran
and the People’s Republic of China both of whom maintain large numbers of relatively well
armed small ships and boats.62 These surface craft are capable of conducting swarming attacks
on U.S. surface combatants like the LCS and thus the swarming threat in the littoral still obtains.
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This leads us into the second part of this debate, where will the Navy fight? As
mentioned above, the focus on the littoral regions of the world started after 1991 and really came
into focus in the early 2000s. However, neither the Navy nor other interested parties have
totally abandoned the high seas as a focal point for future combat. The first entry into this side
of the debate could be Bernard Cole’s The Great Wall at Sea from 2001.63 This book serves to
portray the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as a soon to be ‘near peer competitor’ and
provided some fuel for stoking the furnaces of a return to the “War at Sea” (WAS).64 It was
included in the Chief of Naval Operations’ reading list published by the Navy Times in 2012,65
not that we ought to read too much into that. However, the term near-peer competitor has been
surface in the defense establishment in the U.S. and certainly among naval officers and writers
regularly over the last ten years.66 While some of the authors are dismissive of the role of China
or even Russia as a near-peer competitor in the maritime sphere and often dismiss this ideational
effort as no more than a quest to justify funding the fact that the term is even used by its
detractors provides some legitimacy and longevity to the idea. This writer has from personal
experience working at both the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and U.S. Fleet
Forces Command (USFF) heard a lot of nostalgia for the Soviet Union and statements regarding
the threat from a mildly resurgent Russian Navy.67 The same holds true with regards to
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individual opinions of uniformed, civil service, and retired military personnel regarding the
PLAN. This shows that the debate is going on at the individual level in the service and that there
is a certain prejudice against operating on the edges and a desire to get back to fleet on fleet
engagements.68
This provides a perfect segue into the next debate about maritime strategy, which is what
are we going to fight with, which for the purposes of this dissertation will focus on the number
and the types of ships that the Navy should buy. Where the Navy expects to fight is critical to
this debate because different geographic and different physical environments require different
capabilities from surface ships. An open ocean fight against the PLAN will require different
platforms, weapons, and sensors than a littoral ’knife fight’ in the strait of Hormuz against the
Iranian Navy or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. In trying to answer the question
of what we are going to fight with the Navy commissioned several comparative studies in 2016
to examine the question.69

THE FUTURE FLEET PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE STUDIES
The Navy first conducted an internal Force Structure Analysis as sort of an entering
argument for the congressionally directed Future Fleet Architecture studies. The Navy
determined that it would require 355 ships with one additional aircraft carrier, 20 additional large
surface combatants i.e. not LCS, the same number of LCS ships (52), more attack submarines
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and amphibious ships.70 In short, the same stuff only more of it. This is not meant to be critical,
the Navy planners’ charter was not to reinvent the fleet but to determine the type and number of
platforms required to meet the Navy’s operational needs based on Geographic Combatant
Commander (GCC) plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Navy then proceeded
to craft the first of the entries into the Future Fleet Architecture studies with mission guidance:
“This dedicated, Navy Project Team was given guidance and wide latitude to develop an analysis that was
a distinct excursion not constrained by current Navy submissions. As such, the Project Team study does not
represent any official Navy position, but just another independent approach to the problem.”71

This is important to note, foreshadowing the discussion regarding Allison’s models and the issue
of bureaucratic politics, because the writing team was composed mostly of senior civil servants
and only two uniformed officers. Regardless of the composition of the concept development
team, they are all in one form or another beholden to their parent organization plus the
subordinate organizations for which they work. This was going to create some inherent bias and
preferences in whatever assessment they produced.
The Navy entry into the future fleet design focused on a networked based capability or
what they termed the ‘Distributed Fleet.’ This is in keeping with the Navy’s tactical thought
over the last two decades and owes much to Captain (ret.) Wayne Hughes who wrote a key work
of fleet tactics in the mid-1980s and to Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski who first introduced the
term ‘network-centric warfare’ to the Navy.72 The Navy group focused on five main mission
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areas including building security globally, establishing sea control, and projecting power.73 The
first mission description term is significant because ‘building security globally’ is so broad that it
can be meant to describe everything from security cooperation events with friendly countries to
forward deployment presence operations to launch land attack missiles. It is almost meaningless
because it is so broad, but it also allows the Navy to include the littorals and open ocean as
potential areas of conflict. Sea control on the other hand at least is very much a disputed term
among naval theorists, it is ill-defined and can be used for everything from undisputed control of
the open ocean to convoying merchant ships in the Persian Gulf. However, it is significant
because, in its traditional usage, sea control was applied to the struggle between surface fleets,
notably the Royal Navy and Hochseeflotte in the First World War. It was also a standard
operational and tactical term used by the Navy in the 1970s and 1980s in the face of the growing
threat from Soviet naval power. Thus, it could be indicative of the Navy’s continuing bias in
favor of blue water battles versus mucking about in the shallows of the littoral regions of the
world. Projecting power is significant because it represents a continuation of the Navy’s basic
deployment strategy in place since about 1950.74 In order to project power ships need to be
operating forward, or projecting from the continental U.S. (CONUS). This mission description
serves to confirm the way that the Navy has been operating and intends to continue operating.
The Navy’s report also mentioned that for the first time in 25 years there is a competition
for maritime superiority with the rise of Russian and Chinese naval power.75 This is another
allusion to the blue water challenge and again may be reflective of this persistent prejudice in the
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Navy. This sets the stage for what might constitute a surprising recommendation from the Navy
regarding the required platforms for a new fleet architecture. The Navy recommended a fleet
comprise of 457 ships which is no surprise but among those would be “136 large unmanned
vehicles.”76 That is somewhat surprising in view of the Navy’s continued commitment to
manned platforms especially air and surface as its core weapons platforms. However, this is
actually very much in keeping with the intent of the LCS concept both in terms of maximizing
the number of hulls or platforms available and in trying to reduce one of the most significant
costs in surface ships, the cost of the crew.77 As one writer put it, the Navy went with “Robot PT
Boats & LCS.”78 That brings up the last point to make, this Navy report did not recommend
deleting the LCS procurement. This is one of the significant differences between this group’s
recommendation and the competing reports.
The second fleet architecture study was authored by the CSBA and while the authors are
not academic in the traditional sense, they are experienced professional analysts, and several are
Navy veterans who have held command at sea.79 This provides some justification for their bona
fides as subject matter experts and some of the potential outlooks that are reflected in this report.
Unlike the Navy report, the CSBA authors focus on changing the fleet composition and assigned
missions as opposed to focusing on a networked system of platforms as a major discriminator for
their architecture. They present a force that is divided mirroring Barnett’s division between
constabulary forces for counter-insurgency and stability operations and the more traditional
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conventional units for force on force combat.80 The authors would divide the fleet into
“Deterrence Forces” focused on specific regions and a “Maneuver Force” of Carrier Strike
Groups (CSG) assigned to the Indian/Pacific Ocean region.81 They also focus more or at least
mention more often the rising near-peer competitors and their potential impact on naval
operations in the future.82
The force mix that the CSBA authors provide is not much different from the Navy
version except in terms of total numbers. They estimate a total of 382 ships (vice 457) and about
94 unmanned platforms (vice 136 large unmanned platforms). They also address Maritime
Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) and unmanned aerial platforms whereas the Navy
report did not. The CSBA group would cease production of the LCS class and push forward and
maybe accelerate the Navy’s intention to procure more capable frigates (FF) in place of the last
ten to twelve LCS platforms.83 Another rather significant difference is that this report
recommends acquiring ‘patrol vessels’ optimized for Surface Warfare (SUW) and strike
warfare.84 These are the most significant differences between the Navy’s recommended approach
and that of the CSBA authors.
The last report came from the MITRE Corporation and provides no authorship
information.85 This is in keeping with MITRE’s tradition and general philosophy as sort of a
neutral or objective participant in providing consulting and analytical service to federal
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customers, but it makes it more challenging to identify potential bias or preconceptions that may
have influenced this report. There is however the fact that MITRE was already contracted with
OPNAV N81 (Chief of Naval Operations Director of Assessment Division) and this report was
produced as a task or project order on a 2010 award, so we can postulate that there is an existing
relationship with this customer and thus some influence on the writers from that quarter. Like
the Navy and CSBA reports, MITRE does not recommend significant changes in the types of
platforms and looks for increased effectiveness through new weapons and sensor systems and
increased use of unmanned platforms.86 There is mention of Russia and China but also of Iran
and North Korea, and in general MITRE’s contribution is focused on both force on force
maritime warfare and operations in the littoral. There may be some bias in favor of fleet
engagements based on the warfare areas that MITRE focuses on, specifically A2AD and
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) but it is no more and no less than the other two
reports.87 Here again, it would appear that ‘Big Navy’ equities and interest may have informed
and influenced the writing team.
The force mix of 414 ships is not as large as the Navy’s but larger than the CSBA (382)
version. There is however, no apparent break-out of unmanned platforms in the force structure
referenced in the MITRE report and the report categorically states that MITRE does not
recommend the force mix of 414 ships because it is not affordable.88 Significantly, MITRE also
recommends shutting down production of the LCS and re-programming that funding to purchase
one additional ARLEIGH BURKE class guided missile destroyer per year.89 The other
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significant difference between MITRE’s report and the other two is that MITRE recommends
several additional types of manned surface and sub-surface platforms including an ‘arsenal ship’
and diesel vice nuclear powered submarines. They also recommend modifications to existing
ship class designs for aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships to decrease costs while
adding additional capabilities to these platforms.90 This focus on manned surface platforms and
adjusting current designs and intended acquisitions are the most notable differences between the
MITRE report and those from the Navy and CSBA.

CONCLUSION
The literature on grand strategy covers a broad swath of IR scholarship and ranges from
the extreme heights of theory to the individual level of identities and dialogues. Some of the
works discussed above, notably the future fleet architecture studies do not fit neatly into
scholarly definitions. They are however, still pertinent based both on the intent of looking at
how and why some of the physical tools of grand strategy are purchased and on the intent to
highlight the intellectual effort, if not traditionally academic that goes into examining policy and
into analyzing questions of national security. This is by no means a comprehensive review of the
literature and scholars who address strategy, but it should suffice to frame the examination of
U.S. national security, naval policy, and naval acquisition that is the focus of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION SYSTEM
This chapter is to provide an analytical framework or structure for understanding how the
U.S. government procures public goods in the national defense market. It looks at the nature of
the defense market in the U.S., several of the key higher-level acquisition documents, and
provides a truncated and simplified description of a Request for Proposal (RFP) process for a
MDAP. While some researchers have recommended that models of military expenditure need to
incorporate a specific role for the behavior of agents in the political market,91 this chapter seeks
to describe the defense market writ large while subsequent chapters will examine the role of
bureaucratic agents at the sub-systemic and even sub-national level, specifically examining the
role of bureaucratic and individual agents in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Department of the Navy (DON).

THE U.S. DEFENSE “MARKET”
If we try to frame the U.S. defense market in terms of classical economics, we ought to
start by defining the goods that are traded in this market.92 Specifically, the good that is
exchanged is national defense and it is classified as a public good. This is a good that is both
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from using
the good and where use by one individual does not reduce availability or utility to others.93
Economists use the term “non-excludable” when defining a public good. This means that
national defense is not a zero-sum game for the consumers, theoretically. However, unlike a
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traditional supply versus demand market where production efficiencies and/or competitive
advantage lead to some suppliers gaining market share based on price differentiation, meaning
their costs are lower in turn leading to lower prices for the consumer and increased purchases by
the consumer, this is not true in the U.S. national defense market. This market is a distorted one
with most of the distortion caused by endogenous vice exogenous factors. By this, we mean that
the importance or value of a factor is determined by the importance of other factors within the
system. The factors that create distortions in military procurement are most often internal to the
acquisition process (if we widen the definition beyond just the DoD officially delineated process)
or at least internal to the U.S. vice created by external factors, like other states or the
international economic or political structure. One of the specific factors that create significant
distortion is the fact that this is a market consisting of small numbers of producers and in effect
one consumer. For commercial products like beer, cars, or large-screen televisions, private
markets of specific consumers e.g. private individuals or a hotel chain, will represent a set of
prices for those products that can be estimated with some degree of accuracy. 94 For example,
market research can identify the number of consumers with sufficient income in a geographic
area or region who might possibly afford and also be interested in say a $85,000 European sport
sedan. This enables suppliers to estimate the size and composition of a market into which they
may want to sell. The national defense market is harder to predict and often less flexible in its
demand. A further complication or wrinkle in the actuality of the defense market is that
commercial markets also offer a yardstick for measuring a firm’s performance in that market.
This is not necessarily so in the market for defense goods.95
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The idea that the U.S. defense market is distorted or warped may cause some raised
eyebrows considering that the amounts of money involved are by no means small but when we
stop to consider the number of systems, suppliers, and customers we find that they are all very,
very small. There is really only one main consumer of national defense, the U.S. federal
government in the form of the executive agency known as the Department of Defense (DoD).
There are for major weapons systems96 a limited number of large commercial companies capable
of providing these large, complex, and often expensive systems to the DoD. And as in the UK or
France, the government has created barriers to entry in order to protect existing, domestic firms
especially from foreign competitors.97 While it is beyond the intended scope of this work to
examine the protection of what the U.S. government calls the defense industrial base,98 we ought
to bear in mind the significant impact of what could be termed protectionist policies on the U.S.
defense market, despite the inroads that firms like British Aerospace and Engineering (BAE) or
Oto-Melara have made over the last three to four decades. The market is consciously and
actively biased and warped in favor of American firms by intentional government policies.
While most readers are likely familiar with the term monopoly, where there is only one
producer of a good who can therefore set the price for that good, monopsony is less well known.
Monopsony is almost the exact opposite of monopoly where there is only one buyer in a market
but more than one producer of a good or service. This results in the monopsonistic buyer
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theoretically being able to set prices. In many ways this is very much the definition of the role
that the U.S. government plays in the acquisition of the public good of national defense. Often in
federal purchasing, most notably for large and complex weapons systems, the federal
government and more specifically the Department of Defense is the sole buyer. This may be
because no other entity has a need or demand for this national security good or because other
entities are legally prohibited from purchasing the good. The Department of Homeland Security
is an exception as are potential overseas purchasers (via the Foreign Military Sales [FMS]
program) but one would not expect the Department of the Interior to purchase jet fighter aircraft
or Health & Human Services to buy an aircraft carrier or ballistic missile submarine. Likewise,
the average citizen does not need and is in fact not allowed to purchase artillery pieces or
strategic bomber aircraft.
Another unique factor that significantly shapes the market for defense goods is the
existence of mutual dependencies between buyers and suppliers. With one overwhelmingly
positioned buyer and relatively few suppliers, the market cannot effectively determine prices and
create ‘efficiencies’ through competition. However, the DoD is often reluctant or restrained
from taking the best prices that it can get because in doing so, the sellers could be driven out of
business. This presents a dilemma for the federal government because if enough companies
decide to exit the weapons systems market supply-side the government will have to produce
these goods themselves. This has often proved inefficient in the past and would likely prove to
be unpopular among those citizens who lose their positions to government workers and stockholders who lose their investments in commercial companies. There is also a policy issue at
stake in driving commercial entities out of the defense business; since at least the Truman
administration, the U.S. government has sought to satisfy its goods and services needs by
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leveraging the traditional free market process, seeking out the ‘best’ price for the desired quality
of good. Forcing all defense production into state-run enterprises would equate to an
abandonment of this long-standing federal policy which has remained consistent regardless of
the political party in power at any given time.99 It could also require the government to devote
even more resources to creating the public good of national defense, further straining the fiscal
and physical resources available to both the government and to the national economy. At least in
the short run, developing a governmental defense industrial base of the size required would
divert significant public and potentially private investment into support this development thus
removing that capital from investment opportunities in both the public and likely in the private
sectors of the economy. To an extent, the government is hostage to the continued existence of
those commercial companies who are willing and able to provide major weapons systems.
Without suppliers willing to work with the government, and often willing to accept lower Return
on Investment (ROI),100 the government would be forced to either produce the goods itself or
purchase from foreign suppliers, a course of action certain to be rejected by various domestic
interests in the U.S.
The limited customer base in the U.S. defense market results in the government enjoying
a monopsonist position in the market. Most of the literature in the acquisition community
addresses the monopsonist pricing power of the government.101 But in some cases, there are
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counter-balancing factors that prevent the government from fully leveraging its monopsonist
power. Without distracting from the main intent of looking at LCS acquisition, there is some
value in taking a short look at some of the literature addressing monopsony issues in government
procurement. One of the better pieces is an article from Walter Adams and William James
Adams, entitled “The Military-Industrial Complex: A Market Structure Analysis.” The reason
this article is valuable because the authors’ postulate a market composed on the monopsonist and
a group of oligopolistic vendors.102 The UK’s defence market has been characterized as one of
“selective competition resembl[ing] oligopoly with entry restrictions.”103 This is in fact a very
accurate description of what the U.S. defense market and DoD’s acquisition process, especially
for major weapons systems is like. The DoD is in effect a monopsonist buyer, despite as
mentioned earlier some potential FMS customers, and the suppliers resemble oligopolistic
market entities. An oligopoly is akin to a monopoly except rather than one firm dominating the
market thus setting prices, a more limited number; often two or three firms dominate the
market.104 In James Hasik’s “Better Buying Power or Better Off Not?” he cites a report
authored under the chairmanship of then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter addressing the government’s monopsony buying power.
He notes that Carter in effect asked why the U.S. government, as the largest buyer by far of
weapons worldwide, and the monopsony buyer in the largest market, did not have more power in
pricing its purchases.105 Hasik goes on to discuss the issue of government purchases of the
technical data rights for systems as his main topic but he also notes that in many ways the
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relationship between the government and some of its suppliers resembles more of a bi-lateral
monopoly versus a purely monopsonist to market (or supplier) relationship.106 Here again, we
can see a relationship that appears close to a monopsony purchaser and oligopolistic set of
sellers.
Daniel Day in his paper “The Limits of Monopsony Pricing Power in the Markets for
Defense Goods,” while accepting the apparent monopsony power of the government also
presents several reasons why the government does not enjoy pure monopsony power. He
assumes the government position as monopsonistic but also provides several strong examples of
how and why this power is eroded by external and internal factors. For some purchases, the
government is in fact not the only purchaser,107 fuel is a particularly appropriate example
commodity of which DoD buys a lot and must compete on the open market for pricing. This
open market is a global one and despite the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) is still one mostly driven by classical supply and demand. Day further points
out that while the DoD can force prices down on other products that it is indeed the sole or major
purchaser of, the department must also allow some price and profit incentive in order to keep its
suppliers in business and providing the needed products and services.108 He also addresses the
role of politics in DoD purchasing and its impact on diminishing DoD monopsony power.109
And finally, Day also acknowledges the oligopolistic power of major defense suppliers,
specifically addressing the United Launch Alliance between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which
mitigated the government’s ability to dictate supplier pricing.110 As other scholars have, he
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accepts that the U.S. government is a monopsonistic entity in terms of purchasing the public
good of national defense but he also points out several factors that contribute to diminishing this
power.

THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) VERSION
While the UK’s defense market has gone through many of the same consolidation and
limited growth challenges as defense firms in the U.S has since the early 1990s it remains both a
distinct national and international market that mirrors the defense market in the U.S. fairly
closely. While it may not remain as true as it was two decades ago, it is likely that a number of
UK high technology companies can be characterized as domestic monopolies, specifically
aircraft, helicopters, missiles, nuclear powered submarines, tanks, and torpedoes.111 There was
and is to an extent, an absence of rivalry or competition, especially within the UK while certainly
not within the EU or globally. By way of proof, there are reported examples of UK Ministry of
Defence (MOD) procurements where competitive bidding has resulted in cost savings to the
British Crown ranging from 10 to 70 percent.112 This level of cost saving could be interpreted as
indicative of monopoly pricing, inefficiencies in the UK defence market, or a market that
parallels the monopsony prevalent in the U.S. defense market. Traditional economic theory
would expect or potentially predict that the MOD and the armed forces would substitute
relatively cheap for more expensive weapons systems in order to make their pound go further.113
However, often the MOD like the U.S. DoD will select the more expensive option, sometimes
based on the more effective capabilities the chosen system offers but sometimes based on other
reasons. These factors must by their very nature include potential enemies and current allies as
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well as arms races, actual conflicts in progress, new technologies and the Exchequer’s or
Treasury’s capability to pay for the weapons systems.114 So in the case of the UK, we have
indications of the purchaser of national defense (or defence) goods as another monopsonist but
we also find some mitigating or variable factors that may impact or influence purchasing
decisions. What is true for the UK is likely to a lesser or greater extent to hold true for the U.S.
not because of the so-called special relationship but because of relative similarities (government
form, alliances, etc.) between these two states. So, monopsony may rule so to speak but it may
also not be an absolute ruler.
In short, the U.S. government does bear a striking resemblance to a monopsonistic buyer
as described in economics theory. However, often this role as the sole purchaser is off-set or
blunted by the sellers’ strengths as oligopolistic firms, with limited numbers being able to supply
the require goods and sometimes services. However, there are several other factors including
regional issues, economic policies, and legislative interest that have significant impact on the
government’s purchasing and pricing decisions. Not to mention the impact of imposed rules like
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS). These
rules, as we will see in the discussion of the DoD DAS, act as sort of pseudo-market drivers.
The intent is to level the playing field and to artificially force suppliers to adjust their pricing and
quality as if there were competing buyers, at least for major weapons systems. So in effect, the
government works in many ways to force itself out of a monopsonistic position in the hopes of
getting better pricing through competition vice using its inherent market strength to dictate
specific ‘better’ pricing.115 One might think that the government and DoD would use its power
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to the utmost in order to drive prices down and save money but as several authors have noted, if
prices are too low, suppliers will lose money and thus exit the defense market – leaving the
government without commercial suppliers to meet its national defense needs. This is viewed by
almost everyone in the government-side of acquisition as a less than optimal choice. This
obviously holds true on the commercial-side of acquisition as well.

THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION PROCESS116

Figure 1- Simplified Notional Acquisition Process

(monopoly) would result in a better pricing situation for both parties vice competitive suppliers in relation to sole
purchasers and competitive buyers versus one supplier. By extension, this would appear to support the aggregation
of DoD major systems suppliers; fewer suppliers equals better pricing for the monopsonist and the suppliers.
116
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The federal procurement system as practiced by the U.S. government and especially the
DoD is a complex one designed to reduce or remove favoritism or bias in selecting goods and
services that the government purchases. See the preceding figure (Figure 1) for a highly
simplified version of the Defense Acquisition process. From the contractor’s point of view, it is
governed by two major sets of rules, the FAR and the DFARS. However, these two documents
are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the rules, regulations, and statutory documents that
govern how the DoD procures weapons systems and in fact everything else that it buys. This
section will examine in some depth the governing DoD and Department of the Navy (DON)
instructions on major acquisition of systems (equipment) and services.
One of the other key governing documents is the National Defense Annual Authorization
(NDAA). This is basically the DoD’s annual budget as promulgated by Congress. It often
directs changes to the FAR and/or DFARS, directs contract awards of a certain size to firms of a
certain type, and basically provides a lot of prescriptive guidance on how procurement ought to
proceed under that Fiscal Year’s (FY) budget authority. This is Congress’ opportunity to exert
its power of the purse over the executive branch of government. The challenge of the NDAA is
that because it is an annual document it changes and can do so significantly from year to year.
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Figure 2- DAU Depiction of the Relationship between DAS, PPBE, & JCIDS

The Defense Acquisition University presents the acquisition system as a series of three
interlocking rings, representing the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS),
the DAS, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and their
interaction (see Figure 2 above).117 As the DAU website puts it; “DoD has three principal
decision-making support systems. Together, the systems provide an integrated approach to
strategic planning, capabilities needs assessment, systems acquisition, and program and budget
development.” This is actually a very important concept to grasp, there are three key factors that
DoD considers in purchasing major weapons systems, the requirement or threat (strategic
planning), if the capability is really needed to fulfill the requirement or respond to the threat
(capabilities), and can we afford it (PPBE) or do we settle for half loaf as better than none? This
is a very close parallel to the concept of ways, means, and ends. There is a desired end and there
are certain ways and means to get there – but what is the best of these or the best combination of
these ways and means? Identifying the ends and the ways they may be achieved determines the
117
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means required (although in short-term strategies or crisis planning, the means currently
available may determine the ways and ends).118 The other key item of interest in looking at the
overarching system of DoD procurement is that inputs from outside the system – near-peer
competitors, strategic non-state threats, and environmental issues – are critical input variables
that go into the equation of defense procurement. This is akin to the old adage that “the enemy
gets a vote.”
For the purposes of this study and brevity, we will focus on the DAS and while not
ignoring the impact or importance of the other two systems, avoid going into depth about them in
relation to the LCS procurement. The DAS is the more important of the three interlocking
systems in acquisition as a topic of discussion for the purpose of this study.
The notional system begins with the definition of a requirement, often by a specific
service, say the Navy for example, that is needed in order to accomplish the assigned missions,
tasks, and functions that the service is required to perform. Once this requirement is defined by a
service or joint entity, it is presented to the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for
vetting, review and approval or disapproval. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) is the process used by the JROC to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), including but not limited to identifying, assessing,
validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements.119 JCIDS ultimately informs
much of the system development and procurement process from requirements acceptance
through the DAS and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) where
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money is actually allotted to the services and other DoD entities (Combatant Commanders,
Combat Service Agencies, Joint Staff, etc.).120

Figure 3- The Interaction between Capabilities Requirements and Acquisition Process121

Using Figure 3 above, let us examine the notional flow from capabilities requirements
definition – “We need something” to acquisition – “We are buying something that we need.” The
initial capabilities document serves to both define the need and provide the justification for it
being a needed capability for one of the (in our case) military departments. Some recent
examples that serve to illustrate this are; a new air-superiority fighter, the F-22 for the US Air
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Force, a mine- and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) vehicle, the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and a new surface combatant, the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for the U.S. Navy. If this capability document is reviewed and
accepted by the JROC, then a Material Development Decision (MDD) must be made. At this
point there has been a decision made that a new product or system is indeed justified and needed
and the lead service or Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must analyze the alternative
solution(s) available. This pushes the acquisition program in the system into the Material
Solution Analysis Phase. The outcome of this is a review of the Analysis of Alternative (AoA)
by the requirements authority, which varies with the size (cost) and nature (for example some
DoD Information Technology programs are the purview of a Defense Acquisition Executives,
generally a senior Deputy or Under-Secretary of Defense vice a military officer). The outcome
of this step is the drafting of a Capabilities Development Document and the first milestone in the
acquisition process commonly referred to as Milestone A.
Milestone A, or the Risk Reduction Decision, is an actual decision to procure something
to fulfill a capabilities requirement. It is a decision by the DoD or service to invest in developing
a specific product or design concept. The intent is to commit the resources, generally funding, to
mature a technology and/or reduce the risks inherent in a new technology before further
resources are committed that would lead to the production and fielding of a system.122 The
bottom line here is that the procuring agency or department needs to make a decision that
something like the electro-magnetic rail-gun the Navy has been developing for the last five to ten
years is effective enough and sufficient ‘bugs’ have been worked out of the technology that
paying a company to set up a production line, provide a prototype able to function at sea, and
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then being producing sufficient numbers to fit on Navy ships is a reasonable commitment of the
Navy’s limited resources. Or in our specific case study, that the concept of the LCS would
provide the mission effectiveness and system reliability that the Navy needs for the next 20-30
years.
If a system passes Milestone A, it proceeds into the Technology Maturation and Risk
Reduction phase. Here the service seeks to improve the selected technology or develop it so that
potential failures are minimized. There is another phase of Capability Development
documentation because the requirements may have changed during the intervening period of
maturation. As the instruction states: “Capability requirements are not expected to be static
during the product life cycle.”123 We shall see just how important this specific statement in the
road to IOC for LCS. The world situation, new technologies, emerging threats, and budgets all
play a part in the definition of required capabilities and the acquisition professionals need some
way to adjust system and design acquisition to address these changes. The DoD employs what it
calls Configuration Steering Boards (CSB), to periodically review acquisition programs and
adjust or even out-right recommend cancellation based on the capability requirements at that
time. For example, the Army’s self-propelled artillery system “Crusader” was cancelled with the
end of the Cold War and the reduced call for large caliber, mobile tube artillery.124
At some point in the technology maturation and Risk reduction process, DoD begins to
shift into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition.
This is when DoD actually commits to building and putting into service a system, aircraft, or
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ship and it entails three major decision points. The first of these is the Requirements Decision
Point or Capability Development Document (CDD). There is where major cost versus
performance trade-offs have been completed and enough risk mitigation done to commit to the
set of requirements that will apply to the initial design, development, and production of a system.
This means that the Navy has determined that 42 ships with a certain speed, weapons systems,
and endurance are preferable in terms of cost versus 20 ships with half the speed, more systems,
and longer endurance, again if we apply our specific case study, the LCS. Bear in mind, that the
cost is not just the procurement cost per unit but the entire cost of the system (people to run it,
training the same, spare parts, system upgrades, even disposal costs) over the entire life-span of
that system. In the Navy’s case, as evidenced by the very recent retirement of USS
ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) a life-span can last almost a half-century – and in her specific case
much longer in view of the eight nuclear reactors that were installed and still require disposal at
the time of this writing (June 2014).
The second major decision point in the EMD phase is where industry really starts to get
interested because it leads to the government soliciting a proposed solution from commercial
companies. This is the Develop Request for Proposal(s) (RFP) Release Decision Point.125 At
this point, DoD decides whether or not a vendor, more often than not a commercial company,
can provide a capable system to meet the requirement(s) as defined by the government. For
LCS, the requirement addressed ship size (tonnage and dimensions), crew, weapons systems,
engineering systems, sea-keeping (how well the ship was supposed to handle rough seas and
winds), maintenance, durability, speed, and endurance (either in range or days at sea). With the
required performance parameters provided by the government, the bidders are expected to
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provide a design that fulfills all of the required metrics of performance and present the
anticipated cost for them to design and build this system.

THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP) AND AWARD
The final decision point in the EMD stage is DoD’s Milestone B, or the decision to
actually award a contract to a bidder who best satisfies the stated requirement(s). The
government has several options in awarding a contract, especially for a major weapons system
like a ship or aircraft. The simplest procurement selection process is called LPTA or “Lowest
Price, Technically Acceptable.” In effect, if the offered solution is “good enough” and cheaper
than the other offerors, that bidder is awarded a contract. This is however, not the preferred
solution in the case of major systems because of the complexity and overall cost of the system.
The other option labeled ‘quality trade-off’ is the preferred one for complex procurements like
the F-22 or the LCS. In this process, the government assesses the quality or value of the offered
solution in comparison to the cost of the unit or whole series procurement. Again because of the
size and scope of major weapons systems acquisitions this is the preferred and generally most
appropriate source selection criteria to use. One generally wants to avoid buying anything,
especially multi-million or multi-billion-dollar weapons systems from the proverbial “lowest
bidder.”126
Another alternative has gained popularity in government procurement though mostly for
service contracts vice systems acquisition. This is a multiple award contract, where there are
numerous winners of a contract who then in turn compete for individual task orders issued
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against that contract. These are often seen in military construction (MILCON) and called
Multiple Award Task Order Contracts or MATOC and in services where Indefinite
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) are issued. These have become much more common
because first, if everyone wins, no one loses and thus no bidder has grounds for protesting the
award of a contract. However, in competing for the individual task orders there are quite a few
losers and often only one of two winners; this is in fact one of the main complaints heard from
holders of the Navy’s Seaport-E multiple award contract vehicle.127 There has been a decided
rise in the number of protests over the last decade and the addressing a protest costs the
government a lot of time, money, and delays actually procuring the services or equipment that is
required. The other advantage from the government’s perspective is that bidders continue to
compete, often driving down price bids, against one another for the individual task orders issued
under a MATOC. In the case of LCS, the government decided to make two awards, one to a
consortium headed by Lockheed Martin and the other by General Dynamics – Bath Iron
Works.128 This retains a certain level of the continued competition leveraged in multiple award
contracts but requires more management from the procuring service. However, two Rand
Corporation studies, one on shipbuilding and the other on the Joint Strike Fighter actually
provide evidence to the contrary. In Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen? the authors note
that they “found no statistically significant evidence that using multiple producers lead to lower
unit costs.”129
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The decision to award a contract is not the end of the procurement process but is the final
major milestone in DoD acquisition. The final but often the most complex and costly steps are in
the initial fielding, operational, and the disposal phases of the process. Often new systems,
including LCS go through “teething” problems as previously unsuspected or unexpected
mechanical, electronic, maintenance, or software challenges (to name just a few) emerge with the
first operational deployment or employment of a system. One of the unexpected problems that
has emerged with the LCS as a class is a more severe degree of metal fatigue and cracking than
was predicted.130 Rectifying these issues takes time and money and can delay the Final
Operational Capability (FOC) of a system, which though not exactly a procurement milestone is
nonetheless a critical one for the owning service and the Geographic or Functional Combatant
Commanders (COCOM) who will actually utilize these systems in military operations. The
other piece that is often overlooked is that weapons systems, especially ships but also aircraft and
vehicles are not only maintained but updated over their life-cycle. This sometimes engenders
another round of procurement as the government looks to commercial vendors to develop new
capabilities, install new equipment, or provide material repairs and overhauls to the systems and
sub-systems. One good example of this is the B-52 “Stratofortress.” This aircraft was originally
designed in the late 1940s to early 1950s, first flew in the mid-1950s and remains in service
today (2016). Over this almost 60-year life-cycle, most if not all of the systems including the
engines and electronics have been replaced at least twice and the airframes themselves have been
mechanically repaired on a regular basis. Very much like DOD 5000.02 states, the requirements
will not remain static over the life-span of a system and neither will the mechanical or electrical
or software structure of the system. This reflects why and how the Operations and Support phase
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can actually become much more expensive than the purely acquisition phase(s) for a major
weapons system. Disposal costs are becoming more and more important as ecological values
gain popular currency and the cost of protecting the environment rises. We have already
discussed the case of CVN 65, but Naval Air Station North Island in Coronado CA is another
good illustrative case. There was and is a major Navy aviation maintenance depot as North
Island which has been there since the 1920s. This is akin to a mid-sized factory or major
industrial plant which overhauls and repairs aircraft, engines, electronics, and other aviation
systems. The problem is that for the first fifty or so years of the depot’s existence the issue of
toxic heavy metals, petroleum products, and other chemical and metallurgical waste was not an
issue. It was often buried or dumped near the airfield and no provision to prevent toxic materials
from contaminating the soil or ground water was required. However, in the 1970s the
environment and protecting it started to become a major interest item for the American people
and thus for the military. The level of contamination or pollution at North Island to this day,
despite 30 plus years of remediation is high enough to match some of the EPA’s “Superfund”
Sites. This means that the military, and not just the Navy but all of the services have become
much more environmentally conscious because of the costs inherent in spills, pollution, and
contamination. Many major weapons systems like ships cost money to dispose of properly and
while neither the Navy nor this writer believe the environment to be unimportant; the Navy
ought to expend its resources supporting the national security and national military strategies not
in creating and then cleaning up new environmental disaster sites.

SECNAVINST 5000.2E, “DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION
SYSTEM AND THE JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM”
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The Navy’s governing instruction fits or nests underneath the over-arching structure
provided by the Secretary of Defense’s instruction. It starts out with the usual broad statements
of intent and applicability and then aims directly at many of the key pieces that fit under the DoD
instruction. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition
(ASN, RD&A) serves as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) for the Navy.131 Thus he
or she is the key person in the formal procurement process for equipment and services for the
U.S. Navy, assigning duties and responsibilities for specific acquisition programs to other
individuals, offices, or organizations in the Department of the Navy (DON). For us, in looking at
the LCS program, the prescribed role of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is of particular
interest. The CNO is tasked to assign program sponsors who are responsible for identifying
naval warfare and functional areas program capability needs and requirements.132 This means
that the CNO or his staff (known as OPNAV – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) is
responsible to identify and quantify or qualify the capability requirements for naval warfare
which include several different areas applicable to the LCS class, including Surface Warfare, Air
Warfare, and Undersea Warfare, to name some of the more significant. It also means that
functional areas, like communications, Command and Control (C2)133, and sensors like sonar or
radar are ‘owned’ by OPNAV designated program sponsors. This has some important
implications in the procurement process and the manner in which decisions are made – especially
as we explore the issues of organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics. Also of note, the
SECNAV instruction ensures that the verbiage in the instruction is in keeping with the latest
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joint directives by stating that the “legacy term ‘requirements’ as used in this instruction may be
interpreted to mean ‘capability requirement’ as defined in” the JCIDS Instruction (CJCSI
3170.01I).134 Returning to the role of resources sponsors, the instruction notes that CNO
resources sponsors are responsible for specific appropriations categories, the acquisition
categories of ACAT, which are defined by both the equipment, systems, and services being
acquired as well as the cost of these. They may also have dual responsibility as program
resources sponsors.135 Here again, we can see the potential for impacts driven by organization
behavior and/or bureaucratic politics in the Navy’s acquisition process.
The instruction also delineates the process by which the Navy reviews and makes
resource allocation decisions in a forum that allows the various stakeholders a say in where and
when the Navy’s resources are allotted. This is in the form of the Resources and Requirements
Review Board (R3B). The R3B serves as the organizational process or decision point where the
senior members of the Navy’s flag mess, 3- and 4-star admirals look at major Navy and Joint
acquisition programs, specifically ACAT levels I through IV. A simple if imprecise
characterization means that level 1 programs cost more than $2.19 billion (FY2000 dollars),
level II cost more than $660 million, III are less than or equal to $660 million, and IV don’t meet
some of the other criteria for level III while still costing $660 million or less.136 This simplified
description serves to highlight the significant costs of the acquisition programs that the R3B
reviews and also serves to highlight just how much of the Navy’s resources may or may not be
committed to fund an ACAT program. The decisions that the R3B makes can have significant
impact on the resources that the Navy has available for regular operations (or Operations &
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Maintenance often called O&M dollars) and for other acquisitions in both a specific fiscal year
(FY) but also for the ‘out years.’137 In short, R3B decisions can have a significant impact over
half-a-decade later on the naval service. As the instruction puts it, the R3B serves as:
“a focal point for decision-making regarding Navy and JCIDS ACAT I through IV and abbreviated
acquisition requirements; the validation of non-acquisition related, emergent, and Joint requirements; the
coordination of service input to Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes; and
the resolution of cross-enterprise or cross-sponsor issues.”138

The section regarding the PPBE processes again highlights the potential influence of
organizational behavior because this is where the competition between the services for resources
is often ‘fought’ out in a very political, Darwinian, and Machiavellian sense.139
The instruction goes on to describe the roles and responsibilities for various OPNAV and
Navy entities in the procurement process and interestingly highlights an overarching theme of
cost reduction or cost control whenever and wherever possible. For instance the Deputy CNO
for Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education or CNO (N1) is tasked to support the Program
Executive Offices (PEO), System Commanders (SYSCOM), and direct reporting program
managers (DRPM) with maximizing the use of technology in order to reduce manpower and
personnel requirements and associated life-cycle costs for acquisition programs.140 This is of
particular note for the LCS program because one of the key concepts for the individual platforms
is the idea of minimum manning. Sailors are considered both one of the Navy’s most important
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resources but also one of its largest expenses and any possibility of reducing manpower
requirements can translate into significant savings in other areas of the Navy’s corporate
structure. Likewise, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information Dominance) CNO
(N2/N6) is enjoined to “optimize Navy network investments.”141 This means that he or she is
responsible to make the most efficient use of the Navy’s money in buying the computer
hardware and software possible. Considering the number of computers required to effectively
run most of today’s weapons systems, ships, and aircraft, network investments represent a large
sum of money and being able to purchase the most effective systems in an efficient manner can
represent large resource savings potentially freeing up money that the Navy can invest
elsewhere. Likewise, though it is more implied than categorically stated, the Vice CNO for Fleet
Readiness and Logistics (N4) is tasked with developing and recommending policy for the ASN
(RD&A) to approve regarding acquisition life-cycle logistics. This office is also directed to
conduct assessments of system life-cycle cost affordability.142 Again it is drawing inferences,
but the unstated assumption is that N4 should develop policies that will, if possible, minimize
systems maintenance costs for the entire life-cycle of the system. Likewise, if the system
logistics life-cycle is not affordable, N4 will notify the acquisition lead and potentially make
suggestions on how to decrease the overall life-cycle costs, cut-short, or even recommend
cancellation.
One final observation from the introductory section of SECNAVINST 5000.2E; the
various acquisition entities tasked with leading procurement efforts are provided with very
definite directions. The various Program Executive Offices, System Command Commanders
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and DPRMs are granted the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the life-cycle
management of all acquisition programs under their respective cognizance.143 Again, this infers
that managing and if possible reducing those costs in a policy goal supported by the office of the
Secretary of the Navy and levied upon subordinate organizations in the acquisition process.
For the LCS program, the role of Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM) assigned by this governing instruction has some special
significance. This is because much of the LCS concept is based on the idea of networked
platforms working in concert.144 SPAWAR (to use Navy short-hand) is tasked with managing
the system and technical architecture and mission-area chief engineer for command and control
(C2) and net-centric segment reference architectures (SRAs). Again, this is important because
the LCS mission or function concept relies very heavily on timely and accurate C2 and the
integration of individual LCS platforms (hulls) into net-centric networks where each functions as
part of the greater sum to apply kinetic or non-kinetic effects (or “fires”) against a specified
target.145 The introduction goes on to delineate roles and responsibilities for a host of other
offices and organizations from Navy Net Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), the Naval
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Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), and the Ergonomics Center of Expertise owned by the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (who as “NAVFAC” is more often associated with shore based
architecture and engineering, than systems acquisition).

FLEXIBILITY IN ACQUISITION
While the DoD acquisition system is a clearly defined and complex process it is not set in
stone. Part of this is necessitated by the differences inherent in procuring a ship or a system of
systems, and for example, a radar system to be mounted on said ship. Differences, especially in
the time required to develop and field a major weapons system force the ability to adapt and
adjust the system to program needs and to filling defined ‘gaps and seams’ in current military
capabilities. The governing instruction specifically states:
While these generic decision points and milestones are standard, MDAs have full latitude to tailor
programs in the most effective and efficient structure possible, to include eliminating phases and combining
or eliminating milestones and decision points, unless constrained by statute. 146

The intention here is not to enable Milestone Decision Authorities to cheat, it is to allow them
sufficient flexibility to get the required capability into the hands of those who need it in as timely
a manner as they can consistent with budgetary and legal i.e. statutory constraints. This idea is
repeated in several other places in the instruction; “Tailoring is always appropriate when it will
produce a more efficient and effective acquisition approach for the specific product.”147 And in
fact, there is a specific acquisition model for the “Accelerated Acquisition Model”148 as well as
an entire enclosure addressing the acquisition process for the Rapid Fielding of Capabilities.149
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What these passages and example all serve to highlight though is that the acquisition process is
described as being capable of flexibility and adaptability. There are certain advantages to this
and the Navy has adapted them to its ship acquisition process.

SECNAVINST 5000.2E (CONT.)
The Navy’s acquisition process is governed by the DoD instruction and the Secretary of
the Navy’s instruction, 5000.2E. This instruction describes how the Navy is to implement and
execute the DAS and JCIDS program within its own acquisition programs. It also describes in
somewhat less detail how Navy acquisition may diverge from the strictest interpretation of the
Secretary of Defense’s guidance. As mentioned several times in preceding passages, the
acquisition of ships, representing a “System of systems” can be and often is significantly more
complex and more expensive than a new aircraft or tank. While these systems are not simple by
any means, the sheer size of most ships and the number of component sub-systems that are
installed on ships can be orders or magnitude larger than other DoD weapons systems. This
increases the development time, the design and construction time, and the overall cost of the
program. In view of the time requirements to bring a new ship class into service, the Secretary
of the Navy has “hedged” his or her bets by including verbiage that allows increased flexibility
specifically for shipbuilding.
Unlike most DoD major acquisition programs, according to the Secretary of the Navy,
because of the need to design the structure of the ship (hull and superstructure), the program may
be initiated at milestone A – before the technology maturation and risk reduction efforts are
undertaken.
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“Shipbuilding programs may be initiated at milestone A in order to start ship design concurrent with subsystem and component TD.” 150

The rationale behind this is that naval architecture and systems engineering need to proceed in
concert (if not ’lock-step’) so that while the systems are being designed, the container that they
shall be placed in i.e. the hull is designed at the same time. All of the systems to be installed
need to both fit and be mounted in such a way that they do not make the ship unstable or
underpowered. A very appropriate historical example is the Swedish warship VASA. She was
and is a masterwork of 17th century naval architecture but when her weapons systems (cannons)
were fitted they created a negative metacentric height, in effect the distance between the ship’s
center of gravity and its center of buoyancy was insufficient to provide a righting arm (otherwise
known as the metacentric height). This in turn created a very unstable platform that once it was
in the water with the guns mounted proceeded to heel (tilt) excessively, allowed water to pour in
further decreasing the metacentric height, and finally sank because of the flooding off the shore
of Stockholm.151 Another famous historical example is the Tudor warship MARY ROSE. While
scholars, maritime archeologists, and naval architects still debate the specific reason(s) for her
sinking on 19 July 1545, one of the more reasonable hypotheses is that she was overloaded with
guns newly fitted before the battle with the French. This coupled with a sharp heel during a turn
allowed water to flood through her lower gun ports sinking the ship. The key fact that these two
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examples highlight however, is that designers have to be very careful when installing systems or
weight into and on a waterborne hull.
These historical anecdotes while potentially anachronistic highlight the very real concern
regarding stability of a warship. The U.S. Navy has made a very calculated risk-reward decision
in its acquisition program by enabling program managers to adjust the formal DoD process to
allow for concurrent design and development of ships and systems in order to better balance the
engineering requirements with the capability requirements or performance. Many major
weapons systems must address the balance between intended systems to provide the desired
capability and the physical platform which will carry the system or systems through the
operational environment. Military aircraft need radars, bombs, missiles, radios, etc. in order to
accomplish their mission. These physical loads must be balanced with the airframe that will
carry them, the engines that will propel them and the airframe, and the fuel required to power the
whole system. Trade-offs need to be made so that the aircraft has the required range, speed, and
the flight endurance to carry out required missions; the same is true for LCS and other ship
classes. Concurrently designing the ship and the technologies is a logical approach depending on
the complexity or “newness” of the technology. There is also the fact that while ships are often
designed to be multi-mission platforms, sometimes they are specifically designed around one
major weapon or one major system. The TICONDEROGA class of cruisers was designed
around the Aegis weapons system, using an already existing hull and power plant. This led to
some early challenges with stability because the radar transmission panels and associated power
and cooling systems were mounted high in the superstructure.
What the Navy has done by allowing parallel development and design is to adjust volume
and weight considerations in the technologies and to in turn adjust the volume, weight, and shape
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of the hull which is intended to carry those systems. Referring back to the earlier example of the
electro-magnetic rail gun, a gun that is too large or requires too much power for a given hull
would potentially fail to fulfill the required capability. As an extreme example, a gun that can
fire a projectile 200 nautical miles and sink any ship afloat but that requires a 1000-foot hull and
20 electrical generators to power it, might match the required capability but be so expensive to
produce that it is impractical and ultimate fails to truly fulfill the capability requirement. In
developing the gun system while designing the hull and supporting systems, the Navy might be
able to produce a level of effectiveness at a reasonable cost that does satisfy the capability
requirement. The same holds true in the case of the LCS class; designing the systems or more
accurately the mission packages while designing the ship itself enables the needed tailoring and
adaption to integrate these equipment packages into an effective system of systems.
The Navy’s instruction returns to the standards set out in the DoD governing instruction
with the statement that a Capabilities Development Document will be validated and approved
before a shipbuilding program not started at milestone A is approved for program initiation.152
This serves to reiterate that while the Navy may choose to initiate an official procurement
program at milestone A this is not necessarily the general rule. In the case of shipbuilding, the
lead ship and initial follow-on ships are normally approved at milestone B. The follow-on ships
that are approved at milestone B shall be sufficient quantities to maintain shipyard construction
continuity until the FRP DR.153

SECNAVINST 5000.2E: THE TWO PASS, SIX GATE SYSTEM
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The companion volumes to the DoDI 5000.02E from the Navy are the Secretary of the
Navy instructions, 5000.2E “Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System”
and its partner volume SECNAVINST M-5000.2 “Department of the Navy Acquisition and
Capabilities Guidebook.” These two instructions expand and amplify the direction provided by
the DoD instruction and tailors acquisition planning to better fit Navy (and Marine Corps) needs.
Both of the documents follow the prescribed processes laid out in the DoD instruction while
assigning specific duties and responsibilities to organizations and individuals internal to the
Navy organization in accordance with the governing instruction. However, neither of these
service specific documents are mere reiterations of what the Secretary of Defense has published;
they both leverage off of and differ from the overarching guidance in some particularly important
ways. Having already looked at the first section of SECNAVINST 5000.2E, let us turn to the
second section where we can find the Navy’s acquisition process described by the “Two-Pass
and Six-Gate DON Requirements and Acquisition Governance Process”154 depicted in the below
figure.
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Figure 4- Diagram of the 2 Pass/6 Gate System155

The Navy’s DAS and JCIDS implementation guide provides a description of what the
service calls the “2 Pass, 6 Gate System.” The stated intent of this process is to “improve
governance and insight into the development, establishment, and execution of acquisition
programs in the DON. The goal of the review process is to ensure alignment between Servicegenerated capability requirements and systems acquisition, while improving senior leadership
decision-making through better understanding of risks and costs throughout a program’s entire
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development cycle.”156 The DON process in effect overlays or is embedded in the standard DoD
acquisition process. Pass 1 and gates 1 through 3 are focused in the JCIDS and Material Solution
Analysis phases before the milestone A decision point. Gate 1 is the Initial Capabilities
Document that must be routed and approved by both the Navy’s and the joint community’s
acquisition hierarchy. Gate 2 encompasses the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) where the intent
is for the service or MDA to determine the ‘best’ solution to their capabilities requirement.
Without belaboring the point or reiterating specifics from the DoD instruction, this step is
important because the alternatives are not always technical or physical in nature. One of the
unspoken policies at US Joint Forces Command in the early 2000s until the command was disestablished was the pursuit of non-materiel solutions.157 Often in looking at required capabilities
analysts would investigate the DOTMLPF-P158 domain for solutions not requiring the acquisition
of major weapons systems. Gate 3 is the review of the service approved Capability
Development Document (CDD) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the system described
in the CDD and ought to be completed before milestone A.159 It encompasses an additional
variety of steps or system attributes that must be certified before the program can move forward.
These include developing the cost position and scope – or in other words the affordability of the
system – with a focus on the costing of the technology development (TD) phase.160 In concert
with the costing of the TD phase, gate 3 requires a review and acceptance of the strategy for TD,
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for testing and evaluation, and for the System Engineering Plan. Following along this funding
theme, there is also a requirement to certify the selected solution for funding for milestone A and
to review the entire intended program for health in terms of both costs and funding.161 There is
also the requirement in the technical sphere to validate the System Design Specification (SDS)
Development plan and to ensure that the outlined SDS links to the required Key Performance
Parameters (KPP) and Key System Attributes (KSA). In short, the intent of these technical
reviews is to ensure that the system or system of systems is designed to perform as intended and
to fulfill the required capability for which it is being chosen.
Pass 2 starts at milestone A but just before the technology development (TD) phase itself
initiates. This pass encompasses gates 4 through 6 with 6 lasting throughout the entire life-cycle
of the acquired system or ‘system of systems.’ It is led by the Component Acquisition Executive
(CAE) and as noted above encompasses three acquisition gates and continues through the end of
the system life-cycle to disposal.162 Gate 4 approves the formal SDS and formally approves a
program to proceed to gate 5 and milestone B. The gate chair (Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development & Acquisition – ASN [RD&A]) is responsible for verifying that the
SDS reflects the design parameters necessary the KSAs and KPPs delineated in the Capability
Development Document (CDD). He is also responsible to review and certify that the system is
designed for some degree of ‘mass’ production, operability, inter-operability, reliability and
maintainability.163 In short, to make sure that it can be built with some level of manageable cost,
that it works and that it will work without prohibitively intense maintenance and/or repairs. For
some systems these are not easy characteristics to certify and it requires significant effort on the
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part of the service and stakeholders to ensure that these attributes apply with a level of accuracy
to the system to be procured. Here again, as at gate 3, the reviewing body and chair are required
to look at the overall program health in terms of cost and budgeting but also in terms of schedule
and risk before passing the program to proceed through the acquisition process. This is also a
stage where the Configuration Steering Board (CSB) provides inputs regarding any changes to
the systems, and where their technology, their required performance, materials, etc. are
addressed and incorporated as required. The CSB has significance for the LCS program because
of the two selected platforms or hull forms and the variety of intended mission modules.
Maintaining the configuration of these systems or adjusting them to changes in required
capabilities can be a complicated and expensive endeavor. This requires that the CSB monitor
the technical configuration of the systems and sub-systems to ensure that the required updates
meet the requirements and are cost-effective. In some cases, required capabilities may need to
be delayed or even out-right rejected by the CSB, if implementing them will be too expensive or
take too much time to complete.
Gate 5 is designed to ensure that the Navy has completed the needed actions and
recommendations made by the MDA so that the MDA can release a formal Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry.164 This gate also
serves to justify full funding certification for milestone B and to ensure that the CSB changes
have been addressed. It also provides another point in the government acquisition process to
review the overall health of the program, the risk in the schedule, and the planned program
budgeting for sufficiency throughout the entire life-cycle of the capability acquisition.165
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Gate 6 repeats the assessment of the overall health of the program and continues to do so
throughout the life-span of the program. It also requires an assessment of the program’s
readiness for productions, the sufficiency of the SDS, the Earned Value Management System
(EVMS) Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB), and the Integrated Baseline Review
(IBR).166 Gate 6 reviews are conducted initially after the EMD contract award and the
satisfactory completion of the IBR. They are also conducted before the Full Rate Production
Decision Review (FRP DR) and after the system reaches IOC. The post-IOC review focuses on
program sufficiency in terms of both fiscal and material resourcing. Gate 6 reviews will be
conducted periodically during the entire life-span of the systems and serves as a forum for annual
CSBs.167
The gate review boards are composed of various stakeholders from across the Navy (and
Marines when appropriate) and sometimes the joint world as well. The principal members
include Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller (ASN(FM&C)); Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
(N00N) as required; Principal Military [Assistant to] DASN(RD&A) (PMDASN(RD&A)); CNO
(N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4, N8); Warfare Enterprise (WE) representative(s) (Surface, Undersea,
Naval Aviation; Naval Network Warfare (NETWAR)/FORCEnet; and Navy Expeditionary
Combat Command) lead (TYCOM)168; and or Deputy, United States Fleet Forces Command
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(USFLTFORCOM), and cognizant SYSCOM commander. The chair determines the specific
membership for each Gate Review. The chair also determines which advisory members or other
representatives may be included while principal members may request attendance by other
relevant stakeholder commands. These relevant commands may include Department of the Navy
Chief Information Officer (DON CIO); Chief of the Navy Reserve (CNR); cognizant PEO; and
Director, Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).169
The advisory members for gate reviews may include Chief of Naval Operations (CNO
Director, Programming Division (OPNAV (N80)); Director, Assessment Division (OPNAV
(N81)); Director, Fiscal Management Division (OPNAV (N82)); Associate Director, Assessment
Division (OPNAV (N81D)); CNO (N091); resource sponsor); Deputy, USFLTFORCOM (Fleet
Policy Capabilities Requirements, Concepts and Experimentation (N5/N8/N9)); DASN(Budget);
DASN(Cost and Economics (C&E)); DASN(Acquisition and Procurement)(AP); Office of
General Counsel (OGC); SYSCOM cost director; Director, Navy International Programs Office
(NIPO); SECNAV Office of Program Appraisal (OPA); DASN Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E); Chief Systems Engineer (CHSENG); cognizant DASN; and the
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Forces (COMOPTEVOR). It is notable that we
can see the scope and breath of organizations involved based on the position title of the
respective organizations or offices – there are quite a few stakeholders in Navy ACAT programs.
They cover a broad spectrum of service equities including the funding sources, the technology
offices, the acquisition community, and some of the actual operations stakeholders. This broad
spectrum presents an opportunity to get buy-in from key stakeholders, but it also presents the
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opportunity for an organization or individual to impact the course of an acquisition. In some
cases, there may be a ‘cast of thousands’ or a small, select group of decision makers involved in
all of the gate reviews under the SECNAVs’ cognizance and the CNO has a preponderance of
influence in selecting or allowing participants.

SECNAVINST 5000.2E – CHAPTER TWO
The following chapter in the instruction addresses specifically the assessments required
for initiating a shipbuilding program, paragraph 2.10.3. The title of the paragraph says it all
“Assessments Required Prior to Approving the Start of Construction on First Ship of
Shipbuilding Program.” SECNAV is required by law (the 2008 NDAA) to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees on the results of any production readiness review and
concurrently certify to them that the findings the review support commencement of
construction.170 These production readiness review report assessment addresses multiple key
issues in an acquisition program focusing on shipbuilding. The first metric the report must
address is the maturity of the ship’s design as measured by the stability of the contract
specifications e.g. how much growth there has been in the Statement of Work/Performance Work
Statement (SOW/PWS). This measuring of stability must also include the degree of completion
of detailed designs and production design drawings.171 The next set of metrics that are addressed
in the report are the development status of the developmental Command and Control (C2)
systems, the weapons and sensor systems, and the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E)
systems. Along with these metrics, the SECNAV must report on the readiness of the shipyards
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and personnel to physically begin construction of the ships which requires inputs from the
commercial contractors like Marinette and Ingalls Shipbuilding who have bid on the work. The
final three metrics are by no means the least but are all interconnected and connected to the
preceding series of measures addressed in the report.
The SECNAV speaking for his department must report on the Navy’s estimated complete
program cost at completion of the acquisition and the adequacy of budgeting to support this
estimate. He must also provide the estimated delivery date(s) for the ship and/or ships and
justify or explain any variance from the contracted delivery date(s). And finally, SECNAV must
tell the defense committees what processes are in place and what metrics will be used to measure
and manage risk (e.g. cost overruns, production delays) for the entire scope of the program. 172
This is obviously a comprehensive and critical report for the acquisition program, and potentially
explains the adopting of a rigorous internal acquisition process on top of or in addition to the
strictures already delineated in the DoD instruction on major acquisitions.
The full rate production decision i.e. building ships number two and three and so forth is
actually addressed in chapter 1 and thus it is logical to address that decision point here vice under
the section on chapter 1 above. The FRP DR is held to inform the MDA on the outcome of the
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). It also serves to authorize the construction of the
remaining follow ships in the class and to satisfy the requirements of the instruction itself.173
This assumes of course that the IOT&E has been successful or at least satisfied the minimum
requirements for authorizing continued construction.
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THE ACTUAL ‘PROCUREMENT’ OF SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF
SYSTEMS
At this point, we will step away from the governing instructions and how the
government’s processes are designed to work to look at the actual process, in a broad sense of
how the systems are actually physically procured by the government and in a narrow sense as to
how the Navy is procuring these specific ships. This should help set the stage for the following
chapters which will describe the actual acquisition of the LCS; since its inception as a capability
concept to the six commissioned and 13 under-construction units.174 It also provides some
insight into the competition for contracts, the source selection process, and the administration of
awarded contracts.
At a much lower level, once the money is divvied out and the individual services receive
their budgets, they then decide what the internal distribution will be. In our case, the Navy has to
decide how much money the shipbuilding and systems acquisition offices get to build and to
equip the hulls that the Navy is buying. The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) is the overarching organization within the Navy responsible for surface ship
acquisition including the LCS class. The respective subordinate offices, like the Program
Executive Office (PEO) Ships then decide what portion of their monies will go to the LCS
program, what portion other surface combatants (like guided missile destroyers (DDGs)) and so
forth. This money becomes the bucket from which the LCS program office can draw to purchase
what they require. Thus, despite potential resources available from other programs or money

U.S. Navy Fact File, “Littoral Combat Ships - Fleet Introduction and Sustainment – LCS” Available on-line at:
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4. Accessed 16 Aug 2016, 1022 EDT.
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freed up by Overseas Combat Operations (OCO) supplemental funding, the program office must
make choices and prioritize what it will buy.
The uniformed or Government Service (GS) decision makers, who actually ‘own’ the
funding must then work through the procurement or contracting offices to write Requests for
Proposals (RFP) or Requests for Quotes (RFQ) to which commercial bidders must respond in
order to qualify for a contract award. This was what the DoD and SECNAV instructions labeled
the RFP step or milestone B. This is the stage where the FAR and DFARS really come into play.
For the purposes of this work, with the focus on the “power balance” between organizational
behavior and individual behavior, the FAR and DFARS, while they are important are also
beyond the intended scope. For the sake of brevity and allowing for the inaccuracy of the
statement, these documents direct how the Request for Proposals will be written by the
government, how the government should assess the responses, and how the government will
administer the awarded contract or contracts. They in effect determine the playing field upon
which the potential vendors will compete and how the government will deal with all of the
competitors both successful and unsuccessful.

A SOLICITATION OR REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS OR QUOTES (RFP OR
RFQ)
In a simplified example of an RFP issued by the government, the Statement of Work (SOW) or

Performance Work Statement (PWS) delineates exactly what the government wants from the
vendors.175 In the case of LCS, these specifications included range, maximum speed in a high
sea-state, aircraft embarked, provisions in terms of days, weight capacity for mission modules,

Despite using the phrase “exactly” what the government wants, often there are some questions on specifics and
definitions that require negotiation after contract award.
175
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draft, and operational availability.176 There were also a variety of other design parameters that
the bidders were required to provide, many of them exactly mirroring the programmatic
requirements illuminated in both the DoD and SECNAV acquisition instructions. The actual
structure and contents of the solicitation will be the subject of a significant section of the
following chapter and for the sake of brevity this is as deep as we will dive into the contents for
this chapter.
The various bidders review the solicitation, especially the SOW/PWS, the contents and
format required to be included in the response, and the grading criteria. Based on these specifics
and their firm’s intended solution, the proposal team will write a response to the government
describing and pricing how they will satisfy the government’s capability requirement. Usually, a
proposal for a MDAP like LCS or the Joint Strike Fighter will include four to five volumes
encompassing the technical approach in volume 1. The second volume will generally describe
the contract and program management design. Volume 3 will include past performance,
describing how a bidding firm or team of firms has successfully completed similar projects in the
past. Pricing is generally included in volume 4 and the fifth volume will address the subcontracting plan, delineating how the prime contractor will use its smaller team-mates like 8(a)
firms, minority and women owned small businesses and companies certified as Historically
Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones)177 for example. The RFP response being duly

Solicitation N00024-03-R-2309, Attachment J, “Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document Serial
Number: N763F-S03-026 For Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0 Pre ACAT.” Issued by Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command, 28 February 2003.
177
Per the Small Business Administration: “The 8(a) Business Development Program is a business assistance
program for small disadvantaged businesses. The 8(a) Program offers a broad scope of assistance to firms that are
owned and controlled at least 51% by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” For HUBZone firms:
“The Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone) program helps small businesses in urban and rural
communities gain preferential access to federal procurement opportunities.” The qualification requirements for
both programs are more extensive than we need to investigate for this work, but more information is available online
at https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs/8a-business-development-program/about-8a176
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written, the bidders are generally required to provide at least one hard-copy and electronic copies
on CD to the government.178
The government receives the proposals and begins their review. Often, the government
will set up both a proposal review team and a source selection committee to which the review
team reports. The review team will be broken down into technical, managerial, and fiscal review
groups who in turn review the pertinent sections or volumes of the proposals. Once the review
team determines if a proposal is compliant with the response requirements, they will assess the
sections of the proposal for the value of the solution that they provide. As mentioned earlier (see
p. 49) the grading criteria are generally either LPTA or a quality trade-off (quality compared to
cost). Almost invariably bidding firms state that they will meet the government’s needs ‘better,
faster, cheaper’ but unless they categorically and clearly state how they plan to achieve these
goals, the review team will down-select or reject their proposal. One key item to bear in mind is
that the government is looking for reasons to reject proposals – they are laboring under a deadline as was the proposal writing team and anything that enables them to save time, like rejecting
a non-compliant proposal, will be embraced with alacrity. Once the review team selects the best
proposal or proposals, they will provide the source selection committee with their assessments
and recommendations. The committee actually decides on the winning proposal(s). The
responsible contracting officer will review the source selection and if they concur, will notify the
winner(s).

business-development-program and https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs/hubzoneprogram. Accessed 17 Aug 2016, 0902 EDT.
178
This scenario is again, based on a major acquisition program and does not describe the level of effort and cost
often involved in just submitting a bid. And it should be noted that for large acquisition programs, the response
documents can run will over 500 pages of text, graphics, diagrams, and sometimes blueprints.

76

The award of a contract is only the beginning of a more intricate and complicated process
by which the contract is administered and executed. The administration deals with required
reporting, delivery schedules, payment, personnel, and security issues. The execution is the
schedule of progress, level of effort, monetary expenditure (often called ‘burn-rate’), and the
testing of delivered materials, systems, or sub-systems. This is a much-simplified version of
how a contract is awarded and executed but it provides a frame-work for understanding the next
chapter on the specifics of the acquisition of the LCS.

SUMMARY
This chapter described the nature of the U.S. defense market, described how the U.S.
DoD goes about acquiring products and services, with a distinct focus on MDAPs like LCS, and
in a very simple manner, presented the RFP process from both the bidder and from the
government perspective. The intent is to provide a basic understanding of the structure within
which the LCS procurement was and is operating and to introduce some of the key stakeholders
if not by name then by role or sometimes more importantly their ‘office.’ This framework
should provide the needed context for a more descriptive and in-depth narrative and analysis of
the actual development, acquisition, and fielding of the LCS class of ships.
The other key take-away from this chapter is that the market for national security is not a
traditional market in the Smith, Ricardian, or Chicago School sense of a ‘free market.’ It is
instead a significantly warped market where supply and demand are both greatly impacted and
warped by indigenous and endogenous factors. The single demand source has very much of a
monopsonist’s power in the market. Meanwhile the limited number of firms enjoy very much of
an oligopolistic power of supply in reference to the customer. It is a challenging environment for
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for-profit companies to compete and also for the government to get what it needs at a reasonable
price.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LCS CONCEPT AND SOLICITATION
This chapter is a narrative of the actual development of the LCS from a concept to IOC.
The intent is to answer as many of the 5 ‘Ws’ as possible with some emphasis on the ‘Who’
question. In order to understand the program and the organizations involved however, we need
to understand the ‘What, Where, When,’ and of course the ‘Why’ of this acquisition program.
This chapter starts with an investigation of why the U.S. Navy decided that it needed a Littoral
Combat Ship. The strategic environment that the U.S. had faced since 1945 suffered a sea
change with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. The open ocean war at sea was a thing of the past. This required new capabilities
and thus new ships. The second portion of this chapter addresses the actual solicitation that was
released to industry for designing and constructing the LCS. This Request for Proposal (RFP) is
reviewed in depth to highlight the scope and breadth of the requirement. This portion of the
chapter is also intended to highlight just how transformational this solicitation was in comparison
to past Navy ship procurements. Previous classes of ships were incremental developments on
preceding hulls and were solicited as technical specification bids. LCS was a brand-new hull
design and was solicited as a performance specification bid. This encompasses almost ten years
and about seven ships to date. The overarching intent of this chapter is to recount the
background and the specifics of the solicitation.
We need to examine this road to IOC for the LCS class to better understand the class’
triumphs and failures. The intent of this chapter is to examine the ‘birth’ of LCS, tracing it from
the federal solicitation for bids to the first deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) to the current
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status of the class. The goal is not to emphasize the failures of the LCS program so much as to
reveal the challenges inherent in fielding an entirely new ship class. The intent is to emphasize
the revolutionary nature of this procurement program. The LCS class was solicited in a very
different way from any other class of ships in the U.S. Navy and it incorporates a groundbreaking main propulsion system unlike any since the introduction of the US Navy’s first screw
driven steamship USS PRINCETON in 1843. This chapter will highlight just how unique the
RFP for the LCS was in comparison to other ship solicitations and how different the installed
propulsion system is from any other larger ship in the Navy. This was the first time in living
memory that the Navy solicited a new ship class using performance vice design specifications;
there may have been some precedents but no other major combatant since the Second World War
has been procured in this manner. Akin to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Navy told
bidders what the LCS must and should be able to do and told them to design and build it based
on those required capabilities. One of the direct outcomes of this, specifically based on the
required speed of the LCS class, was the design and construction of the first major U.S. warship
propelled by hydro jets vice propellers. The other engineering first that resulted from this Navy
requirement was the capability to reconfigure the individual platforms for different missions.
This was another major departure from traditional warship design. Previously ships were
designed for one fixed mission or to undertake several different missions with appropriate
weapons systems permanently installed.179 This chapter will provide an in-depth view of the
solicitation and the resulting ships.
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For example, frigates were generally outfitted with a focus anti-submarine (ASW) sensors and weapons while
destroyers had a broader equipment suite including anti-surface (ASuW) and anti-air systems (AAW). Currently
cruisers represent the most stereo-typical multi-mission platform including weapons and sensors for ASW, AAW,
ASuW, strike warfare (SW), and electronic warfare (EW).

80

Figure 5 LCS Fielding Timeline

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The LCS was born of a sea change in the strategic environment in the early 1990s. The
end of the Cold War and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union created a brave new world (or
“New World Order”)180 for which the US Navy needed a brave new operational concept. 1992
saw the first in a series of Navy white papers aimed at re-orienting the operational focus and
training of the Navy from a “blue water” battle against the Red Banner Fleets of the Soviet
Union to fighting in the littorals against regional threats. The maritime focus of the U.S Navy
shifted from the open ocean of the high seas to the cluttered regions near the shore where
regional states represented potential maritime threats. The white paper “…From the Sea” was
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the first official Navy document that addressed the littoral “or near land” areas of the world as
important potential areas where the Navy expected to face threats and in which it would be
forced to operate.181 This was a huge conceptual adjustment from the open ocean combat that
the Navy had expected in the North Atlantic to keep the sea lanes of communication (SLOC)
open for reinforcing the land forces battling the Red Army as it tried to overrun Western Europe.
Instead the US Navy envisioned a series of brush-fire wars similar to those fought across the
Third World during the Cold War against a series of regional adversaries or those fought by the
British and French during the height of the 19th centuries imperialist years in Africa, the Near,
and the Far East. Further complicating the future challenges was the very nature of the littorals;
rather than the unrestricted waters of the high seas, the littorals are “confined and congested
water and air space”182 with friendly, hostile and neutral entities and geographic features
significantly complicating the identification, targeting, and weapons engagement processes.
“…From the Sea” was also the first place that mentioned the concept A2/AD though not
in so many words. What the white paper did mention however, was the capability of adversaries
to concentrate and layer their defenses.183 These defenses did not include anti-ship ballistic
missiles but did encompass tactical ballistic missiles, sea-skimming cruise missiles, submarines,
mines, and potentially small attack craft.184 It also proposed the first tentative steps towards a
mission tailoring albeit indirectly. The concept did categorically state that a “carrier battle
group” may not be the answer in every situation.185 Instead, the new war in the littoral regions

“…From the Sea Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century: A New Direction for the Naval Service,”
(Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 1992), U.S. Navy white paper, available online at
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt. Accessed 10/09/2016 at 1013 EDT.
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would require continuously tailored naval forces with sufficient command and control and
surveillance capabilities (among others) to dominate the battlespace.186 This threat assessment
and required operational capabilities would persist as key issues for the design and intended
employment LCS. Additionally, the concept of affordability and of fiscal resources impacting
naval operations was highlighted in “...From the Sea.” This white paper categorically stated that
the naval forces had to be capable and affordable for the new struggle to control the littorals. It
also addressed at least in passing, the redundancy remaining in the Navy in the aftermath of the
end of the Cold War. These ideas too were going to resurface throughout the development of the
LCS.
The next iteration of Navy strategy was entitled “Forward…From the Sea” and came out
in 1994. This white paper reiterated the new challenge focused in the littoral regions of the
world.187 It also focused much more intently than its predecessor on the idea of presence and
most especially on forward presence by U.S. Navy units.188 But like “…From the Sea,” the new
concept paper also mentioned the idea of “tailored” naval forces with specific capabilities.
Alongside the consistent reiteration of forward presence in regional hotspots, this strategic
concept paper emphasized the tailoring or sizing of naval forces as one of its basic themes. This
idea came to be one of the foundation concepts for the development of the LCS, that being the
ability to adjust system installations on platforms to or for specific mission capabilities like mine
warfare and surface warfare.
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The last iteration of naval strategy papers from the 1990s again emphasized the criticality
and influence of forward deployed naval forces operating in contested littoral regions around the
globe. It also continued the theme of dispersed and networked systems (or platforms) “linking
dispersed units as an integrated force with command and control networks.”189 This phrase was
repeated later in terms of spreading surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across a wide
geographic area.190 This version of the Navy’s operational concept provided more focus on the
idea of the dispersed and networked platforms.191 It also emphasized or introduced so to speak
the idea of on-scene command and control and the inherent self-sustainment capabilities of naval
platforms, specifically in our case ships. This self-sustainment piece included what became
another key concept for LCS, the rapid re-deployment piece.192 The idea of the mobility of naval
forces and dispersion of the same remained a persistent theme throughout this iteration of the
Navy’s operational concept.
It also brought out a point regarding the littorals that proved to be an important phrase in
the following years for both the LCS program and for the Navy as a service. “Seventy-five
percent of the Earth’s population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major
commercial centers lie in the littorals.”193 Several other key buzzwords or phrases like this also
entered the strategic lexicon on the U.S. Navy in the wake of the Cold War. Over 70 percent of
the world’s surface is covered by water, over 90 percent of international trade by weight and
volume value is sea-borne194 and any disruption of the global maritime commons would have a
“Forward…from the Sea – Navy Operational Concept,” U.S. Navy white paper, 1997, 3. Available online at:
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serious deleterious impact on the global economy. By extension this would have significant
negative impacts on the American economy. All of these phrases came to play a large role in
what might be termed marketing materials published and promulgated by the Department of the
Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy itself. In many ways, the ‘New World Order’
presented a much higher risk to the continued fiscal health of the Navy than it did to any of the
other services, not excepting the Marines. The blue-water armada that Admiral Sergey
Gorshkov had so assiduously nurtured as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy was almost
completely no more and certainly most distinctly diminished. The U.S. Navy had to find other
dragons abroad to slay, if only to guarantee its continued physical and fiscal existence in the face
of a looming ‘peace dividend’ in the years immediately following after the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
At the end of the Cold War, in a surprisingly short time for such a large organization, the
U.S. Navy re-evaluated the international system that it faced and worked very hard to adjust its
strategic assessments, plans, and goals to better suit the new operational environment. The LCS
was born of this strategic re-assessment especially when the outside environment was matched
with the resource constrained national security environment or atmosphere internal to the U.S.
and especially to the government, if not to the Department of Defense. The Navy realized that it
was going to face new threats both foreign and domestic and that it needed to adapt its approach
and resource allocation to more effectively address these threats. Hence new naval strategies
were crafted, and new thoughts emerged on what sorts of systems the Navy ought to procure in
the decade of the 1990s and into the Twenty-first century.

THE BIRTH OF A CONCEPT
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The genesis of the LCS began with the publication of Wayne Hughes’ Fleet Tactics in
1986. 195 There had been various other attempts to field small, high-speed surface ships from the
ASHVILLE class gunboats in the 1960s to the PEGASUS class hydrofoils in the 1970s. Hughes
provided a new and somewhat compelling if fictionalized argument in support of small surface
combatants. In his account of the ‘Second Battle of the Nile” he emphasizes the impact and
effectiveness of the “absurd little eight-hundred-ton missile boats” comprising the U.S.
Mediterranean (Sixth) Fleet.196 He also pointed out that conceptually mobility is the capacity to
move long distances in a relatively self-sustaining manner and to do so in a timely and quick
manner.197 Both of these ideas came to form key pillars in the concept development, design, and
construction of the LCS. Hughes also introduced the concept of dispersed platforms
concentrating their firepower effectively in the offensive which also became another key pillar in
the development of the LCS class.198 In many other ways Fleet Tactics was a seminal work as it
strove to re-introduce the idea of tactical thought and development into the U.S. Navy, at least in
the surface warfare community. However, for our purposes Hughes’ postulates of a ‘new’ killerclass of small, fast, and hard-hitting surface combatants employing long range missiles,
connected (or networked) into a cohesive striking force, and moving with significant rapidity
serve as the soil in which the LCS concept germinated and began to flower.
The second edition came out in 2000 and added both a new title and several new chapters
focusing on the near shore or littoral regime. The new title Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat
highlighted the significant and continuing shift from the “blue water” or open-ocean to the
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littoral regions of the world as the main stage for U.S. Navy operations.199 The preceding fifty
years had seen the USN focused on fighting the Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic in an updated
version of the fight against the German Kriegsmarine to keep the flow of men material across the
Atlantic Ocean to the European theater going. The end of the Cold War had created a sea change
in the operational and tactical focus for the USN and for most of the US allies around the globe.
The second edition of Fleet Tactics also highlighted the challenge between fighting in the
littorals with the large, multi-mission platforms against smaller, cheaper and often less
individually capable weapon systems. The disparity in the costs of the two types of platforms
only served to emphasize this challenge.
The next key work that forms the basis for LCS was an article co-authored by Hughes
and the-then president of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and published
in 1999. This article “Rebalancing the Fleet” addressed the Navy of yesterday, today, tomorrow,
and the ‘day after’ tomorrow and focused very much on the littoral regions as the key places
where the Navy today and in the tomorrows, would be operating.200 The first of the major ideas
was the issue of numbers (of hulls) and the ‘robustness’ or survivability of these hulls. They
made a consider argument in favor of raw numbers while still accepting the importance of the
idea of economy of force.201 Ultimately, the Navy and DoD only have so many resources or so
much money, meaning that there must be a balance between just raw numbers and the individual
capability (or complexity) of hulls or systems. The authors also highlighted the importance of
networking “a series of systems” in order to mass fires (or effects)202 in order to achieve military
199
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missions. Several other key attributes that also came to be intimately associated with LCS were
discussed in this article including speed and modularity.
Hughes and Cebrowski summarized their fleet rebalancing in terms of many small ships,
minimally manned, and operating in swarms. This was their version of the Naval War College’s
“Streetfighter Concept.”203 They likened it to the 1970’s high-low mix with a change in that the
smaller less-individually capable ships would lead the entry into hazardous waters in effect
clearing the way for the larger, more expensive multi-mission platforms.204 The authors also
discussed the portion of the concept that dealt with modularity enabling the smaller hulls to be
tailored with specific systems installed or swapped-out to better execute given mission sets like
(anti-) surface (ASuW) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This scalability was married very
closely to the required capability for networking the different platforms mentioned above. The
three key attributes that the authors were aiming for were numbers of platforms, affordability
(including manning and flexible modules), and networking the platforms to mass fires or
effects.205
In fact, the issue of affordability was actually rather strongly addressed in Cebrowski and
Hughes’ article. As noted above, the authors’ basic theme was a mixed force of multi-mission
ships and a more numerous group (the Economy B force) of platforms.206 This bore a passing
resemblance to the ‘High-Low’ surface combatant mix first pursued during Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO (1970-74). Focusing on the price for the predicted force the authors
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stated that the Navy must develop an Economy B force that complements and enables the
capabilities of the larger, more expensive multi-mission ships “our Economy A power-projection
force.” The intended goal was to create a low-end force of ships costing less than 10 percent of
the more expensive ships. Based on a rough price estimate of one billion US dollars for a highend guided missile destroyer, the authors envisioned a “Streetfigher” ship to cost (in 2001
dollars) about $100 (or less) million per hull. This was actually not an unreasonable pricing
strategy but would certainly have resulted in a rather austere platform when compared to the
High-end ships envisioned in this strategy. It is also likely that the Economy B ships would have
had to be single mission ones. The other part of the estimated force structure was that the Bteam ships would comprise more than one quarter of the entire surface force. This coupled the
argument in favor of less costly ships with the idea that raw numbers of hulls was good. The
idea of affordability or economy was one that has persisted throughout the life-cycle of the LCS
program.

THE NAVAL POST-GRADUATE SCHOOL STUDY
In 2000, the President of the Naval War College, then Vice Admiral Cebrowski, asked
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA to undertake a study or series of studies
investigating the potential functionality of fast, dispersed and ‘cheap’ surface platforms to meet
the Navy’s operational needs. These studies included the following two key documents, the
‘Crossbow’ and ‘Sea Lance’ engineering studies. Cross functional team of NPS studies
undertook these analyses as part of the curriculum for Systems Engineering & Integration, Total
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Ship Systems Engineering Program, the Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Business and Public
Policy graduate programs.207

CROSSBOW
The “Crossbow” engineering study was the first volume of the ultimately five-volume
series of studies aimed at defining how to realize the ‘Streetfighter” concept championed by
Admiral Cebrowski. The first volume of the report focused on the ‘system of systems’ that
would create the capabilities needed to field an effective “Streetfighter” force. This report went
beyond merely analyzing the required surface platform capabilities, it analyzed the required
capabilities of a “Streetfighter” and the systems needed to deliver these capabilities. This is one
of the key ideas that many people have ignored when analyzing the LCS program. LCS was
never envisioned as a stand-alone platform but as one part of a system of systems to include a
Littoral Sensor System (LSS) that through networking would provide the functionality required
by the Navy to meet intended missions in the 21st century. The hull was in effect a truck or
frame upon which the required systems could be mounted, removed, and replaced with other
systems depending on the assigned mission(s).
The Crossbow study started by defining the problem and scope in terms of the required
capabilities:
“CROSSBOW: A high-speed, rapidly deployable, integrated and distributed naval force with a primary
mission of forward presence, littoral sea control, forced access, and access maintenance, in low to moderate
threat environments around the globe.”208
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The team then listed some of the entering assumptions and key considerations for the
CROSSBOW system. For the purposes of this work, the assumptions of interest include the idea
of “combat-consumable” units, high-speed, and the system as a distributed force.209 The issue of
combat-consumability did not survive as a basic system attribute into the construction and
fielding of LCS except possibly indirectly.210 The indirect way that this may have survived is
through the continued calls for cost control and ‘cheapness’ for want of a better term in the
procurement of the LCS class of ships. The high-speed requirement has definitely remained
throughout the course of the entire acquisition program from concept to realization. This is true
too, of the distributed force operation both in terms of physical distribution but also in terms of
networked platforms working as a complete, integrated system. The “Key Considerations” that
the engineering team utilized also replicated (or established) some of the basic attributes that
were also delineated in their assumptions sections; these attributes have also persisted as
components of the LCS class over its life-span. The first of these was the intended extensive use
of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology – in order to reduce the cost of the system.211
The other important cost saving intent was the stated ‘need for automation.’212 This was aimed
at reducing the crew size which in turn can significantly reduce the cost of operating a system or
system of systems, especially over the full life-cycle of said system. The last section of the key
issues focused on environmental factors; in terms of the external environment within which the
system or platforms(s) would be required to operate and not environmental protection type
issues. None of these factors are necessarily remarkable but all have in one way, shape, or form
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continued on into the actual procurement of the class. Two specifically rate some discussion,
one addressed the physical geography and the other the sea-worthiness required of the platform
itself. The first environmental point in the report addressed the cluttered physical environment
and the increased risk of effective surprise attacks in the littoral regions of the world.213 This
concern has provided fodder for the critics of LCS and has remained one of the required
functional capabilities of the LCS from the release of the original design-build specifications to
the present day. The second consideration was the capability to operate in various weather and
sea-state conditions.214 There were certain minimums of stability and sea keeping capabilities
that any platform would require in order to effectively operate at sea, regardless of the specific
geographic location.

SEA LANCE
The study group at NPS undertook another significant engineering study in academic
year 2000 that resulted in the “Sea Lance” concept report.215 This is in many ways the first true
effort to format the modeling and simulation entities from war games and experiment into a
physical reality that could be built. The design team followed the standard acquisition
programmatics in defining the requirement and crafting a mission needs statement from this
requirement. They then created an operational requirements document with a variety of topics to
be addressed including the expected threat, current gaps and seams, required capabilities and
cost. The next step was an AoA with three alternatives and a comparison of the relative merits
and shortfalls of each. The last step was a technical evaluation that examined the actual
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engineering and technical requirements to satisfy the overall system requirements. From this indepth study, the engineering team found that the Sea Lance concept could satisfy the mission
requirements as defined by the Navy.
The mission statement noted that the end of the Cold War had shifted the U.S. Navy’s
most likely operating areas from the “Blue Waters” of the high seas to the near shore, or littoral
regions of the world in reacting to regional crises.216 The team’s stated key to success was to, in
effect, to flood the littoral waters with sensors, platforms, and weapons but to do so with
sufficiently robust and affordable forces.217 This is in keeping with the already noted key
attributes of ‘higher’ numbers of platforms and ‘manageable’ cost per unit. The team also noted
that the current fleet is not suited to operating in the confined and cluttered regions of the
littorals218 – and while they do not categorically say so, the inference is that the current fleet is
also extremely expensive to replace and losing it fighting in the littorals would likely be cost
prohibitive. In comparison, the Sea Lance would potentially be viewed by hostile forces as no
worse than a “nuisance” and not worth expending expensive ordnance to eliminate.219
The operational capability requirement that the engineering team focused on was the
“Capabilities for the Navy After Next” (CNAN), part of a study sponsored by Navy Warfare
Development Command (NWDC). The main focus was on platforms to distribute and augment
a littoral sensor grid or network called the “Expeditionary Warfare Grid” (EWG), a successor to
the LSS with slightly expanded capabilities but designed to cover a smaller geographic area. The
goal was to develop a combatant platform that could deploy the system and become part of the
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network as dispersed individual platforms networked together and with other platforms, sensors,
and weapons.220 The key issue to note is that while the individual platforms were the focus of
the study, the required capabilities of these platforms were not necessarily inherently organic to
the ships themselves. The mission goal was to be able to deploy the EWG – to temporarily
install a system that would provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISAR) of the
operational environment, the littorals. The Sea Lance was merely one of four main components
in the EWG i.e. the “small combatants that deploy/tend the sensors and weapons.”221 They
would provide some command and control of the sensor systems but much of the overall
capability would reside in the networked nature of the systems.
The engineering study team in effect conducted the acquisition program steps of the
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).222 This included or was followed by the technical evaluation of
the specific engineering alternatives that were reviewed in the AoA process. The AoA looked at
three potential system architectures. The first was a medium size combatant with a tow (Option
I). The second was composed of all medium size combatants (Option II). The final architecture
reviewed was a mixture of small and medium sized combatants (Option III).223 The design team
then developed a set of Measures of Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) depicted
in Table 2 below. These included a number of standard warship attributes like range, speed,
stability and some specific, new factors like the Grid Deployment Order and Modularity – of
which Modularity has persisted as a key LCS attribute to this day.
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Table 1- Sea Lance MOE/MOP 224

The team then analyzed the capacity of the potential system architectures to fulfill the
required capabilities represented by the MOPs and MOEs. There were several, notably the
procurement and upkeep costs that the team could not realistically assess and reasonably they did
not do so. The next attribute of the Sea Lance that the team looked at was the salvo analysis.
This analysis looked at required number of missiles or amount of ordnance required to attack a
target, land, surface or air generally, or to defend the platforms themselves from attack. This was
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an application of operations analysis similar to that applied by Hughes in his Tactics books.225
The research team followed this with a cost analysis focusing on the initial platform material and
engineering costs.226 They looked at flexibility, lethality, and survivability and came to the
conclusion that the largest of the three hull sizes (by displacement) scored best in four of the five
MOEs/MOPs.227
The following section of the report looked at the specific nuts and bolts of the system
architecture. By this the authors meant the engineering systems, focusing on propulsion but also
damage control systems228, sensors, computers, and the software to run all of these systems. In
striving to explore new and innovative solutions, the team looked at an electric drive for the ship
based on the intent to apply an “Integrated Power System, which include[ed] electric drive.”229
In a more ground-breaking move, the engineering team considered and decided that the surface
platforms ought to employ water-jet propulsion in place of conventional propellers and shafts for
the main propulsion system(s). This engineering design recommendation was ultimately retained
in the design-build phase of the LCS. In a more information technological focused innovation,
the team recommended the adoption of a Total Ship Open Architecture (TOSA)230 system to the
Crossbow platforms. This is in effect a commercial or open data and information for
engineering, control, communication, and energy systems throughout a platform.231 The goal of
TOSA was to reduce costs by enabling similar engineering standards across various sub-systems
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thus minimizing required hardware changes when systems updates or installations were made.
This was part of the PMS 512 (PEO Surface Strike) “Affordability Through Commonality”
program where using similar software and more importantly similar hardware e.g. electrical
controls, switches, motor controllers for various different ships and submarines would save
money for the Navy by allowing the service to buy in bulk. The other advantage, cost-wise, is
that by using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software programs, the cost of acquisition is
significantly reduced as compared to proprietary software or software written to a specific
military specification (the infamous ‘milspec’).232
The engineering team continued with their analysis by examining the estimated volume
(cubic feet), weight (tons), required power (kilowatts) and cost of the weapons and sensors to be
installed.233 These estimates were based on COTS equipment available on the open market,
mostly courtesy of European vendors. They also categorically stated that the Sea Lance
combatant is primarily [intended to be] a network centric warfare ship.234 In keeping with the
intent to reduce costs, the team also looked at the minimum required crew to operate but not to
maintain the installed systems on the platforms.235 The crewing review included reviewing the
required sewage system, habitability issues (bunks, cooking [mess] facilities), and the training
required to prepare the crew to operate the platforms. The idea of the crew as focused on just on
operating equipment versus operating and maintaining the equipment is another concept that has
been retained throughout the acquisition and fielding of the LCS.
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The key take-aways from the CROSSBOW study and especially from Volume II, the
SEA LANCE were the value of multiple, simple dispersed platforms operating in the newly
important littoral regions of the world. The end of the Cold War revealed to the Navy that the
areas of strife would likely shift from the high seas, especially the North Atlantic or Pacific to
areas much closer to shore and in regions where maritime threats had previously been
unimportant or less important than the threat from the peer competitor force, the Soviet Navy.
Smaller and thus cheaper surface platforms ships for all intents and purposes were assessed to be
more effective for the predicted costs. Single mission ships, dispersed throughout the battlespace
would in effect provide more bang for the buck to the U.S. Navy than a force of multi-mission
ships operating in a more constrained geographic dispersion. Alongside the idea of “quantity
having a quality all its own,” rode the idea of high-speed. Whether it is covered by ‘selfdeployability’ or simply ‘high-speed’ in the required capabilities, speed remained one of the core
required capabilities for LCS from concept development through fielding. The same has held
true for the concept of networked or network-centric platforms and sensors. These three key
determinants have consistently dominated the LCS program – low cost for high(er) numbers,
high speed, and networked systems. By way of illustrating this, the Commander Fleet Forces
Command (CFFC) “Overarching Requirements” in the LCS Concept of Operations brief (Figure
6 below) that was released with the solicitation for LCS preliminary design stated: Cost, mission
packages, and networking capability while speed was to be a prioritized parameter for the new
class i.e. they needed to be fast.236 This Fleet Forces table serves to further illustrate the three
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key factors of cost, numbers, and connectivity or networked platforms. The crew size entry reemphasizes the desire to field minimally manned platforms in order to reduce overall costs.

Figure 6- LCS CONOPS Brief - Slide #7

THE WAR GAMING
It is a bit difficult to separate the sequence of the Cebrowski & Hughes article and the
series of experiments conducted under the auspices of the Naval War College collectively
labeled “Streetfighter.” The article was published in November 1999, while then Vice Admiral
Cebrowski was appointed as the President of the War College in 1998.237 The first reported
“Streetfighter” experiment was conducted as part of the War College’s annual Global or Title
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10/Global238 war-game in the summer of 2000. The Global series of war games started in 1978
to explore Navy capabilities employed in a strategic context against the Soviet Union. For the
Navy, Global turned into the Title 10 game and carried on after the Cold War exploring Navy
capabilities and doctrine.239 This war game series focuses on operational level warfighting
concepts and was conducted by the War College from 1978 to 2001 as Global and resumed as
Global/Title 10 in 2008. For the 2001 iteration, the small, self-deployable and networked ships
provided a potent surface component in the war-game scenario; where the U.S. Navy was facing
an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operational concept based on a potential capability of the
People’s Republic of China circa 2015.240
There were also war-games or experiments conducted as part of the Fleet Battle
Experiment (FBE) series in the early 2000s as a sort of follow on series to the Naval War
College’s “Streetfighter.” The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) executed the
FBE series in the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate new material and procedural
capabilities to fulfill the Navy’s mission requirements in various warfare areas. The emphasis
was slightly different in these experiments in that the networked platforms were not just surface
platforms but included other sensor system, unmanned systems and Marine Corps assets as
well.241 The monograph “Strategy for a Long Peace” besides discussing the FBE series, also
assessed the value of smaller (cheaper) surface platforms, networked with other platforms, and
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with high speed. The high speed for Krepinevich, et al was a tactical asset but the overall
concept ultimately valued high speed for self-deployability vice the ability to out-maneuver a foe
or out-run a hostile missile of torpedo. The FBE series encompassed at least two (FBE “Foxtrot”
and “Golf”) events and potentially three (the two named earlier and “Hotel”) where the surface
platforms and networked system of systems of “Streetfighter” were physically tested and
analyzed.
There was also a series of experiments or war-games executed in the mid to late 1990s
sponsored by OPNAV which examined the concept of smaller, distributed and networked
surface platforms. These games were executed under the general title of the Joint Multi-Warfare
Analytical Game (JMAG) and unlike the FBE series, were done completely through modeling
and simulation.242 The JMAG series investigated various unmanned systems, weapons, sensors,
and platforms operating against a notional adversary (likely modeled closely on real-world
states) with live decision makers, uniformed and non-uniformed subject matter experts (SME) in
the decision loop.243 Reportedly many of the specific attributes of what came to be known as
LCS were highlighted in JMAG events. These included operations in the littorals, specifically
focusing on the Strait of Hormuz; small, relatively high-speed surface ships; and mission
capabilities focusing on mine warfare and anti-surface warfare capabilities. The results and
feedback from the SME participants provided several key insights that are likely to have
impacted the concept development for LCS. These included smaller size, mission specificity
with some multi-mission capability depending on the threat environment, minimum manning,
self-deployability, a level of high-speed, the ability to defeat multiple small boats attacking in
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concert (known as “Swarming tactics”244), and some of the specifics of the hull forms and
materials.245 Despite the claim of the article’s author, the JMAG series of war-games were only
one of several concepts, experiments, and ideas that contributed to the creation of the LCS
program and to the actual construction of the ships and their associated systems.
These sets of war games and experiments while not necessarily directly linked all served
to investigate the concept of the LCS. There have been continuing questions regarding whether
or not the Navy did the due diligence encompassed in the JCIDS process. There may be some
legitimacy in the contention that the level and number of experiments and war games served to
feed the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) required in
the first two phases of the acquisition process. The real disconnect from the standard process
timeline is revealed in that the Capabilities Development Document (CDD) was not released
until after Milestone A – meaning that per the flexibility stated in both the DoD and DON
acquisition instructions, the Navy did start this shipbuilding program before the official
Milestone A was ‘met.’
The really important concepts that were revealed through the Navy’s war gaming and
experimentation were however, the keystone concept ideas that culminated in the design and
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fielding of the LCS class. The first was that the new ships needed to be cheaper, both as
individual hulls but also in terms of manning as compared to the larger, multi-mission ships like
the TICONDEROGA class cruisers and the ARLEIGH BURKE class guided missile destroyers.
The operational environment (formerly battlespace) that the Navy expected to see in the 21st
century encompassed geography that enabled hostile states to apply Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) systems that would make sending larger classes into their coastal waters would greatly
increase the risk of losing these expensive ships even if the mission(s) are successful. The
second key attribute was that the new class of ships needed to be flexible with systems that could
be tailored to specific missions. This was based on the predicted operational environment but
was also based on the scheduled decommissioning of several classes of legacy ships like the
mine-warfare ships (AVENGER and OSPREY classes), the PERRY class guided missile
frigates, and the aging of the CYCLONE class Patrol Coastal (PC) boats. There was an observed
need, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, that each of the missions that these classes were capable
of had to be done by another, replacement class of ships. The pending decommissioning and/or
aging of 91 hulls would leave a large gap in the number of ships that the U.S. Navy needed in
order to accomplish its peace- and war-time missions. And lastly, the new class needed to meet
certain specific physical characteristics in order to be effective in the predicted environment.
These specific characteristics included a very good turn of speed, shallow draft, and a range of
operation enabling them to ‘self-deploy’ to regions where they might be employed. These three
broad areas of characteristics became the driving force(s) behind the concept and the material
design of the LCS.

THE CONCEPT “OPERATIONALIZED” OR “THE SOLICITATION”
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As noted above the CDD was officially released in 2004. But the actual RFP was
solicited in 2003. This is effect made industry a collaborator in taking the concept of a warship
for the littorals and turning it into a physical reality. There was (and is) by necessity a rather
higher level of collaboration and or ‘free rein’ for bidders to design ships as compared to smaller,
less complex military systems. The actual solicitation that was released bore more of a
relationship to set of performance specifications versus a standard set of bid specifications. The
Navy basically told the bidders “Here are the capabilities that we want. Please provide a design
or model that will achieve the required capabilities in the package size that we described.” While
many fans and critics will not admit it, the LCS solicitation package in effect was an attempt to
make the “Streetfigher” concept a physical reality. The actual RFP was issued on 28 February
2003 under the title “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Preliminary Design,” (Solicitation Number:
N00024-03-R-2309). The required response date and time was “2:00 PM Eastern Standard Time
on 14 April 2003.” This did not allow a large response time-frame and there was a lot of
required response material to compete for this contract.

THE STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW)
The SOW specified the initial ‘flight’ or first production run as the desired Navy
acquisition and specified that the delivered product had to meet the parameters listed in the
Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document (PD-IRD) (Attachment J-4).246 It also
categorically stated that the “CAIV target for the LCS ship and the installed core mission
systems is $220M FY-05 dollars threshold and $150M FY-05 dollars objective.”247 This
statement was significant in and of itself because of the use of the term CAIV or Cost as an
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Independent Variable. This showed very clearly to the potential bidders at the very beginning of
the LCS acquisition program that cost of significant interest to the government. CAIV is part of
an acquisition strategy that seeks to control (or minimize if possible) life-cycle costs across the
entire life-span of a weapon system beginning with the acquisition phase.248 Formerly in looking
at acquisition programs, the government focused on cost, schedule and performance.
Performance was the fixed variable, meaning that cost and schedule could be adjusted as long as
the delivered system met (or exceeded) the goal performance parameters. Using CAIV, the
performance is allowed to rise or fall along with the schedule and cost. This allowed the
government more flexibility and potentially lower costs than was possible with performance set
in stone.249 The pricing was to include all of the design, outfitting and testing of the initial Flight
0 LCS ship.
The initial portion of the state of work addressed the basic requirements and desired
performance compared to the minimum required performance. Much of this requirements
information was contained in Section C, Attachment J-4, and J-8-1 of the solicitation package.
Attachment J-4 is the “Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document Serial Number
N763F-S03-026 For Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0 PRE ACAT.” This document
basically represents the design specifications sort of akin to the infamous ‘milspec.’ Looking at
Table 3 following, we can see many of the key requirements that started as desired capabilities in
Fleet Tactics and carried through the concept studies and other preliminary documents. The first
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key requirement that we can see is the “Total Price per Ship.” This goes back to the number of
platforms needed and the desired cost per hull.250 There are also the line items for crew size and
accommodation requirements. These continued to point out the desired minimum manning in
order to push down overall costs for the LCS. The second repetitive item that shows up is the
required ‘sprint’ or maximum speed. Of note, the minimum or threshold level is 40 knots in a
specific sea state (winds and wave height). And the desired capacity is 50 knots in the same sea
state. What was missing or not addressed in the list of design parameters was the networkcentric capability. This was however, addressed in several other sections of the solicitation that
we will review later in this chapter. What was added or gained much greater emphasis was the
requirement to adapt the ship to perform alternate missions, which translates into the mission
package change out time limit. Another important parameter to note in Figure 4 is the desired
payload size. This is important as the desired and required metric tonnages are not large and the
difference between the two, 30 MT all total, is very small compared to normal U.S. Navy
warship displacements. The last key item to note in this figure is the required ‘Operational
Availability.’ This translates into a percentage of time that while on a deployment or not in a
maintenance period (usually called an ‘availability’ by the Navy); the ship must be available for
operational missions at least 85 percent of the time. This equates to a cost-savings because it
reduces the load on other ships/hulls and thus reduces the absolute number of hulls required to
meet the Navy’s mission requirements.
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Table 2- LCS Design Parameters 251
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If we look at section 3.0.2 “Modularity,” we can see the increasing emphasis placed on
the mission modules and the scalability or flexibility that is a stated key attribute for the LCS
class. As this section states:
“The modular Mission Packages are a central feature of the LCS design and will provide
the main war fighting capability and functionality for specific mission areas.”
This clearly delineates the importance of the mission packages and the desired capability to modify the
functionality of the ships to focus on specific missions, like mine warfare or ASW. This is very much of
a departure from the previous Navy preference for multi-mission platforms with the ability to undertake
various missions using only installed systems. Throughout the required parameters there was a distinct
emphasis on marrying organic or installed capabilities with expanded equipment modules to improve
mission capacity.
Speed remained extremely important throughout this section of the solicitation. In particular, on
the last page when addressing the requirement to meet the Cost as Independent Variable (CAIV) goals
there was a list of discriminators provided. Discriminators in contracting serve to highlight the
advantages or better quality of a contractor’s offering whether equipment or services as compared to other
competitors submitting on a government solicitation. In this specific case the first of the listed
discriminators was “top speed.”252 The second was performance in seaway (rough water) both at loiter
and cruise speed further emphasizing the importance of speed.
And just in case anyone missed the importance of speed in the response to the solicitation, the
following figures depict the PowerPoint slides that were included as Exhibit B in the government
package. This exhibit was entitled “ONR/NWDC Sponsored Technology Demonstration Programs and
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Experimentations.”253 The slides were meant to summarize the series of physical and/or modelling and
simulation experiments and tests conducted by the Office of Naval Research and NWDC over the
preceding decade or so. Two of the platforms depicted were basically leased from commercial vendors
for physical experimentation and two were expected to be either leased or constructed by companies for
testing by the Navy. In fact, the Navy had been experimenting with new hull forms for higher speed ships
since at least the 1990s, first with the ‘Sea Shadow’ program then with the High-Speed Vessel (HSV)
which was actually adopted for service by the Navy and Army as the Joint HSV.254 Including these slides
in the solicitation package served again as a very strong signal that speed mattered, and that the successful
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offeror must include speed as a key system attribute in their proposal. They are included in Figures 7 and
8 following this section.

Figure 7- Exhibit A from the LCS Solicitation (Slide 1)

Figure 8- Exhibit A from the LCS Solicitation (Slide 2)

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
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The really surprising thing about this specific solicitation is the amount of conceptual material
and information included in it. By this I mean that government requests for proposals or quotes often
have broad and general descriptions in them with required quality attributes of the products or services to
be provided. However, they don’t often have the very, very broad concept materials like the CONOPs
included in the formal solicitation for the government requirement. More often albeit in slightly different
government markets e.g. architecture and engineering, professional services and engineering services, the
design specifications are either already provided to the bidders or a comparatively stricter set of
design/performance parameters are presented. The most pertinent example of this that comes to mind is
the design contract versus a design-build/design-bid-build contract. In a design contract, the government
solicits reputable and capable firms to design an architecture or construction engineering project (most
often a building or structure like an aircraft runway). The winning bidder does the research, site surveys,
calculations, drawings and basically delivers a set of design plans or blueprints to the government to be
actually built or erected by the government or another commercial company as part of a separate contract.
The design plus bid or build contracts have the prime contractor both design and erect or bid out the
construction of the planned infrastructure. There is very little that is undefined i.e. required floor space in
square feet, number of offices, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) etc. There is some
room for creativity but there are also many definable factors that the government will specify, and this
limits the flexibility of designers.
In the case of the LCS solicitation, in many ways the government had far fewer parameters, many
of which were (and are) to be honest difficult to quantify because of volume and weight trade-offs
required in ships or surface platforms. Because there were fewer hard and fast definable factors, the
bidders were in effect given a much larger degree of freedom to design the system of systems to satisfy
the government’s requirements. But as mentioned earlier, the nature of balancing the various
components and systems of the ship with the allowable volume and weight necessitates a certain amount
of freedom and flexibility in the design of the vessel. The more volume the ship has i.e. the larger the
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hull, then the larger the engines that can be installed in that volume. However, the larger size increases
weight which in turn requires more powerful engines which are generally larger and heavier to reach the
desired speed. Also, designers need to consider the amount of fuel which can be stored which again leads
to the issue of more volume equates to more weight thus yet again requiring more horsepower to reach
designed speeds. It is a very careful balancing act, trading off capabilities to reach the most effective
compromise possible. In the case of the LCS class, these trade-offs were fixed by the desired and
required draft, speed, and cost of the resulting ships. The 20-foot maximum draft255, minimum maximum
speed of 40 knots, and the required range of action without refueling placed some very tight design
parameters on the bidders to achieve. Based on this, they had to be allowed a higher degree of latitude
than in many other government procurement programs to craft their own designs to meet the
specifications.

In the next section of the solicitation, Attachment J 9 Option Items, we can see many of
the same themes mentioned earlier running through this portion of the RFP package. Section C
provides Design Specification and Performance Work Statements, and especially Option Item
0004 – Final System Design256. This Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) addresses the test and
evaluation of the delivered physical platforms preceded by two Critical Design Reviews. But in
addition to the design reviews and op-testing, the contractor is directed to ‘report and utilize
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) reduction measures for the new, proposed system...”257 Later in
the section, the government also directs the contractor to show how the proposed ship design
incorporates and successfully supports life cycle supportability considerations.258 This in effect

Draft or how deep down into the water column a ship’s hull extends is in direct relation to the volume of water
the hull displaces. This is, in turn, directly related to both the shape of the hull but more importantly to the weight of
the hull (which is equal to the weight of water that it displaces).
256
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means that the design needs to be fiscally manageable over the entire life-span of the system,
from cradle to grave. Here again, we see the drive to control and if possible drive down the
fiscal cost of the LCS program writ large. This holds true almost by inference in the section of
this attachment that addresses the automation, damage control, and maintenance requirement
reduction desires of the customer. Or to quote directly from the solicitation, to “maintain
optimized manning levels.”259 In addition to this unstated goal of minimizing manning to reduce
costs, solicitation enjoins the contractor to “affordably” modernize and upgrade LCS systems.260
This is hard to truly quantify, meaning just how affordable will specific upgrades or
improvements be? But it does re-emphasize the Navy’s desire to acquire a cheap or lower cost
ship compared to previous ship classes. As does the direction in this section that the contractor
“shall ensure the straight forward and inexpensive accomplishment of technology insertion,
technology refresh, scalability, and other modernization and disposal efforts.”261 Of note, the
government was also very careful to delineate the amount of potential growth on the options
listed in Section J-9 by addressing priced orders and undefinitized orders.
Any priced order required that the contractors provide price quotes or estimates to the
contracting officer.262 If awarded, the contractor and contracting officer were to negotiate the
price and delivery schedule – leaving some room for adjustment but the underlying government
inference is that this will result in orders that either in terms of timeliness of delivery or cost
were advantageous to the government. The terms were similar for undefinitized orders. An
undefinitized order is one for which the contract terms, specifications, or price have not been
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agreed upon before performance is begun under the order.263 In the case of undefinitized orders,
the contractor and contracting officer were bound by a maximum cost ceiling. The contracting
officer (CO) was to provide an estimated ceiling above which the government will not pay while
the contractor in responding is tasked to provide a maximum ceiling mount as part of the
response. There is still some room for maneuver for both parties because both by definition and
because this was very early in what would amount to a prototyping stage for LCS, the scope in
terms of time and cost for “new” work or new work orders would be very difficult for either
party to determine with any level of accuracy or precision. What this all really amounts to
though is that the government strove very hard to manage costs in the solicitation phase of the
LCS acquisition while acknowledging that designing and building new ships, especially ones
intended to be such a radical departure from previous Navy surface platforms was bound to
create increased risk (of failure or problems) and this equated to increased cost to the
government.

THE NAVY OPEN ARCHITECTURE GUIDANCE
Networking the LCS platforms and systems and by extension the required software was
such an important part of the concept that it warrants some discussion as it was presented in RFP.
In section J-10 of the solicitation package there were several documents addressing the software
and systems integration requirements applicable to the LCS acquisition. The first of these was
the “Design Guidance for the Navy Open Architecture Computing Capability.”264 This
document was incredibly important to the entire LCS acquisition because it really drove the

263
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requirements on how these ships were to be “network-centric” systems. However, this was not
the only key issue that the guide addressed; it also strongly reiterated the cost control or cost
performance required of the architecture (software and hardware) systems to be procured. While
much of the preceding text has dealt with system acquisition and ship design it was not meant to
down-play the importance or the cost of investment in the Information Technology (IT), both
hardware and software associated with ACAT level I programs. LCS is definitely an ACAT
level I program, and the amount of software involved in the installed, modularized, and
associated off-board systems is huge. The point to make here is that the cost of the LCS
acquisition or just about any major weapons system is not just caused by the hardware but also
by the software required to operate that hardware. And over the life-cycle of a weapons system,
the cost to update, upgrade, and ‘fix’ software is not inconsequential by any measure especially
across a number of platforms, whether airframes, sea-frames, armored fighting vehicles, or
communications systems.
For the Department of Defense, “architecture” means the fundamental organization of a
system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and to the environment,
and the principles guiding its design and evolution.265 An open system is defined as:
“A system that implements sufficient open specifications for interfaces, services, and supporting
formats to enable properly engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of systems
with minimal changes, to interoperate with other components on local and remote systems, and to
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interact with users in a style that facilitates portability.” –

DoD Open Systems Joint Task

Force”266

This includes both hardware and software. From our perspective and for this portion of the
chapter, the key component of this is the software portion. The NOA Guide focuses very much
on the software and programming involved in Navy systems especially at it pertains to the LCS
program. The guide states that the design goals for Navy systems “include enhanced Human
Systems Integration (HIS) and optimized manning.”267 This is another example of the intended
and desired cost-control associated with LCS both from the stated design goal of minimum
manning and the intended benefit of minimum manning, reduced operating and life-cycle costs.
A following key policy statement emphasizes the ability to rapidly and affordably maintain,
refresh, and upgrade systems throughout their life-cycle.268 It is the affordability requirement
that again highlights the importance of cost to all Navy acquisitions not just the LCS class.
The Navy’s guide goes on to discuss the attributes of open architectures. These are
systems of systems that use widely accepted and available specifications, standards products and
design practices for systems so that these systems are interoperable easily modified and
extended, both in capabilities and life-spans.269 Here again, we can see the emphasis on cost
management as easily modified and extended systems are generally less costly than those that are
not. But we also revisit the idea of network-centric systems in that they are interoperable with
other systems, one of the key requirements for the Streetfighter concept and the actual LCS class.
The intent of the guide’s approach is to manage, and control problems associated with technical
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refreshes (updating or improving the hardware and/or software), mission capability upgrades and
the total ownership cost of acquired systems.270 Here again, while it is the last of the intended
benefits, we see the importance of costs to the Navy.

The physical challenge that the Navy

faces is that any weapons system, immediately upon fielding is obsolescent. The NOA guide is
meant to address, at least in part, the challenge of providing surface combatants like the LCS
with warfighting upgrades to avoid obsolescence and to keep pace with the threat while still
containing the total cost of ownership to the Navy.271 So basically the Navy is attempting to
balance the cost of maintaining premier capabilities in its warships with the need to apply fiscal
resources across the entire Navy (and DoD) enterprise through applying open architectures to all
systems procurements. The legacy challenge is that milspec and proprietary systems and
software are expensive to replace and upgrade but again, the threat continues to become
increasingly complicated and capable. This equates to a requirement or a “must do” to maintain
a certain level of capability in Navy systems to defeat the predicted or perceived threats.272 The
Navy states in the guide that the funding required to upgrade systems is in effect a major budget
barrier to continued system development to fleet support.273 This statement in many ways forms
the very core of the challenge that the Navy faces and why controlling costs has been so very
critical to the LCS acquisition. Regardless of the willingness of the administration in power, the
Secretary of Defense, or Congress to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, individual ships are
growing progressively more expensive. As Drezner, et al pointed out in “Are Ships Different?”
the length of time to design and build, the complexity, the low numbers of production units, and
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the high unit costs all contribute to the overall expense of ship acquisitions.274 Another attribute
that significantly increases the cost of warships is the requirement for high speed. The size of the
propulsion plant and accompanying cost for the machinery plus the increased fuel costs
significantly increase both production and life cycle costs.275 Yet another contributing factor
since the end of the Second World War has been the huge increase in the amount of electronics
mounted on and in warships. According to one Rand Corporation study for the U.S. Navy, 35 to
57 percent of the cost of a warship was the cost of the equipment compared to material costs of
11 to 15 percent.276 This same study found that power density has caused a huge increase in the
size and cost of combatant ships.277 The Rand authors posited that power density is a better
proxy for complexity compared with power generation capacity because it is indicative of how
many systems are put on a ship of a given size. For surface combatants over the past three
decades, there has been a 40 percent increase in average power density.278 This equates to an
equivalent increase in the cost of building a warship.
The NOA Guide points out those non-standard products providing unique advantages or
otherwise unavailable functionality and performance flexibility or a cost-benefit to the Navy are
not forbidden but they need to satisfy the special characteristics noted.279 However, the goals of
the program are to provide the Naval Warfare Systems (NWS) with both the benefits of assured
technical performance and reduced life-cycle costs, affordable tech refresh costs, and reduced

Drezner, et al, “Are Ships Different?” xi.
Moran & Russell, Maritime Strategy and Global Order, 225.
276
Mark V. Arena, Irv Blickstein, Obaid Younossi, Clifford A. Grammich, “Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships
Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over the Past Several Decades.” (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 28.
277
Arena, et al, “Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?” xv. Power density is defined as electrical power
generation capacity in kW divided by Light Ship Weight (LSW) tons. LSW or light displacement is the weight of
the ship (in tons) including all permanent items. It does not include variable loads such as crew, stores, and fuel.
278
Ibid, 38.
279
Navy Open Architecture Guide, 7.
274
275

118

upgrade cycle time; all of which equate to reduce overall life-cycle costs for procured systems
and equipment. 280 In short, the Navy categorically states in the guide that it will implement
warfare systems that meet operational performance requirements and that are affordable. There
is no inference that performance will be sacrificed for cost, but this inference could be drawn if
resources became particularly constrained in future acquisitions. In fact, the stated requirements
for computing capability, again encompassing both the hardware or computers themselves and
the software to run them, are robust. While maintaining the requirement for affordability and
maintainability, the required NWS computing systems are expected (or required) to continue
operating under “battle conditions” that include exposure to shock, fire (or high temperatures),
and salt-water spray.281 These are all well documented conditions that U.S. Navy warships have
been subjected to in historical combat situations and are not likely to change in future conflicts.
The one area that the NOA Guide does not specifically address and that has come under much
closer scrutiny recently is the issue of cyber-attack. Without veering too far afield on this topic,
which is actually very important, the use of open architectures does increase in some ways the
vulnerability to cyber-attack of Navy computing systems.282 However, it also makes it easier to
craft patches and protective programming to defend systems from attacks or intrusion. The
ability of technicians and programmers to access the systems and their resident software enables
more experts to support trouble-shooting, repairs, and improved security programs.

280

Ibid, 8.
Ibid, 15.
282
For a more popular ‘take’ on the issue of computer and warfare systems, see P. W. Singer and August Cole,
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).
281

119

The following section of the RFP included the Navy Open Architecture Computing
Environment (NOACE) Technologies, Standards, and Products guide. 283 This guide reinforced
and expanded on the issues and guidance provided in the NOA Guide. This document’s stated
purpose was to provide initial and preliminary standards and product selection guidance for the
Navy Open Architecture (NOA) program’s Navy Open Architecture Computing Environment
(NOACE).284 It re-stated the NOA program’s goal as developing unified Navy product line
using a common computing environment with a common set of warfighting functions shared
across multiple platforms.285 Here again, we see the intent of distributed or network-centric
ships or platforms as one of the key discriminators for Navy acquisition in general and the LCS
program in particular. But again, the Navy is also trying to avoid losing functionality while
saving money because the end of the section mentioned above notes the intent to retain the
“unique sets of warfighting functions associated with each ship class.”286 The overarching
definition of the computing environment in this section of the document is that of a compatible
set of standards based, Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) computing infrastructure components.
These components will form a framework (or architecture) upon which warfighting and support
applications (generally software) are to be built in accordance with the NOA rules and
regulations.287 The use of COTS is particularly notable because it has and continues to be one of
the Navy’s and the entire Department of Defense key policy ingredients for taming costs in
acquisition programs.288 Later in this guide, the Navy discusses Information Assurance (IA)
283
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again as in the NOA guide. The basic argument that the Navy applies to IA while adopting
commercial standards is that commercial best practices for products are less likely to inhibit their
performance because market competition drives commercial developers to field systems that will
both meet their operators’ performance needs while also protecting the operators’ proprietary
information and data.289 Products that do not provide these capabilities will be driven out of the
market by lack of demand. So, in a somewhat ironic sense, considering the nature of the
American national defense monopsony-oligopoly market, the DoD is relying on market
efficiency conditions outside of the national defense one, to provide sufficiently robust and
efficient products. The following two attachments in the J-10 section of the RFP are
spreadsheets containing standards, specific equipment, product manufacturers, advanced
technology demonstrations, and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
stakeholders. These data are to inform the potential bidders on specific options required and
desired in the solicitation response as well as identify potential beneficial items and technology
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for their responses.290 The overall goal of section J of the solicitation was to inform and
influence the potential bidders. The inform piece was about the overarching network
architecture and how it is intended to function. The influence piece was intended to make sure
that the bidders knew that costs were a significant factor for the network portion of the system
and that whatever the bidder proposed as a solution had to function and function well within the
parameters and network-centric architecture as described in the attachments. These attachments
again however serve to highlight two of the critical themes running throughout the LCS
acquisition, price (or cost) and networked systems and platforms.
The section following the architecture inserts also served to emphasize the goal of cost
reduction and/or control in this acquisition program. In section J-11, the Navy provided inferred
guidance to the bidders by including the Performance Based Logistics (PBL) Guidance
document.291 This was a directive that the FY 03 Defense Policy Guidance directed all of the
services to establish a PBL for all new weapons systems acquisitions and to retrofit to all ACAT
I and II fielded systems. The basic goal of PBL is to improve logistics to the warfighter while
maintaining or reducing the cost for this support. As in the preceding sections addressing the
software and hardware of the design, this PBL document focuses on “improving the total life
cycle support and cost.”292 Here again, we can see the Navy’s goal of not necessarily buying
LCS “on the cheap” but striving to control costs as far as possible in advance of actually
purchasing and then maintaining the class over its entire life-cycle.
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Attachment J-12 (see Figure 7 below) further hammered home the point about controlling
costs. This serves to both emphasize the desired price controls but also the government’s recog-

Figure 9- Attachment J-12 Cost vs Performance 293

nition that the stated design goals would come with increased costs. The graphic represents this
acceptance because it details the relationship between ship size and speed and the predicted cost
of production. The short version is that the faster and therefore the larger the ship, then the
higher the cost to produce it (and likely the higher the cost to design it as well). It may be an
inference, but it is likely a good one that the intent is to reduce or manage as much as possible
consistent with attaining minimum performance goals the expected cost per hull of the winning
design.
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The remainder of the solicitation package is not immediately applicable to this analysis
other than to serve as proof that certain acquisition requirements from the FAR and DFARS
remain applicable regardless of the nature or size of the acquisition. While Section L-2 was
relatively standard ‘boiler-plate’ FAR/DFARS on “Provisions Included in the Full Text” it also
included several references to earlier acquisition documents that re-enforced the quest for cost
control and flexibility in performance and/or construction standards.294 The opportunity to
provide updated or non-military standards for the LCS flight 0 design was provided through
reference to a NAVSEA document empowering “ALTERNATIVES TO SPECIFICATIONS OR
STANDARDS (NAVSEA) (AUG 1994).”295 This paragraph allowed bidders to show how using
or not using ‘old’ standards or specifications was “advantageous to the government” and provide
how alterative, recommended newer or non-government (i.e. commercial) standards would
satisfy the requirements as described in the solicitation. Again, the inference here is that the
government wanted to save some money by enabling the commercial bidders to make their
case(s) for alternative and hopefully cheaper solutions that would satisfy the requirements. The
last paragraph of this attachment addressed another potential cost-saving measure through the
use of Non-Developmental Items (NDI).296 In short, if there is some piece of equipment or
software already in service, for sale, or needing some minor modification(s) to satisfy the
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requirement of a Research and Development (R&D) or conventional milspec item, then the
bidder could recommend the substitution to the government. And rather than infer money
savings as a goal, the Navy came right out and stated: “The intent of the NDI alternative is to
provide the Navy with effective and economic solutions to its essential operational
requirements.”297 The solicitation package combines two hard to achieve but complimentary
goals, design and build a system that performs as required and provides that performance at a
bearable fiscal cost. The specific proposal response items and assessment criteria bear this out.

THE RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS (AKA “THE PROPOSAL”) AND THE
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
In most cases of government RFPs and RFQs, the soliciting agency will spell out the
specific response sections, to include permissible page lengths, that it wants from bidders. The
government will also tell the bidders how their respective proposals will be evaluated. This held
true in the LCS Flight 0 solicitation. The response section (Section L-3) laid out very clearly
what responding offerors were required to submit in their proposals.298 This was to be a Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) award to the offeror who provided the “best value” to the government.299 The
vendors bidding on the LCS were directed to provide three volumes in their proposals to include
a Technical Volume (I), a Price Evaluation Requirements Volume (II), and a Standard Form 33
(SF-33) Solicitation Set and Subcontracting Plan Volume (III). The below table (Table 4) shows
that Volume I and certain required appendices had page limits while the other two volumes did
not have a page limit.300
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VOLUME

TITLE

SECT –L PART

PAGE
LIMIT

I
Appendix 1

Technical
General
Arrangement
Drawing
Booklet and
Releasable
Artist Concept
Weight Report

II

Price
Evaluation
Requirements
SF-33
Solicitation Set
and
Subcontracting
Plan

III
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Table 3- Response Proposal Required Contents

The Technical Volume requirements included a Management Factor with five sub-factors to be
addressed by the bidding firms. These sub-factors included capabilities and qualifications (1.1),
ability to meet CAIV targets (1.2), the bidders’ management approach (1.3), and the bidder’s
data management approach (1.4), and the usual past performance (1.5).301 The way these factors
are articulated, their ordering, and their weighted value in the assessment evaluation are
important because they reflect the Navy’s striving to achieve the desired performance
capabilities but to do so at an economically feasible cost. According to the Evaluation Factors
for Award, the technical factor is more important than the pricing factor and the most important
of the technical factors is the management one. It outweighs all of the others. In turn, factors 1.2
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to 1.4 all outweigh 1.5 or past performance.302 These factors and the evaluation criteria serve to
highlight the Navy’s focus on finding an offeror that is capable of producing a complex warship,
hence the ‘capabilities and qualifications’ factor but can also adjust the cost by balancing it
against the desired traits, thus the CAIV ‘management’ factor. The other technical sub-factors
serve to describe the actual nuts and bolts of how the bidder will design and build the LCS but
also how that bidder identifies and mitigates risks e.g. schedule slippages, cost overruns,
software failures. In fact, though it has the least value in the assessment scoring, past
performance is specifically retained to enable the Navy “to determine the offeror’s performance
risk.”303
After management, the second of the important technical factors was technical approach
itself. This included three major sub-factors, the preliminary design and systems analysis
approach, the systems engineering approach, and the systems architecture development and
implementation approach.304 These factors also reflect the quest to balance cost with capabilities
but also serve to highlight one of the consistently sought capabilities of the LCS from concept to
commissioning; the idea of networked platforms and systems. Admittedly, the systems analysis
and systems engineering is easily applied to the hardware associated with surface ships but the
increasing ubiquity of computer controls, sensors, and the software to run them makes their
application to electronics and software at least as important. This becomes especially true in the
area of systems architecture development and implementation. The preliminary design and
analysis was all geared towards creating a design capable of performing the specified mission

LCS Solicitation, N00024-03-R-2309, Section M, “EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD,” M-2.
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areas and in accordance with the LCS CONOPS discussed earlier.305 The technical approach
was required to address the specifics of the Hull, Mechanical, and Engineering (HM&E)
equipment, the mission packages, and the Human Systems Integration (program) that the bidder
intended to apply.

THE PRECEDENT
The request for bids that the government sent out was a very unique acquisition strategy
for the Navy – because it was based on a set of performance specifications. The more traditional
or standard way that the Navy had acquired ships, the FFG-7 or CG-47 classes for example,
involved significant engineering and Research & Development (R&D) investments well before
the first steel or aluminum was cut for the hull. The current DD-1000, formerly DD(X),
involved expenditures of $5-6 billion before the contract was awarded for construction.306
Previous Navy ship acquisitions were not done using design specification style acquisition
strategies. The strategies used for the FFG-7, DD-963, CG-47, LHD, and new CVN class ships
all involved both significant R&D allocations before the solicitations for construction were sent
out. They also included detailed design contracts where the Navy provided much of the design
parameters, blue prints, and plans. The TICONDEROGA cruisers were an evolutionary design
that used the hull form and engineering plant of the preceding SPRUANCE class. On top of
these was mounted the Aegis combat system.307 They also shared many of the sub-systems from
the preceding destroyer class including the guns, torpedo tubes, and sonar sensors. The DDG 51
class used the weapons system from the cruisers and mounted it on a modified hull form. The
engineering plant was also modified but again in an evolutionary vice revolutionary way; the
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main engines and auxiliary generators remained the same but the space layout and some of the
control and auxiliary systems were changed or improved. The same is true in many ways of the
current LHD/LHA class ships. The WASP and AMERICA class are a direct linear descendent
of the first Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) class, USS TARAWA and her sisters
commissioned between 1976 and 1980. Their immediate predecessors were the IWO JIMA class
of helicopter carries (LPH) serving from 1961 to 2002. These ships are highly representative of
the incremental design changes that the Navy applied to succeeding ship classes. The physical
layout of the succeeding classes was changed but generally in a minor way when compared to
preceding classes. The same was true of the engineering plants, where it was not until 2001 that
USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8) was laid down without a steam plant. Instead, the last ship of
the WASP class was designed and outfitted with gas turbine engines. This design continuity
clearly reflects the traditional Navy approach to ship design and construction. And the LCS
acquisition was and is a decided break from this tradition.
Referring back to the previous chapter, the Navy had previously come to the bidders with
a more detailed package formulated with the potential bidders more often than not.308 Most of
the material or engineering specifications are already determined; hence the famous of infamous
“milspec” or military specification, and the remaining definitions are limited in scope. These
were not the terms in which the LCS solicitation was couched. This RFP was not an “I do not
know exactly what I want but I will know it when I see it!!” sort of request. It was however, a
distinct departure from the process and methodology the U.S. Navy used to procure previous
classes of ships.

See Figure 3, specifically the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction Phase. See also Figure 4 for the Navy’s
“Two Pass/Six Gate System,” notably the “Technology Development Phase” prior to releasing an RFP at Milestone
B.
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The basic thrust of the solicitation was for cheap, fast, and single mission capable
platforms to be designed and delivered within rather stringent capability parameters. The
overarching goal was affordability with speed (of the platform but to a lesser extent delivery)
coming a very close second. Price was to be kept low (relatively) through limiting the platform
hull size and through minimal manning. The minimal manning was in some ways the overriding
factor for consideration because smaller ships require smaller crews and crews are often the most
expensive operating cost for an individual ship or any other naval weapons system for that
matter. The other crucial design variable that the bidders had to satisfy was the speed of the ship.
As discussed earlier, the engineering plant required to drive a hull at 40 knots would become the
overriding technical factor in designing the LCS and in crewing the ship. In some ways, the LCS
parallels the A-10 Thunderbolt II (more commonly referred to as the “Warthog) which has been
described as an airplane designed around a gun. Similarly, the LCS class could be described as a
propulsion plant around which was constructed a ship. The government’s solicitation was clear
if not precise regarding the desired performance parameters to include managing costs, making
the ship go fast, and providing the platform to carry the desired capabilities. The following
chapter will show that the Navy got what it asked for but did not and does not like it.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROAD TO INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

This chapter will delineate the path from solicitation to fleet introduction of the LCS. It
will in effect show how the Navy has taken a concept and made it a reality.309 How much of a
reality is an on-going debate which this chapter will also serve to highlight to the reader. The
first section looks at the timeframe from contract award to ship launch. The second portion
describes and examines the propulsion plant problems and casualties that the class, regardless of
hull type has faced and what has been done to improve the performance and reliability of the
engineering plant to date (April 2017). It will also provide context to these propulsion
engineering challenges through some significant historical examples of other Navy ship class
acquisitions. Some of these examples are recent and some are more dated but as in the earlier
cited episode of the Swedish ship VASA, marine engineering and naval architecture tend to
present particularly difficult technical problems. The final section of this chapter will describe
the development and testing accomplishments to date with the mission packages. It is also
intended to highlight just how hard it is to design these systems because of space and weight
limitations and the required system capabilities. The final section will start to bridge the
transition from technical to organizational challenges and the theory of organizational behavior.

THE LCS PROGRAM – AFTER MILESTONE A
The release of the solicitation for LCS design and build proposals marked Milestone A
for this program. And again, turning back to the previous chapter, we need to remember the
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“flexibility inherent in the system” for ship building programs where production decisions are
sometimes made before the Technology Development Phase and Integrated System Design are
completed.310
“Shipbuilding programs may be initiated at milestone A in order to start ship design concurrent
with sub-system and component TD.” 311

The contracts were awarded to two bidders. One was a partnership between Lockheed
Martine and Fincantieri (in the form of the Marinette Shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin) and a
team of General Dynamic Information Technology (GDIT) and Austal Shipbuilding, a joint
company formed by the Australian firm Austal and the U.S. firm Bender Shipbuilding and
Repair Company, that operates a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. The awards were made on 27
May 2004.312 USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) was delivered to the Navy and commissioned into
service on 08 November 2008. USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) was commissioned in January
2010. Both ships have made extended deployments to the Pacific region since commissioning,
FREEDOM in 2013 and INDEPENDENCE in 2014. The road to IOC has not however been a
smooth one for either variant of the LCS.313 Figure 10 shows the difference in appearance and to
a degree design between the two variants.

See preceding Chapter 2, “Flexibility in Acquisition,” 58.
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Figure 10- LCS 1 (top) and LCS 2

314

ENGINEERING CHALLENGES
The LCS class, whether built by Marinette or Austal employed a revolutionary, for naval
ships, propulsion system. In order to reach the desired 40 knot top speed, the only viable
alternative for a ship of roughly 3300 to 3500 tons (LCS 2 and LCS 1 versions respectively)315
was to use water jets vice the more traditional propeller system.316 There has been a constant
challenge in marine engineering to translate the rapid rotation of high speed turbines into lower
rate rotations that ships’ screws or propellers can use to develop thrust and move the hull through
the water. Higher speed or higher Rotation per Minute (RPM) turbines are more efficient in
turning thermal energy from steam boilers or fuel-air combustion in gas turbine generators like
the LM2500 series engines into mechanical energy for propulsion. However, these high RMPs
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are often too high for large diameter shafts and screws to effectively and efficiently turn into
mechanical thrust for moving hulls. Navies around the world have used reduction gears since the
introduction of turbines for propulsion to translate higher RPMs into usable propeller rotations
for warships. Reduction gears are generally bulky and heavy sets of machined gears and pinions
that take up a lot of space and generally increase the displacement of a ship by several tons. The
propulsion system installed in the LCS class has eliminated the need for reduction gears but still
requires the conversion of mechanical energy into usable thrust. The use of water jets, akin to
air-breathing jet engines in that the rotation, compression, and expulsion of a medium (liquid
water vice vaporous air in this case), creates thrust has made reduction gears unnecessary. This
new water jet propulsion system while removing the requirement for reduction gears has
however suffered from teething problems since the launch of the LCS hulls. In 2010 one of four
Rolls-Royce water jet propulsion units was replaced and in 2012 a shaft seal failed, which also
required replacement.317 This level of mechanical reliability is not unusual for new marine
propulsion systems, but it has made the LCS class an easy target for its critics. Despite
numerous critics and critiques however, the LCS class has been deploying to the western Pacific
since 2013.

FIRST DEPLOYMENT
USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) deployed to the Western Pacific centering on Singapore in
March 2013. The first leg of the trip was marred by power losses that forced the ship to stop
over for a more extended stay in Guam than had been planned.318 In April 2013, while inport
Singapore, sea water intrusion contaminated the lubricating oil system reportedly in the main
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reduction gears but more likely in the shaft bearings for the main propeller shaft(s).319 On 21
May 2013, FREEDOM’s engineering watchstanders found sediment in the ship’s lubricating
system forcing the ship to return to the Changi Naval Base.320 Whether this was organic matter,
metallic ‘chips’ carved from the machinery itself, or other foreign matter in the oil is unclear but
based on the fact that the ship got back underway shortly after this casualty, it was likely just dirt
or some other non-metallic ‘bits’ in the lube oil. Then on 20 July 2013, while participating in an
exercise with several other navies, including that of the Republic of Singapore, FREEDOM
suffered a main propulsion engineering casualty that forced her to return to port.321 The ship had
been preparing for a vertical replenishment at sea and these sorts of events usually require all of
the ship’s propulsion and engineering systems to be up and running.322 The return to port while
undoubtedly caused by the engineering casualty was a reasonable and standard safety measure
under the circumstances.323 The ship returned to Changi Naval Base and an initial assessment
identified exhaust leaks in turbochargers for the ship’s diesel generators that caused one
generator to overheat and shut down. There were also reportedly problems with electrical load-
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shedding between online generators, which is the process of prioritizing and shutting down (or
shedding) non-essential systems.324 In October, the ship’s crew discovered sea water
contamination in the starboard steerable water jet hydraulic system.325 This was followed by
another minor engineering casualty in November when a steering indicator for the port steerable
water jet was found to be operating incorrectly during pre-underway steering checks.326 The
system itself was working fine but the position repeater on the bridge, potentially providing
steering information to both the helmsman and to the Officer of the Deck (OOD),327 was not
indicating the jet’s position correctly. This was reportedly due to a damaged feedback cable in
the system. This first deployment served to highlight many of the predicted and some of the notso-predicted engineering challenges associated with the LCS class.
Despite these engineering challenges, FREEDOM did exercise at sea with other U.S.,
coalition, and partner nation ships. This included Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT) exercise programs with naval units from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. While some might consider
CARAT exercises as rather simplistic events including basic seamanship, navigation, and shiphandling events, they are prime venues for U.S. Navy units to show their skills in the skills that
are crucial to professional mariners. They also serve as opportunities to operate with current and
potential allies, gauge these same navies’ skills, and to develop professional and personal
relationships with these same current and potential allies at the individual level. FREEDOM
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also participated in the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise program in
September 2013 and made several port calls during her deployment. Besides these training and
Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) events, the first LCS class ship to deploy also
conducted real-world operations, specifically providing Foreign Humanitarian Assistance by
delivering supplies to the armed forces of the Republic of the Philippines after Typhoon
Haiyan328 as part of Operation DAMAYAN.329 FREEDOM also conducted passing exercises
(PASEX) with two Brunei and one Bangladeshi naval unit.330 In another key for the ship class,
FREEDOM swapped crews in Singapore, completing the turnover on 06 August 2013.331 This
was one of the key entering arguments in the concept of LCS, the ability to rotate crews bringing
in new fresh sailors when embarked crews were worn down by the long hours of work and
watchstanding. The Navy, at least in the form of the Surface Force Commander, Vice Admiral
Copeman considered the ten-month deployment by FREEDOM and her two embarked crews a
success:
“USS Freedom’s (LCS 1) maiden 10-month deployment validated the Navy’s overall concept of operations
and provided us with valuable feedback on its operation, manning, and logistics. The insights gained on the
deployment will be used to further improve the operational flexibility, maintainability and efficiency on
future deployments for this newest class of ship in the U.S. Navy. “332
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For all of the bad publicity aimed at USS FREEDOM, this was a success considering the miles
steamed to get in and out of the Seventh Fleet area of operations and the specific mission and
tasks completed by the ship’s crews during the ten months spent away from homeport. It was
not an unqualified success, but it did serve to provide “valuable feedback” to the Navy on this
“newest class of ship[s]” and to support the theater engagement plans of the Combatant
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

THE LINGERING ENGINEERING CHALLENGES
While the first LCS deployment was underway, USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) was
experiencing propulsion challenges as well. Getting underway from Naval Station San Diego on
21 June 2013, she experienced a sea water cooling casualty that forced the shut-down of her
main propulsion gas turbine engines.333 There have reportedly also been problems with the
INDEPENDENCE variant’s power generation equipment and propulsion drive-train
components.334
The Navy has both acknowledged the problems and stated that fixes had been identified:
“The SSDGs,” says Navy Undersecretary Sean Stackley, are “probably the most significant
design deficiency we’re dealing with today. We do have reliability issues that we have identified.
We have fixes in place on the follow ships. As LCS-1 continues its deployment, we’ll be
incorporating those fixes on LCS-1 to address that issue.”335 One of the major problems was that
the diesels were supposed to run for 850 hours until a failure occurred but the LCS ships were
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only getting 400 hours between failures.336 There were also some design issues with the cooling
system, maybe the diameter or geometry of the piping was not allowing sufficient cooling water
flow to maintain the needed temperatures. There is also a reported problem with the governors
on the diesel engines that maintain the number of piston strokes required to support a given
electrical load on the generators. All of this is not surprising nor was it unexpected by the Navy.
To quote a senior naval officer “The five things that I briefed [to more senior Navy officers and
leaders] were going to break. They broke.”337
The Navy undertook several initiatives to address the LCS class engineering challenges
including a flag officer level council, an engineering program review, and hiring more engineers
to oversee new ship construction. The LCS Council was established by the CNO in August 2012
with a charter to “rapidly and decisively resolve impediments to the LCS program’s success.”338
The members were all 3-staff flag officers including the Director, Navy Staff; the Principal
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)); the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); and the
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNSP).339 The seniority and composition
of this council reflects the importance with which the CNO views the success of the LCS
program in general, and the program’s engineering success in particular. The engineering
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program review is being supervised by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and includes
reviewing both design and operational data.340 This review is intended to identify both material
and systemic defects or potential defects before they become actual failures or breakdowns. The
Navy has also invested significant time and resources into providing and improving the
engineering training that LCS crews receive. The training contract awarded to Cubic Systems to
develop courseware material includes the curriculum, teaching materials, individual class guides,
and the software to use in the virtual ship facility out in San Diego, CA.341 Not only have new
training facilities been brought online but the training curriculum and personnel rotations have
been revised to strengthen individual and crew training.342 And finally the Navy awarded a
contract (N00024-14-C-4313) to General Dynamics, Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine to provide
planning yard services in support of both variants of in-service Littoral Combat Ships.343 The
idea behind a planning yard is that the contractor (or public shipyard) serves as a central manager
for engineering, planning, ship configuration, material and logistics support to maintain and
modernize a given class of ships. Despite strident claims to the contrary, the Navy has not
ignored the engineering casualties and perceived short-falls suffered by the LCS class. However,
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none of the solutions are going to be rapid panaceas and it will take some time to fix the
problems with the LCS engineering plant.

PREVIOUS ENGINEERING CHALLENGES
The LCS class of ships were not the first ones that the U.S. Navy commissioned
employing electrical propulsion plants. In the early years of the Twentieth century, a collier,
USS JUPITER was outfitted with a turboelectric drive. This drive used boiler produced steam to
run a turbine generator that powered a motor directly connected to a propeller.344 The main
alternative was using reduction gears to reduce the high rotations per minute (RPM) of steam
turbines mechanically to a more efficient, lower RPM to drive the propellers. The test-bed was
sufficiently successful that the Navy chose to install a turboelectric propulsion system in USS
NEW MEXICO (BB 40). In fact, the system was deemed so successful that the next fourteen
battleships laid down by the Navy used it for their main propulsion.345 There were some
challenges associated with this first electric propulsion system notably weight and volume. Also,
it became obvious after the fact that the hatchways on the battleships were not large enough to
allow the generators to be removed without cutting out larger accesses.346 This turboelectric
system was obviously not the same type of propulsion plant as has been fitted on the LCS class.
It was however, as groundbreaking in its time as the hydro jet system installed in LCS. The
biggest difference is that the turboelectric system was tested on a naval platform while hydro jets
had been used commercially and successfully. This is only part of the story because the LCS
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propulsion system is required to push ships upwards of 40 knots while the battleships required a
top speed of 21 to 22 knots.
Another new class of ships, the NORTH CAROLINA battleships had a significant
propulsion related issue that delayed their operational employment in the Second World War.
While both ships had been commissioned by the summer of 1941, neither had been able to
achieve their maximum power trials because of excessive longitudinal vibration.347 A series of
fixes using different propellers and more structural bracing topside were tried but the problems
persisted until at least 1943.348 These problems had in fact delayed the deployment of both
NORTH CAROLINA and her sister-ship WASHINGTON to the Solomons Island campaign in
the Pacific.
While not intending to be an apologist for or fan of the ships, the author would be remiss
if he did not point out that these sorts of engineering problems are neither unique to LCS nor
uncommon in the U.S. Navy’s surface force. The fact that the reader ought to bear in mind is
that naval engines, of whatever type, are intended to drive large hulls through the water at
relatively high speeds. This puts a lot of stress and strain on warships’ engineering plants and
thus leads to periodic failures through high pressures, corrosion, and high temperatures. Some of
the casualties onboard FREEDOM were design faults but at least as many were due to running
the engineering plant up to its designed limits, for extended periods of time. And ultimately
regardless of the reliability issues, the U.S. Navy got the speed and displacement that they
wanted.
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The SPRUANCE class destroyers which were commissioned into the fleet beginning in
1975 also suffered from perception issues early on in their introduction to the fleet. They were
criticized for being too big compared to the visible armament of two five-inch guns and one
Anti-Submarine Rocket Thrown Torpedo (ASROC) launcher.349 What most critics did not
comment on was the design that allowed for expansion and installation of new systems and
weapons once they were available.350 Throughout the life-span of the class the weapons systems,
especially for surface and strike warfare were updated with new missiles, launchers, electronic
warfare and cryptographic systems.351 They also failed to realize that the new engineering plant
while not hugely more efficient in terms of fuel consumption was more efficient and more
importantly was infinitely more flexible in terms of starting and acceleration when compared
with the high pressure steam systems installed in previous USN destroyers and cruisers.352 It also
incorporated a sound reduction system with systems that generated bubbles which masked the
noise from the engineering spaces (called “Masker”) and one that generated air bubbles along the
edge of the propellers, reducing noise created by cavitation (called “Prairie”). This made the
SPRUANCE class significantly quieter than preceding classes which in turn made them much
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more effective anti-submarine (ASW) platforms than their predecessors from both a sensor
effectiveness and counter-detection perspective.353
The same sorts of criticism greeting the introduction of the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY
(FFG 7) class frigates and the TICONDEROGA (CG 47) class of cruisers. In the case of the
FFG 7 class, the then General Accounting Office issues a report in January 1979 that addressed
several perceived short-comings in the class. GAO stated that the FFG 7 “program has been
characterized by significant cost growth, schedule delays, shipbuilding claims, and deficiencies
in the performance of naval ships.”354 This statement sounds like it could be a summary for the
LCS program, thirty years later. The GAO director went on to note that in order to build the
number of hulls required by the Navy, significant design controls were exerted on the size and
cost of the class. This equated to sacrificing systems and capabilities in order to get a certain
number of hulls.355 In yet another comment that echoes the criticism of LCS was the issue of
ship survivability. The FFG 7 in general was susceptible to splinter damage from topside
explosions, shock induced damage from hits and near misses, and had inadequate protection
against chemical and biological hazards.356 In the case of the TICONDEROGA class, there were
significant and voluminous complaints or concerns regarding how top-heavy and unstable the
ships were because of the radar panels being mounted so high up on the superstructure.357
Dipping further back into U.S. warship design history we can find even more examples where
new classes of ships were derided by the experts. The first series of heavy cruisers built under
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the strictures of the 1922 Washington Treaty were generally underweight, meaning that
displacement that could have been used for improved machinery, weapons and/or survivability
went unutilized.358 It also meant that the stability and sea keeping of the ships was less than
optimal, according to a contemporary Royal Navy observer there was a short and deep roll on
these ships that gave “a sharp violent motion to the ship in any sort of a sea in a way which [was]
very disconcerting to gun pointers and naturally reduces the accuracy of their fire.”359 While the
first tranche of ships built for the U.S. Navy were adequate as proven by their wartime service
they were still called “tinclads” and “eggshells armed with hammers” by contemporary writers.
The second series of cruisers designed and built starting in the late 1920s were better positioned
to take advantage of the un-used weight that their predecessors revealed and were thus much
better protected with armor. However, the treaty limitations adopted as a result of the
Washington and London (1930) treaties meant that the Navy had only 10,000 tons of
displacement to work with a speed requirement dictated by the cruiser’s intended missions.
Again, as with the LCS, the Navy had to make difficult decisions and ultimately sacrificed
increased protection for the required speed.360
These historical examples are not provided as some sort of apologia for the challenges
faced by the LCS class. They are however presented as evidence that designing and building
ships, including the various engineering and weapons systems they carry, is not a simple or easy
process. As noted in a preceding chapter, at least one masterpiece of the naval architect’s art
capsized and sank before its maiden voyage.361 The real point made in this section is that new
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classes of U.S. Navy ships, from battleships, to cruisers, destroyers, and LCS have all met with
less than enthusiastic welcomes from pundits and have almost invariably suffered from some sort
of design failure that required rectification. Most, if not all, were ultimately ‘fixed’ and the ships
provided good service both in peace and war to the U.S. Navy.

THE MISSION PACKAGES
While engineering challenges remain a concern, the lack of fully functioning mission
packages is a critical short-coming for a warship. There have been incremental testing and
development steps completed in the mission module design and implementation since the arrival
of the first LCS hull in 2008 but critics and champions alike, agree that the mission modules
have lagged behind the platforms since the start. As in the preceding section, the LCS like most
other new ship classes has and is receiving criticism because of its weapons or lack thereof. One
ought to bear in mind however, that preceding classes notably the SPRUANCE destroyer,
received significant upgrades and installations of new weapons and sensors throughout the
class’s service life. The lag between the development of the sea frames and the mission
packages remains one of the key criticisms levelled at the LCS program and has some validity.
At congressional hearings in April 2016 the Navy laid out the road map to fielding the mission
packages (MP):
“The LCS Mission Modules program continues to field capability incrementally as individual
mission systems become available in order to fill these critical warfighting gaps. The SUW MPs are being
introduced in three phases, providing capability to address Fast Attack Craft and Fast Inshore Attack Craft
in the littorals and maritime security and escort roles previously assigned to Oliver Hazard Perry class
Frigates and Cyclone class patrol ships. MCM MPs are being fielded in four phases delivering capability to
address maritime mines and to replace legacy Avenger class Mine Countermeasures ships and MH-53E Sea
Dragon helicopters that are nearing the end of service life. The ASW MPs will be delivered in a single
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phase and provide counter-submarine capability in littoral and deep water environments, High Value Unit
(HVU) ASW escort and barrier patrol capability.”362

The mission modules (and entire LCS program) was slated for a Milestone B review in the
summer of 2012 but this was pushed back to late spring of 2013.363 The Continuing Resolution
(CR) which the DoD labored under in 2013 was potentially pushing the IOC of several mission
modules to the right, with the most impact on the mine countermeasures package.364 There was
some good news regarding this package as the Knifefish unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)
completed an important design review in April 2013.365 And the Navy was hopeful of
completing a ‘full dress rehearsal’ with the existing mine warfare package in the summer of
2014.366
For the (anti-) surface warfare package (ASuW) the cancellation of the Army’s non-lineof-site missile in 2009 while not crippling, significantly disrupted the delivery of a fully capable
ASuW mission package. The Navy had intended to experiment with applying the Griffen
missile367 as a stop-gap but instead turned to the Longbow Hellfire, originally developed as an
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anti-tank weapon for the Apache Longbow helicopter.368 USS FORT WORTH completed a
successful test of the second phase of the ASuW package development process in October
2013.369 More recently, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the Navy to provide the
LCS with a surface-to- surface missile (SSM) over the short term. In July of 2016 USS
CORONADO (LCS 4) successfully launched a Harpoon SSM and she had already successfully
launched a Kongsberg SSM in 2014.370 There was also a test-firing of Hellfire missiles from
USS MILWAUKEE (LCS 7) in February 2017 off the Virginia coast.371 These are all however
just temporary fixes for the required capability of engaging hostile surface targets, preferably at
long range, that the LCS class has. In order to address this short-fall, Navy recently released a
draft RFP and a formal solicitation for an over-the-horizon weapons system (OTH WS).372
Unfortunately the specifics of the desired weapon system are enclosed in a classified Top Level
Requirements Document (TLRD)373 but we can surmise that the goal is to develop a longer
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ranged missile than the current potential SSMs with capabilities against threat surface platforms
that are also ‘better’ than the current systems available. In short, the Navy is seeking a long-term
fix to address the current gap in LCS capabilities for the ASuW mission module.
The plug and play nature of the LCS has been one of its main weaknesses according to
various critics throughout the program’s life-cycle. These critics voice concerns about cost,
capabilities, complexity and the rapidity of change out as the major negative attributes of the
intended mission package for the LCS class. The lengthy development time has only added to
the critics’ complaints as they note that the basic components required for the intended core
missions of the LCS of mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare remain in
development almost eight years after the first ship was delivered to the Navy in 2008. 374 In
many ways the technical and engineering challenges in developing and fielding the mission
packages are greater than the propulsion issues that have apparently dogged the LCS class. Akin
to the geometry and weight dictated by an engineering plant capable of 40 knots, the mission
packages have certain volumetric and mass limits that they simply cannot exceed. In turn, they
also have performance requirements that they must meet. This has and continues to represent an
interesting challenge for the contractors developing, testing, and fielding the mission packages.
The LCS was intended and designed to be a limited mission platform with equipment and
personnel that would be added in order to perform expanded missions to be provided by a
“mission package.”375 The main missions or ‘focused missions’ for which packages were to be
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developed were anti-surface, anti-submarine, and (anti-) mine warfare. And to add to the
complexity the Navy intended that these mission packages would be capable of rapid change out,
meaning that an LCS could be configured to say hunt mines and then in a matter of hours or
days,376 would have the modules swapped out and proceed back to sea to hunt submarines.
These were the major warfare ‘missions’ that the Navy intended would require increased
equipment and people but there were several additional missions that were felt to be inherent;
these included Special Operations Forces (SOF) employment, mobility, and to an extent
Command, Control, and Communications (C3).377 Based on the installed habitability, storage
volume, communication, and sensor systems, these inherent missions could be conducted with
no additional, significant changes to the basic ship. However, taking on the other core missions
was going to require a relatively sizable increase in both equipment and people to accomplish
successfully.
One of the key intended attributes of the mission packages was that they were going to be
built based on networked off-board, unmanned systems.378 This is a significant issue from a
design perspective because while they might operate while off of the ship, they would still need
to be stored onboard and lifted into and out of the water in order to function. Thus, some of the
key systems became important variables in the weight and stability, power, and maintenance
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calculations for the ships. The designers needed to ensure that once loaded the off-board systems
had sufficient space and were secured safely to prevent physical damage from movement at sea.
They also needed to be accessible to the outside and have cranes or some sort of lowering and
lifting system to move them from the LCS deck to the water and back. There was also a
requirement that the ship’s engineering plant be powerful enough to provide electrical power to
operate the off-board systems and added auxiliary gear e.g. cranes, hydraulic pumps, that would
be needed to support the underwater vehicles.
The following figures serve to illustrate the variety of systems involved in the three main
mission packages and give some idea of the volume of material, sensors, and the supporting
systems required to operate the whole system of systems. Figure 8 below illustrates the number
of both underwater and airborne platforms to be used in mine hunting and neutralization. This
includes the MH-60S helicopter with several different potential mission packages installed on it
and the MQ-8B Firescout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). There are several iterations of this
mission package that will add capabilities in upcoming FYs. For instance, the Firescout will be
outfitted with the coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system (COBRA), a capability
to search for buried mines and mines in the surf zone.379 There is also a completely autonomous
system “Knifefish” that will be used for mine hunting and neutralization but likely not until FY
19 or later (01 Oct 2018 and on).380

Sam Lagrone, “LCS Mission Packages: The Basics,” USNI News, 21 August 2013. Available online at:
https://news.usni.org/2013/08/21/lcs-mission-packages-the-basics. Accessed 25 January 2014, 0955 EST.
380
Valerie Insinna, “Navy To Use Unmanned Boat, Knifefish UUV To Replace Troubled LCS Minehunting
System,” Defense Daily, 6 April 2016. Available online at: http://www.defensedaily.com/navy-to-use-unmannedboat-knifefish-uuv-to-replace-troubled-lcs-minehunting-system/. Accessed 25 January 2017, 1355 EST.
379

151

Figure 11- Mine Countermeasures Package
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Something else to bear in mind in this investigating this mission module is the scope,
size, and complexity of the ships and systems that the LCS mine countermeasures package is
intended to replace. The AVENGER (MCM 1) class minesweepers in spite of claims to the
contrary once all of the equipment and personnel were factored in, represented a fiscal value (in
roughly 1999 dollars) of $250 million. Despite concerns regarding the cost growth in the LCS
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cost per hull to a roughly $440 million cost, this would seem to be a good economic choice,
especially in terms of the single mission nature of the MCM 1 class, their top speed of 14 knots
(vice 40), and their 25 plus years of service. The AVENGER class included a hull mounted,
variable depth sonar, a Mine Neutralization Vehicle (MNV), and mine sweeping gear. All of
these capabilities are scheduled to be replicated in the LCS’s mission package to a greater or
lesser extent. In another explanatory figure below (Figure 12), one can see the size of the
minesweeping gear (in particular the white floats and the cutting cables in the middle
foreground) that is being replaced albeit with some loss of raw physical cutting capability.

Figure 12-MCM 7 Preparing Minesweeping Rig, Exercise FOAL EAGLE 12382

The following picture of the Remote Mine Hunting System with a AN/AQS-20A sonar
body mounted below it (Figure 13), serves to highlight that the new systems are large in and of
themselves and will probably be larger than the MNS that was installed on the AVENGER class
ships. The development of unmanned underwater autonomous system is of great interest to the
382
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Navy writ large and especially to the LCS program. The focus is very much on the LCS
program because of their stated mission requirement to conduct MCM operations. Autonomous
platforms serve to reduce the risk to the personnel involved as well as the ‘mother-ship’ that
controls and services the systems.383 An interesting though maybe tangential point about the
developing MCM packages is that the Navy is looking at systems that will operate both within
the water column meaning underwater vehicles but also surface systems operating on top of the
water column where most of the mine targets are likely to be operating.384 While development is
still lagging according to some the Navy remains optimistic that LCS minehunting packages will
be ready for fielding and deployment by 2020.385 On a cautionary note however, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has
expressed significant reservations regarding the individual testing of the MCM systems in the
past. According to a 2014 report the systems performance and reliability of the RMS was overly
optimistic. The DOT&E stated that: "These tests were not conducted in an operationally realistic
manner."386 Again, without seeming to be an apologist for the laggardly appearing MCM
mission module, it is important to keep in the mind the number of systems and the volume that
these systems take up as currently configured in and on a ship’s hull. Developing the same
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capabilities and fitting them into a somewhat smaller volume is a not insignificant engineering
challenge.

Figure 13- RMS recovery aboard LCS 2 387

This somewhat exhaustive section is intended to highlight the complexity and the sheer
engineering challenges of developing a mine counter-measures mission packages for the LCS
class and its variants. Basically, the Navy is trying to cram an entire set of sensors, towed and
self-propelled bodies into a manageable ‘package’ that can easily be installed and removed not to
mention possibly shipped to a foreign port for that installation – thereby enforcing even more
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weight and volume restrictions so that the mission package is air portable. Again, this is not
intended as an apology or justification for the long time-line to develop this and all of the
mission packages; it is however intended to highlight that this is akin to rocket science and is
certainly an ‘engineering challenge’ if the Navy wants it done right.

Figure 14- Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Package

The above figure (Figure 14) of the ASW mission package is intended to replace the
sensors and systems associated with the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) class ships. While
in some ways simpler than the mine warfare module, it does involve switching out various
systems, the RMS for example to be replaced by the ‘Light weight tow,’‘Multi-function towed
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array,’ and the “Variable depth sonar’ for hunting submarines.388 Also, while the helicopter
remains the same MH-60R/S, the equipment and ordnance to be mounted will be different. In
fact, the ordnance, in the form of torpedoes and sonobuoys will be significantly different. ASW
has historically required a large number of torpedoes and sonobuoys which in turn requires much
more storage and much more secure storage onboard the ship. The explosives, fuel, and
electronics used in torpedoes do not take kindly to rattling about and excessive vibration and
concussions can cause leaks and malfunctions. The sonobuoys are less susceptible to shock
damage but in some cases, they also require explosives in the form of explosive charges used to
eject them from launching tubes. All of this means that the storage spaces on the ship need to
have cradles or shelves in which torpedoes and sonobuoys can be fastened down and that are
able to vent inadvertent explosions to limit damage to the hull and systems on the ship should the
ordnance detonate.
One facet of the anti-submarine warfare package that has not received much attention is
the computer processing power required. Sensor information in the form of detected sound or
reflected sonar energy requires computer processing to filter out non-target ‘noise’ and to
identify specific frequencies of sound. This entails more computers and more auxiliary support
for powering and cooling these computers. This in turn increases the required shipboard volume,
the electromagnetic signature and increased weight. There is surprisingly little comment or
criticism about this potential challenge in any of the literature concerning LCS. There has been
one observation regarding the weight or displacement of the class, but as with many other claims
for and against the LCS there is very little hard data upon which one can make an accurate
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assessment.389 The other challenge is that if the data processing for ASW is to be done off-board
of the ship, at some shore location, then the data transmission requirements increase
significantly. There have been several reported shortcomings in the LCS capability to transmit
its own engineering data back and forth from the shore-based maintenance node.390

SUMMARY
The path to IOC has been a difficult and slow one. Both the engineering plants and the
mission modules have been plagued with physical and fiscal challenges since the commissioning
of LCS 1. These challenges are not new and are inherent in the fielding of new weapons systems
and as described above, in the fielding of new ship classes. A new class faces not only technical
but organizational challenges on the road to joining the fleet. It takes time and ultimately money
to fix the problems and to develop the support programs for new ships. To add to this challenge,
the technical complexity of both the LCS propulsion system and the intended mission modules is
significantly greater than most of the previous ship systems procured by the U.S. Navy. This
chapter has served to describe the road to IOC and to highlight some of the specific challenges
inherent in the fielding of the LCS class. The next chapter will address some of the
organizational complexities and challenges faced by LCS and reveal some of the insights these
offer to the theory of organizational behavior.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ANALYTIC MODELS

This chapter will analyze the acquisition of the LCS class through the lenses of the three
models of state or government behavior as presented provided by Graham Allison and Philip
Zelikow in the second edition of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. The
intent is examine this acquisition in terms of the Rational Actor Model (I), Organizational
Behavior model (II), and Governmental Policies model (III). The goal is to provide some insight
or explanation into how the concept of LCS was developed and made a reality from its origins in
Admiral Cebrowksi’s Streetfighter to the ships current active and joining the fleet. This chapter
will address the nature of the evidence available, its strength or fidelity and the challenges that
exist to gathering additional information. Finally, it will also present an initial assessment of the
original hypothesis that this dissertation started with; namely that individuals have as much
impact as organizations on decision making. At the risk of pedantry, organizations are made up
of individuals. And while organizations operate in accordance with certain rules or customs as
described in Essence of Decision and elsewhere, not all individuals abide strictly by these rules.
But in truth, the evidence of this is rather thin on the ground.

THE FRAMEWORK
In trying to determine the best analytical methodology to address the how the USN
acquired the LCS vice the why, one particular set of models came to mind. These were the three
models introduced by Graham Allison in the first edition and expanded on by Allison and Philip
Zelikow in the second edition of The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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While understanding that these models do have limitations they do however seem to a good fit as
an analytical framework. At the risk of disrupting the flow of reasoning here, it is important to
segue back to the reason behind looking at the “how” the USN acquired the LCS and not the
“why.” The why was sufficiently explained in Chapter Three and was based on the number of
hulls removed from the Navy inventory from 1990 until the present day. This decrease in hulls
coupled with both Operation Plan (OPLAN) force requirements391 and the everyday “presence”
operational requirements, the Navy had and has required capabilities that it must provide to
support the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies. Hence, we have the why but
the how remains murky at best. Even knowing how the process of major system acquisition is
supposed to function, our view from the outside remains opaque. Thus, we need some
methodology to determine the reality, albeit one offering only a certain level of real clarity or
ground truth, for the “how” the Navy end up with the LCS. The linkages between an action and
an outcome, the acquisition of a major weapon system brings us back to the appropriateness of
the analytical models.
We are after all looking to explain the decisions or outcome of a large organization which
was and is impacted by many of the same variables that states and their governments face in
international relations. These models have also been tried and tested in various analyses of state
behavior within the international relations system at both the structural and sub-systemic levels.
For example, the Rational Actor Model was one of the cornerstones of deterrence theory,
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especially the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) concept. MAD was cornerstone of nuclear
deterrence strategy starting in the 1960s and continuing at some level to the present. The works
of Schelling, Wohlsetter, and Brodie, to name just a few were heavily influenced if not
dependent on the idea of rational actors.392 Organizational Behavior, or Model II, has less of a
pedigree than RAM but has still served as a successful template for analyzing individual state
behavior, especially how sub-state (national) processes impact state actions and choices at the
systemic level. The last model, governmental or bureaucratic politics has provided significant
insights into various international relations theoretical and case studies, most notably in the
various examinations of the European Union (EU), its member states, and other states and
organizations outside of the EU.393 Of course the most obvious successful application of these
models was by the Allison and Zelikow in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

THE ANALYSIS STRUCTURE
In the second edition of Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Phil Zelikow reintroduced the three models of government decision-making. These models were the Rational
Actor Model (RAM), the organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model,
numbered Models I through III respectively. There were three basic propositions behind the
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authors’ selection of these models. The first was that scholars and practitioners of international
relations actually relied on implicit conceptual models that have significant impact on how the
think about problems in foreign and military affairs.394 These models not only frame the analysis
of the situation but also the actual perception of the situation; at the risk of stating the obvious
the input variables and outcome products are driven by the concepts or maybe more accurately
the perceptions of the analysts. The second proposition underlying the authors’ analysis is that
most analysts explain and predict the behavior of national governments through applying one
model, RAM.395 This means that actors’ choices are framed in terms of rational decisions or
selecting rational courses of action in order to achieve their specific objectives. Finally, the
authors reintroduce two alternative conceptual models which they opine “provide a base for
improved explanations and predictions.”396 The following paragraphs will provide a more indepth parsing of just what the three models are.

RAM
For our purposes and in the spirit of simplification in this section, RAM or model I will
be used interchangeably to indicate the Rational Actor Model and U.S. Navy will be substituted
for “the state” or “the government.” The idea of the state represented in proxy by the
government of that state acting as a unitary actor in a rational manner has been one of the most
important assumptions both explicit and mostly implicit used by IR scholars since the field was
formalized in the early 1950s.397 Under RAM, the basic unit of analysis is the national
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government or leadership of a state, which is treated as a unitary actor or “monolith.398” Using
short-hand phrases like “The United States” or “the Crown” allows analysts to conceptualize a
state as one entity in the international system, vice a conglomeration of competing internal
political organizations and interest groups e.g. the president, parliament, etc. As one
international relations scholar has termed it, the unitary actor, the state is a “black box.”399 It
enables a level of theoretical parsimony in analysis which as some scholars have pointed out may
result in oversimplification but it is sufficiently robust and complex for our purposes.400 Model I
focuses on the actions taken by an actor are chosen as a calculated course of action to solve a
strategic challenge. 401 In model I, the core concepts include goals and objectives, alternatives,
consequences and choice. All of these concepts are predicated on one key governing
assumption. The actor in question is seeking to achieve the best payoff, value maximization, or
greatest utility under a defined set of essentially limiting conditions.402 This assumption is based
on the classical “economic man” and the rational man of modern theory, who makes optimal
choices in narrowly constrained, neatly defined conditions.403 There are some problems with
this model in that players are assumed to have perfect information and to have considered all
possible alternatives before choosing a course of action or making a decision.404 For our
purposes, it should suffice to frame this model as an actor faced with a problem must make a
decision that will provide the most utility (in the economic sense) with certain limiting factors
like time and money available obtaining.
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The decision or action facing the U.S. Navy was a requirement to replace numerous aging
and retired ships. There were as always, only so many dollars available in the defense budget
and only so much time before the shortage of ships had significant impact on the Navy’s ability
to perform its missions. The expected behavior of the Navy as a rational actor would be to
acquire new ships using the monies available. In order to maximize its utility, the Navy would
seek to acquire the most number of ships that it could with said monies available.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL
Model II focus on the interactions within the “monolith” to describe or define how a
certain decision was made or action taken. Decisions and actions are the outcome of the result of
internal response to external stimuli. The idea of the action as an outcome has some importance
as we can potentially see how a selected action may appear only partially rational i.e. reflects
bounded rationality405 because it is the result of internal processes and compromises as opposed
to a perfectly ‘rational’ action taken by a unitary actor. This is a bit of a canard but because we
are looking inside the black box as it were, the actual formulation of the action or decision is
more complex or nuanced and more intricate than in model I. The authors note that a
government is actually a conglomeration of different organizations, each of the organizations
having a life of their own.406 In our case, the Navy is very much a smaller example of the
government model, with numerous organizations, some subordinate to others and some not,
operating with tasks and goals, or sub-tasks and sub-goals. Theoretically, the tasks and goals
embraced by subordinate organizations all serve to supplement or support the intended goals of
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the larger organization. It is rather obvious from the historical record that this theory is not
always completely accurate.
Organization behavior predicates that the action by a state or other entity is not an active
decision but the outcome of various internal processes within an organization or conglomeration
of organizations.407 The key issue with these internal issues that often seems to result in a less
than optimal or less than completely rational ‘decision’ is that large and complex organizations
are heavily dependent on standard operating procedures (SOP) for reacting to situations. This
results in what James March and Herbert Simon classify as the logic of appropriateness in taking
an action or making a decision.408 This translates into organizations often making a sort of
heuristic assessment of a situation, determining how familiar the situation is to some recognized,
historical standard, and applying that standard to address or process the decision or action in
question.409 The problem is that not all situations are actually akin to their perceived
predecessors and thus SOPs may lead to an unintended or less than optimal output. It also goes a
long way to revealing how and to an extent why, as Allison and Zelikow put it: “Organizations
often behave in ways that seem inconsistent with a purely functional account, even one that
acknowledges the idiosyncratic ways an organization might pursue efficiency.”410
There are five key points for Allison and Zelikow in addressing organizations as entities.
The first and most basic is why organizations or why organize? The second point provides the
answer to the first; organizations create capabilities for achieving purposes and performing
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tasks.411 They are designed and intended to “do stuff” whatever that “stuff” might be. Their third
point is that existing organizations, programs, and routines ultimately serve to constrain
behavior. The fourth key consideration is that organizational culture within existing
organizations shapes the behavior of the individuals working in those organizations. The result
is that individual people are in effect pressured to abide by and act in accordance with the formal
and informal norms of their respective organizations. This individual behavioral constraint has a
multiplicative effect when coupled with the organizational behavior constraint in point three
above. The fifth and final key point in looking at organizations is that organizations are less
analogous to individuals than to technology or a bundle of technologies.412 There are several
ideas to highlight from these key points but the first is that while organizations may be viewed as
unitary actors as in RAM, unlike the conceptually unitary actors in RAM, an organization is still
the outcome of a variety of viewpoints and compromises. There is also the restriction or
constraint that the organization applies to the individual thus implying conformity and a
willingness to adopt or accept the organization’s goal as an entity. This is a nuanced difference
between model I and II but the perspective of analysis for model I does not take into account
how the unitary actor formulates his decision while model II does account for the inputs and the
process of how a decision is made or an action is taken. This can reveal what the critical
variables are and how they are ranked by the organization. This priority ranking through
organizational processes can have significant impact on the apparent rationality of a decision or
action under model II.
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Besides these five key points, another key concept in examining model II is the
competition between what they call the “paradigm of efficiency” and that of “culture.”413 This
has direct bearing on the issue of rationality addressed in the preceding paragraph. A paradigm
of efficiency is focused on producing the most output using the least input. The organizational
goal is to in economic terms “reduce transaction costs enough to offset the cost of the
organization itself.”414 The paradigm of culture on the other hand will drive organizational
decision making or actions based on a rationality based on the organization’s ability to define its
own missions.415 The idiosyncratic pursuit of efficiency mentioned earlier becomes much
clearer when for example the Navy is directed to clean up an oil spill and sends a bunch of
sailors out with boats, hoses, and oil-absorbent pads while say the Coast Guard hires a
commercial contractor to do the same task. The Navy just wants to get the task done while the
Coast Guard might be more interested in avoiding bad press created by the media portrayal of its
personnel cleaning up a spill because this implies Coast Guard responsibility in causing said
spill. This is a simple illustrative example, but it helps to convey the difference between
efficiency (accomplishing an assigned task) and culture (avoiding bad publicity). Differences in
organizational culture and norms make certain decisions logical or rationale if one understands
the internal preferences of a given organization.
The authors’ proceeded to analyze the paradigm of organization and the title they used
the basic unit of analysis is very revealing: “Governmental action as organizational output.”416
This serves to highlight the sub-process going on within the black-box that is conversely labeled
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a “unitary actor” in RAM. The following section of the analysis addresses the organizing
concepts, reiterates some points mentioned earlier but also reveal some key attributes that serve
to distinguish model II from model I. The first of these is the repetition that the key actors in
model II are not monolithic nations or governments but constellations of loosely allied
organizations which act only when component organizations perform their routines.417 This
serves to highlight the second point that organizations, internally and externally, operate under
conditions of factored problems and fractionated powers. This means that individual
organizations are tasked to deal with certain aspects of a given problem even when they have the
“primary” power or capability of addressing said problem.418 It also means that specialization i.e.
the ability to address certain problems or take certain actions leads to differing levels of
responsibility even within an individual organization. This idea leads directly into one of the
overarching issues that acts as both an input into organizational behavior and an output of it, the
issue of standard operating procedures.
Not only do standard procedures impact how an organization addresses a problem, they
also have a very deterministic impact on what the organization does or the actions that it can
take. As mentioned above, SOPs allow large organizations to address complex problems or take
actions in response to the problems. They (SOPs) are driven by and designed to deal with both
the complexity of the organization and the complexity of the problems faced by a given
organization. The challenge is that in international relations and federal acquisition both,
standard procedures again both enable but also constrain the actions that an organization is
capable of taking in response to a situation. This can mean that the actions taken are not exactly
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pertinent to the situation at hand or on our case the acquisition may not match the conceptual
capabilities. Another key attribute is that often organization objectives become performance
targets. This can result in successful compliance with organizational objectives and
organizational constraints becoming measure of success. SOPs become the framework within
which organizational performance is measured as well as a framework for how performance is
executed. There are several other attributes in the organizational behavior construct that are of
interest including uncertainty avoidance, problem-directed searching and organizational learning
and change.
Avoiding uncertainty might be considered a sub-set of standard procedures but it is not.
This is an observed organizational behavior, especially in government bureaucracies where the
organization cannot abide uncertainty in their environment. In fact, organizations make every
effort to control their environments in order to minimize uncertainty. Allison and Zelikow call
this a negotiated environment.419 This is very appropriate to our case study in that the Navy and
all of the services work very hard with and against each other and with all of the involved
budgetary stakeholders to create as promising a fiscal environment for their needs as is possible.
In fact, the Air Force is almost notorious for their skills and efforts in these public relations
campaigns. The issue of problem-directed search is not necessarily looking for a problem to
solve. It is an organization’s efforts to adapt to a non-standard situation by searching for a
solution from within the organization’s existing expertise, knowledge, and physical resources. 420
To a certain extent this is akin to ‘when one has a hammer, all problems look like nails’ and the
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example of the U.S. Army’s efforts to combat counter-insurgency in Southeast Asia using the
technology and firepower strengths that it had is very illustrative.421
This leads us into the general propositions of Allison and Zelikow’s analysis. It also
feeds directly into one of the major points for the authors but also for our specific case study on
LCS; existing organized capabilities influence government (organizational) choices.422 To
revisit the hammer and nail analogy again, the military has the capability to address a military
invasion of the Homeland or of an allied nation but if the “invasion” takes the form of a crop
blight or disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) or Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) might be a more effective organization in response. This also serves to outline the issue
of organizational priorities or goals influence how an organization implements actions or
responses.423 Again, in the case of an invasion, DoD would likely react with physical force to
repel the invaders. For crop blight DoD might cordon the fields and burn the affected crops.
USDA might instead, take samples, do biological studies, or experiment with bio-responses like
alternative seeds or insects to displace or eat the affected plants. It becomes an issue in many
ways of how the organization defines success e.g. acres burned versus spread slowed to x meters
per day. Here we find a third idea from Allison and Zelikow that we have discussed previously,
namely SOPs. The implementation of responses or actions tends to reflect previously established
routines, from SOPs to programs to what the author’s call organizational “repertoires.”424 DoD
has various sets of standard responses to pre-determined situations like harassment at sea, close
approaches to North American air-space by foreign military aircraft, and small infantry unit
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ground combat. The same is true for USDA with crop blights, the CDC for disease outbreaks
and for other government agencies. All of these factors obtain in the case of the Department of
the Navy and the LCS. For instance, the Navy has a corporate knowledge and level of expertise
in the management of ship construction. This coupled with an organizational priority to replace
several different classes of ships, covering several different warfare areas influenced the Navy’s
selection of surface platforms – ships – to fill the impending capability gap vice using aircraft or
autonomous vehicles. The implementation of the solution, replacing the aging or decommissioned ships was very much in keeping with established Navy routines of ship-design
and shipbuilding program management. The one significant change was the solicitation using
performance vice design specifications, and even this could be classified as an “adaption of
existing programs and activities.”425
Organizational behavior or model II serves to illustrate that sub-systemic, sub-national
level analysis can reveal some important insights about how an organization creates an output.
This in turn can help to explain how a seemingly irrational decision or action can be made or
taken by an organization notably if one realizes that it is not a unitary actor or a featureless
black-box. The challenge here is that we violate one of the basic tenets of International
Relations, at least according to leading realist and neo-realist thinkers if we go below the
systemic level. The price we pay for drilling down, so to speak, is the parsimony of the
theoretical construct. However, this is a valid price to pay for the revelatory and explanatory
capacity we gain by looking several layers deep into the system.

MODEL III – GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS
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The one minor modification that we will make to this model is to substitute the word
bureaucratic for governmental.426 While the bureaucratic eco-system is different from the
governmental, the similarities in terms of competition for resources, time, and attention are
sufficiently similar that we do not risk losing much in terms of applicability and appropriateness
by this substitution. As in politics, bureaucracies, notably government ones, are constantly
competing for influence, for resources, and for the attention of key decision makers. Like
politicians one could claim that many bureaucracies have personalities and their spokesmen and
managers certainly have personalities. Bureaucratic politics like organizational behavior is a
challenge for IR scholars because it is after all “messy.” Peering inside the black box reveals a
complicated, intricate, and often confusing process or set of processes that may have created an
outcome or action but we as scholars may remain unsure because of the complexity.427 So,
recognizing the potential short-comings of these models and keeping them in mind let us accept
them as viable if not all-encompassing tools for analyzing the process that resulted in the
acquisition of the LCS.
Even with a respectful nod to Bendor and Hammond, this model has to be the most easily
applicable and relatively straight-forward of the three models from Essence of Decision to apply.
For the purposes of this analysis the author has chosen to accept the limitations for the sake of
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simplicity and to accept that the resultant analysis may not be as rigorous and detailed as
conceptually possible. That being said, the key thesis of bureaucratic politics is decisions or
outcomes are the result of bargaining games vice a more organized or defined process. 428 The
outcomes, what the authors call “decisions” and “actions” are collages.429 This hints at one of
the main drawbacks to governmental politics from the academic perspective, they are messy. It
is difficult to derive overarching and parsimonious theoretical constructs from messy,
idiosyncratic processes, especially one often extremely dependent on the personalities involved.
Framing the Navy’s decisions or outcomes regarding the LCS acquisition and fielding is no
different. It may not have been as contentious as say the Affordable Care Act, but it was a
political fight within the Navy bureaucracy to bring the LCS into the fleet.
Allison and Zelikow frame the governmental politics model in terms of the players, their
make-up, and how they interact to create an outcome. The collages that are created are often the
result of the operational environment within which the players operate, other issues intrude, real
world events, and competition for attention create what are sometimes less than ideal political
outcomes that leave everyone dissatisfied to some degree but are “good enough” to meet part of
everyone’s requirements.
If one substitutes Navy officers for politicians, the rules of the game remain the same.
It is all about bargaining between stakeholders as opposed to brokering a deal as the uniformed
head of the service. The CNO may be the professional head of the service but there remain
strong semi-independent satrapies among the organizations within the Department of the
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Navy.430 The competition within the Navy, between the services, and among the other
stakeholders in the national security community certainly provides the sort of playing field with
which bureaucratic politics thrives.

PREDICTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR – MODEL 1
If we insert Navy or the CNO as the unitary actor in model I the next step is to determine
the value or utility maximization that the CNO was looking for in a given timeframe. In the late
1990s and early 2000s the Navy faced both decreasing numbers of hulls and a resource
constrained environment i.e. less money. It was not until the attacks of September 11, 2001 that
the U.S. military saw an expansion to their funding in the wake of the end of the Cold War and
the resulting Peace Dividend. The Navy was thus faced with competition from the other services
and other federal agencies for funding. If we frame the action or decision with a goal of
maximizing the Navy’s piece of the budgetary pie we can then turn to the expected behavior of
the Navy. For our purposes then the expected behavior will that behavior which maximizes the
number of ships by ‘winning’ largest ship procurement budget possible for the Navy. At the risk
of going off on a significant tangent, this competition for funding is very reminiscent of twolevel game logic. 431 The Navy after all had to ‘fight’ with both internal constituencies e.g. the
aviation community, and against the other services e.g. the USAF for the funding.
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The observed behavior appears to justify or validate the predicted behavior of trying to
maximize the size of the shipbuilding funding and to acquire the largest number of ships possible
based on the funding awarded. Looking at the role of the Chief(s) of Naval Operations (CNO),
most specifically Admiral (ADM) Vern Clark (2000-2005) and his successor Mike Mullen
(2005-2007) during the initial acquisition phase provides some justification for the expected
model I behavior. These two leaders are particularly critical because Clark was the author of the
LCS and Mullen was a driving force during the development and initial acquisition steps. There
are also two main factors that each share and that at least theoretically had significant impact on
the design and building of LCS; each was a surface warfare officer (SWO) and each worked for
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The importance of their warfare community432 is
of significance because the early 2000s saw the pending end of life for several ship classes
including the PERRY class frigates, the CYCLONE class patrol ships, and the AVENGER class
mine countermeasure ships. These pending retirements totaled 79 hulls. The Navy had already
seen the disappearance of roughly nine individual ship classes433 during the 1990s. Coupled
with these ships retired in the 1990s, the on-going disposal of the SPRUANCE class destroyers,
the Navy faced a decrease of 137 combat hulls by 2015. These hulls needed to be replaced. The
timeframe of Admiral Clark’s and Mullen’s respective tenures as CNO under Secretary
Rumsfeld was important because of his attraction to the concepts of innovation and revolution.
The LCS as conceived and designed was a revolutionary weapons system meant to appeal of

The Navy term is ‘designator’ while the Army and USMC would call them Military Occupational Specialties or
“MOS.”
433
The actual number depends on how one parses the nuclear powered cruisers (CGN) that were decommissioned. I
have lumped USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN 25) and USS TRUXTUN (CGN 35) together, though purists would insist
that these two, one-of-a-kind ships, ought to be delineated as individual classes.
432

175

Rumsfeld’s stated philosophy. It was intended to tickle his fancy and served as a sales pitch to
the Secretary of Defense.
The importance of influencing the SecDef is very much in keeping with expected
behavior under model I. In order to achieve their goal of more ships, the CNOs made a rational
choice to maximize their (service’s) benefits. Appealing to Rumsfeld’s interest in innovation
and revolutionary change or the Revolution in Military Affair (RMA)434 was intended to get his
support and thus get the funding to buy the LCS. In the case of the LCS, the two most important
variables in the equation were funding and political attention or support.
The fight for a piece of the budgetary pie is a crucial battle executed each and every fiscal
year by the services. For many years in the 1950s the U.S. Air Force received a larger piece of
the defense budgetary pie than the other services, averaging approximately 46% between 1954
and 1960.435 This and potential racial memories of the Admiral’s Revolt in the later 1940s, make
the leadership of the U.S. Navy particularly loath to lose out in the funding battle in the halls of
the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. None of the services in fact enjoy losing in the funding battles
within and without the DoD and all compete very, very hard against one another to secure their
perceived “rightful” share. Any CNO worth his or her salt will view the pending and on-going
budget clashes as an important if not critical factor in their success. This is true whether in
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comparison with the other service or internal to the Navy. In some ways, the chief of a service is
viewed like a venture capitalist fund-raiser and if he or she can’t get the money that the service
needs, their prestige within the service suffers. This is only amplified when the time comes to
internally divvy up the dollars and in the Navy’s case some stakeholders don’t get as many
airplanes or submarines at they wanted – individual and institutional memories tend to be long in
the sea services and a poor fund-raising CNO will not be a popular leader. However, the idea of
having to compete for funds feeds directly into the next major concern for Admiral Vern Clark in
the early 2000s especially after September 11th, 2001, how to get the administration’s attention –
the transformational nature of LCS was just that thing.
The DoD under Donald Rumsfeld was absolutely fixated on “transformation.” Slapping
a label like transformational, revolutionary, or “represents the very epitome of the revolution in
military affairs (RMA)436” was the perfect sales pitch to Mr. Rumsfeld and his coterie.437 In
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truth, trying to revise the thinking and approach of the DoD was both well-intentioned but also
truly needed. Even after almost a decade, the services were still shaking off the residue of the
Cold War and near peer competitors remained far away over the time horizon. A shake-up was
needed. Thus, transformation came into its own – and LCS was of course transformational. One
of the keys to success is matching requirements to policy whether it is merely spin-doctoring
your sales pitch or actually developing a concept that is in keeping with the current
administration’s buzz-word of the day. LCS fit the bill in both accounts.
If using the RAM model, we look at the participant aiming to maximize their pay-off or
realize the most or best gains then the CNO selling the LCS to the SecDef and Congress seems a
rational strategy. It satisfied the requirement for replacement hulls in view of the previously
decommissioned and pending ship retirements. It also fit the administrations’ and more
specifically the SecDef’s concept of transformational technology especially as a money saver.
By this I mean that even though the LCS as a class was not conceived as a multi-mission system
at any one time, it was conceived as a platform that could be modified to cover at least individual
mission areas. The time required to change out equipment and systems to accomplish the
specified missions was not necessarily played up in the discussions with the people in OSD or in
congress, but it was not a key selling point that received a lot of attention or hype from the Navy.
Stepping back a little and applying Model I as Allison and Zelikow did let us first look at
the unit of analysis. We can still use government action as a choice. In this case the choice was
to acquire the LCS or some other surface system of systems. Now admittedly, rather than a
government, we specifically see a sub-systemic and sub-national entity, a military (or naval)

Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003 [electronic Resource] “Assured Access & Power Projection --from the Sea.”
(Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2003).
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service, the U.S. Navy as represented by the CNO championing this choice to the resource
providers but for the sake of this analysis this suffices. The unified actor for our analysis is a
national level actor, the U.S. Navy.
The problem at the national level is to compete for funding against the other services as
well as the other government agencies and entities competing for federal funding. As mentioned
above, there is only so much money in the federal budget, and only so much of that is doled out
to the DoD. This leads to serious competition within the department to justify service needs and
this service funding.438 In one of the most notable examples of this sort of knife-fight was the
so-called “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949. This was a bare-knuckled effort by the Navy
leadership to fight the Air Force and by extension the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the
aftermath of the cancellation of the first super-carrier, USS UNITED STATES (CVA-58) for
funding.439 The Navy lost but was in many ways saved if not redeemed by the advent of the
Korean War and increased overall military funding as a result. This revolt, if somewhat
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excessive, serves as an illustrative example of the ends to which the U.S. military services will
go in order to secure their ‘just’ funding. The action of choosing to acquire the LCS was based
on the objective of realizing some amount of federal funds in order to purchase capabilities
execute required missions like mine hunting and ASW. It may or may not have been simply a
lack of other viable alternatives but the then recent notoriety of the “Streetfighter” concept and
war games and the Crossbow and Sea Lance engineering studies may have influenced the
decision.
The options included a variety of other more traditional platform designs, potentially
more airborne systems, maybe even a slew of unmanned systems. However, each of these
options had their own drawbacks including limited flexibility, time to fielding, time required to
test, expense, and so forth. The basic challenge with airborne systems was duration or time on
station. Aircraft can fly far and fast but their ability to linger in a geographic region is limited
when compared with that of a surface platform. Plus, while many aircraft can perform multiple
missions, they don’t carry the same number of sensors or amount of ordnance that a surface
platform is capable of carrying, even one as small as the LCS. Finally, aircraft while generally
cheaper than ships are often not that much cheaper, and it takes more airframes to provide the
same time-duration coverage as a ship so any savings in individual platform costs would likely
be negated by the numbers required not to mention the pilot training, crew training, aircraft
maintenance, fuel, etc. Unmanned systems present or presented many of the same problems but
additionally would have required more experimentation, research, and development to reach the
same levels of performance as surface ships or their airframe alternative. Today, almost
seventeen years on from the birth of LCS, unmanned systems remain less capable than most
surface platforms and the command and control of unmanned systems is a communications and
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software challenge of the first order. Thus, some sort of surface platform was the ‘best’ choice
or the value-maximizing one at the time.
The consequences could be a relative loss of funding or the inability to execute required
missions thus increased threat(s) to national security. The choice, for the Navy, was what system
to select? Bearing in mind the mantra of “Transformation” echoing through the halls of OSD and
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)440, the Navy would have been ill-served by trying to buy more
of the same; meaning more destroyers (the DDG 51 class were still in production at the time) or
another traditional frigate or “new” class of destroyers. Again, the system of systems to achieve
the desired effects (see Effects Based Operations or EBO)441 had to be transformative and
revolutionary, for certain values of revolutionary. In order to achieve certain budgetary goals,
the Navy needed to select a platform that could both meet its national security responsibilities
but also scratch the itch at OSD and the administration. The Navy chose the LCS, with some
additional intended mix of unmanned systems to augment the class’s capabilities.
The dominant inference pattern seems to bear up under the RAM analysis in that the
Navy’s selected action was the value-maximizing means of achieving its objectives. The
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ultimate objective was to acquire replacement ships. These ships were needed to “support
conducting prompt and sustained combat operations (the worst case) in support of national
security objectives.” The objective preceding replacing these ships was to secure the funding to
be able to buy them. This required support from the Secretary of Defense. Thus, it behooved the
Navy leadership, for our purposes the CNO as a unitary individual should suffice, to sell the LCS
to the SecDef and his bureaucracy. To sell it, the CNO needed to use words and phrases that
resonated with Secretary Rumsfeld. The LCS as a concept certainly fit this bill. So, we saw the
CNO pitching the LCS, in effect making the choice to acquire this system of systems to meet his
service’s requirements. The action served to meet his statutory and assigned mission needs.

MODEL II - EXPECTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR
Turning to organizational behavior as our analytical framework, we would expect to see
the desire to maximize budget awards as an organizational outcome but maybe not the decision
to maximize the shipbuilding budget. But again, we are faced with a two-level game of sorts as
the Navy is competing internally to justify allocating resources and externally against the other
services and sometimes congress to get the Navy’s ‘fair share.’ The shift from a unitary actor to
a conglomeration of interests changes not only the dynamic but also the analysis. The expected
behavior as noted above remains the same at one level but becomes a lot more controversial at
the internal level(s) of the organization in question. Writ large, one could state that, in general,
the Navy would prefer to have more systems, people and platforms than not. The form of these
desired platforms becomes the key variable. Aviators want more manned airframes, submariners
more submarines and ship drivers want more ships. The internal comparison of resourcing may
reveal some insights into how the organization decided on LCS as an outcome.
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The observed behavior is harder to parse meaning evidence is much thinner on the
ground. This is due to a variety of reasons including security classification, proprietary
information controls, and a certain lack of enthusiasm to discuss this procurement on the part of
those previously and currently involved. We can however tease out some details from the
official record. First, the Navy continued to support the acquisition of the LCS despite
documented engineering challenges, pending weapons system challenges, and a distinct lack of
professional enthusiasm from many in the surface warfare community. Secondly, the Navy
conducted several internal re-organizations and created new sub-organizations to foster and care
for the LCS through the construction of various hulls and the introduction of the class into the
fleet. Finally, the Navy is continuing the acquisition even though it is likely to be less than
expected and there is already a search underway to at least design the successor class.
Again, discovery in the sense of identifying evidence is much more problematic when
dealing with the LCS acquisition. Besides the various factors mentioned above, people in the
military portion of the bureaucracy tend to change more often than one would expect. Most
uniformed personnel spend no more than three years working on any one specific acquisition
program. Service needs, and individual career requirements dictate that commissioned officers
especially need to move to new billets in order to continue their knowledge and experiential
growth for promotion and employment in the larger, broader service organization. We can
however determine at least one evidentiary event that speaks to the tendency of organizations to
react to situations even new one by applying standard operating procedures (SOP).442 The
normal reaction of large organizations to situations, whether normal or abnormal is to act/react in
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accordance with establish patterns of behavior.443 The specific incident from the LCS
acquisition program that indirectly highlights the application of standard routines is the reaction
to the intended mechanical construction standards initially intended for the ship class.
The initial intention was to construct the LCS hulls based on a commercial standard, set
by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).444 This decision came under intense scrutiny as the
first hulls were commissioned and the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) began to
inspect the ships.445 A series of Navy, GAO and congressional studies highlighted the perceived
shortfalls of building the hulls to a non-Navy survivability standard.446 While not directly
addressing the current LCS construction standard the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation told congress that planned improvements in the LCS follow ships, a multi-mission
frigate “will not significantly improve the new ship's overall survivability relative to LCS.”447
The Navy has responded indirectly by raising the level of survivability standards to something
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more than standard ABS commercial levels while still, as evidenced above, not meeting the
entirety of the Navy’s standard for survivability.448
The organization’s reaction was to apply a standard and standard response by trying to
apply a modified version of the normal survivability standards to the design and construction of
the LCS.449 These were admittedly the lowest of the Navy’s survivability but still to some this
was an improvement over the straight-stick commercial ABS standards. The problem with
changing the standards however is that is also increased the cost per hull. The following table
reflects the estimated difference in construction cost per ton in similar ships and for LCS with
increasing levels of survivability.450 As the table shows (Table 5), striving to attain the slightly
improved survivability of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NCS) would have pushed
the price-tag for LCS well over the initial $250 to $350 million goal. The organization found
itself stymied by the cost increase inherent in the improved standards, but it dusted off another
SOP and went hat in hand to Congress to ask for more money, with some success.

Ship
Type

Light-ship
displacement

JHSV
NSC
FFG 7
LCS

1,515 tons
3,206 tons
3,140 tons
2,700 tons

Cost to
Build
(FY2005$)
$174M
$529M
$617M
$310.5M
$445.5 M
$529M

Cost per
Ton

Standard

$115,000/ton
$165,000/ton
$196,000/ton
$115,000/ton
$165,000/ton
$196,000/ton

Commercial
Commercial +
USN Lev I
Commercial
Commercial +
USN Lev I

Table 4- Construction Cost/Ton451
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The second evidence of organizational behavior contributing to the explanation of how
the LCS was procured is circumstantial but involved internal re-organizations within the Navy.
While not exactly providing plausibility to the bureaucracies, if successful, will produce more of
it, whatever it is and seek more resources to do theory posited by some economists, the increase
in internal sub-organizations does reflect attributes of model II. The basic attribute it reflects is
the already mentioned reaction to circumstance by using tried and true forms or processes; in this
case setting up another committee the Littoral Combat Ship Council.452
Unlike some committees however, the composition of the LCS Council is both indicative
of the important that the head of the service places on the class and the influence that its
members can potentially exert in establishing the LCS as a viable platform in the Navy’s arsenal.
The council is composed of senior flag officers, Vice Admirals all,453 and is chaired by the
Director of the Navy Staff (DNS). DNS represents a major center of influence and bureaucratic
power in the OPNAV staff and the Navy in a wider sense. The other principals include the
Commander of the Naval Surface Force, the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), and the Principle Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)). The Commander, Naval Surface Force
is responsible for the manning, training, and equipping of all of the Navy’s surface
combatants.454 His assignment and attention to this council adds emphasis to the service’s
commitment to successfully acquiring, fielding, and actually operating the LCS class. The
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Commander of NAVSEA is responsible for all of the systems installed or planned for installation
on the LCS and also manages much of the research and development of the systems and their
upgrades. The Military Deputy to the ASN(RDA)) is the senior uniformed naval officer
involved in the design and procurement of all of the Navy’s equipment from uniforms to ships.
Much as in the case of COMSURFOR, making these officers members of the LCS Council gives
them, their subordinates, and the Navy writ-large a signal that the Navy, as an entire organization
is committed to the effective implementation of the LCS as a procurement program and as a
fielded system of systems.
The actual mission of the council only serves to reinforce the importance that the service
applies to the LCS. The specific mission of the LCS Council is to:
“…drive action across the requirements, acquisition, and Fleet enterprises of the Navy to
ensure the successful procurement, development, manning, training, sustaining, and
operational employment of the LCS Class ships, their associated Mission Packages, and
shore infrastructure.”455

This makes it very clear that the Navy as an organization wants the LCS to succeed and is
dedicating leadership and management resources to accomplish this goal.
The supporting members of the council further bolster this intent. The primary
stakeholders include the Navy lead manpower office; the Deputy CNO for Manpower,
Personnel, Training, and Education, the OPNAV Director for Surface Warfare, the Commander
of Naval Air (vs. Sea) Systems Command, the Director for the PEO for LCS, and several key
warfare and capabilities staff officers from both US Fleet Forces and the Pacific Fleet. Again,
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the scope of the responsible individuals and their seniority, most of these listed stakeholders are
at least two-star admirals, indicates the importance of this program to the organization. So, while
the Navy has applied a standard practice as per model II, the importance of the people assigned
to the committee indicates this is not just “Let’s study this for a while” - with the inference that
the delay created by the studying will see the issue goes away. There is also the difference in
wording where this council is not directed to study a problem but instead to guarantee the
success of this “problem.”
The second indication of organizational behavior as defined by Allison and Zelikow from
the Navy in regard to LCS is the internal re-organizations or what the Navy calls ‘stand-up’ of
new sub-organizations within the larger organization. This is keeping with the gradual and
incremental changes in organization cited in Essence of Decision. In this case, besides the
creation of a new Council for LCS in 2012, the Navy also created a Program Executive Office,
Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS) on 11 July 2011. What is significant besides the creation or
‘stand-up’ of a new organization, PEO LCS was created in part from the existing PEO Littoral
and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW). PEO LMW was created in 2002 and had been responsible for
much of the mission module equipment and engineering responsibilities that was passed over to
the new PEO LCS in 2011.456 The sea-frame (or hull) had been under the management of PEO
Ships working in concert with PEO LMW.457 However, with the creation of PEO LCS, PEO
Ships like LMW passed its acquisition and maintenance duties off to the new organization with
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In turn, PEO LMW was the successor or step-child of PEO Mine Warfare (PEO MIW) founded in 1992 which
originally had the mine-hunting and mine-sweeping systems in its portfolio. From the PEO LCS web-page.
Available on-line at: http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Pages/PEOLCS.aspx. Accessed on 23 May 2017, 1440 EST.
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Anonymous. "Navy Establishes Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships." All Hands, 01 August
2011. See also NAVSEA Office of Corporate Communications, “Navy Establishes Program Executive Office for
Littoral Combat Ships.” 12 July 2011. Available on-line at:
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=61525. Accessed 24 May 2017, 0900 EST.
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some limited amount of resources, people and money also transitioning. This lineage of PEO
LCS can serve as evidence of the slow but study organizational processes that the Navy seems to
favor. Reorganization can to a certain extent stand as a proxy for incremental changes to
procedures and repertoires and the idea that new activities typically consist of marginal adaptions
of existing programs and activities. In addition, they serve to reflect the concept of organizations
having limited flexibility imposed from both within and without. In the case of the Department
of the Navy limits are not just the result of institutional or cultural drivers but also political and
statutory ones from DoD, the Chief Executive, and congress.

MODEL III - EXPECTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR
Despite the apparent applicability or “rightness” of bureaucratic politics in a case like the
LCS acquisition, the reality is not as apparent and clear once we look a bit closer. Under model
III we would expect to see a significant amount of politicking going on within the Navy to garner
support for LCS in comparison to other programs. There should be horse-trading, log-rolling,
band-wagoning, favor swapping, and pork barrel exchanges between different organizations and
individuals within the Navy hierarchy.458 The different organizations or sub-organizations
involved in this acquisition program would be trading influence, resources, or actual equipment
in order to bolster support for the LCS. We would expect to see program offices trading future
options to support systems under development or to be developed in exchange for providing
‘political’ support to LCS in the present. This kind of support can be political in terms of public
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For more international relations/political science oriented definitions of band-wagoning and log-rolling see:
Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); John Mearsheimer. The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001) 162-3. Kenneth Neal Waltz.
Theory of International Politics. 1st ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979); James M. Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock.
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1962); Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner. "Log-rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff." Carnegie - Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45 (1996): 173-200.
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statements, point papers, or technical studies that positively endorse the intended capabilities of
the LCS class. It can also be purely technical and somewhat passive in nature, where for
instance the PEO for unmanned systems offers support in the form of advocating the systems
that they are already responsible for which in turn will be installed onboard various platforms to
include LCS. Unfortunately, most of the potential evidence for bureaucratic politics is not
readily available.
What we can actually observe of the bureaucratic behaviors is indefinite, indirect, or
inferential as evidence of bureaucratic politics. The strongest evidence may be found in the very
beginning of the LCS acquisition, in fact before LCS became a designated ACAT program. The
initial portion of design and construction funding was actually from Navy R&D funding vice the
Navy’s shipbuilding account.459 This is indicative of a potential trade between OPNAV and the
Navy’s R&D community, potentially including the Office of Naval Research and NAVSEA.
The specific offices involved in this are not clear, i.e. we can’t immediately trace the money but
again this unusual use of R&D finding could indicate a bargain between certain stakeholders in
the Navy. Another example, similar to the notional one cited in the preceding paragraph, is
where PEO Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS) as the responsible technical lead for the LCS
ASW mission module supported the efforts of PMS 406, the PEO LCS organization responsible
for several unmanned undersea vehicles to develop these systems with potential applications to
non-LCS platforms. There is also some potential for internal bureaucratic politics as PMS 406
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Telephone interview with government engineer, 01 Nov 2016, 1330 EST. Telephone interview with senior naval
officer, 18 Jan 2017, 1400 EST. Note: No Navy R&D funds were spent before the award of the LCS design and
build contracts; in comparison roughly $5-6 billion were spent on the DDG 51 class before construction awards
were made in the early 1980s.
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Figure 15- Graphic Representation of the Knifefish Underwater Unmanned Vehicle (UUV)
Source: PEO LCS, PMS 420 Brief to Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, 17 May 2016.

Figure 16- RMMV testing underway
Source: PEO LCS Small Business Industry Day Brief, 13 Aug 2015

and PMS 495, the program office for MIW systems are sharing some unmanned systems in
development like the Knifefish460 and the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV). These two
systems are shown in Figures 15 and 16 above respectively. The focus is admittedly mostly on
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Knifefish UUV Successfully Completes Mine-Hunting Evaluation, Seapower Magazine, 20 Mar 17.
http://seapowermagazine.org/stories/20170320-knife.html
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the mine-hunting mission area but there may be inferred potential to apply these underwater
vehicles to submarine hunting in some scenarios. The other potential evidence of bureaucratic
politics in terms of trading is the cancellation of the follow-on acquisition and the re-issuing of it
at a later date. The delay in re-issuing the solicitation and the decision to not open up new,
alternative supplier yards in addition to the Austal and Marinette teams resulted in significant
short-term savings for the Navy. These short terms savings were re-programmed into other
programs to include paying for several other Navy procurements.461 The challenge is that we do
not know what sort of bargaining took place within the Navy or what sort of agreements were
made between the stakeholders to take this action. This is all circumstantial evidence at best and
nothing but a straw man at worst. It is however, the best evidence we have indicative of some
level of bureaucratic politics active in this acquisition program.
The third model is much more difficult to uncover, there remains no ‘smoking gun’ to
which we can point in the case of the LCS. There is some evidence of bargaining that can be
inferred from the facts available but nothing truly substantive to which one can definitively
point. While this is true for the preceding models, uncovering the evidence to validate
bureaucratic politics as a ‘culprit’ in the LCS acquisition is more obfuscated. This is true for
two main and one minor reason. The first of the major reasons is that the acquisition program is
still on-going thus subject to government and commercial proprietary rules. This also results in a
certain level of unwillingness on the part of those previously and currently involved to speak
candidly regarding the acquisition program. Many people who were formerly involved in the
acquisition as uniformed personnel are not working on it as commercial contractors. Their
continuing livelihood is heavily influenced and restricted by the LCS. The minor reason is that
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Telephone interview with senior Navy officer, 18 Jan 201, 1400 EDT.
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some of the information and data, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, is classified or
unclassified but “For Official Use Only” thus not readily available for use in this dissertation.
One may be able to infer some evidence of bureaucratic politics based on the formation of the
PEO, LCS in 2011. One can only infer though, that someone in the PEO Ships and LMW
wanted to combine the authorities and responsibilities formerly held by the two separate offices
into one “new” organization to be responsible for the LCS. 462

THE EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF
This leads into a somewhat longer discussion regarding the nature of the evidence and the
conclusions to be drawn from it. As mentioned earlier there is no smoking gun in the records
and information gathered in this dissertation to reveal complete compliance with any of the
models that Allison and Zelikow described. There is however some evidence that provides grist
for the analytical mill and that indicates some compliance with each of the three models from
Essence of Decision. One caveat to bear in mind besides the current limitations on publicly
available information is that this procurement is still on-going as is the introduction and
integration of the LCS class into the fleet. Time or history not only provides the benefit of
hindsight, it also reveals more objective data and personal accounts that can shed light on how
LCS was bought and fielded.
The intended over-arching research question of this thesis was intended to be how and
when individuals may have impacted or influenced the LCS acquisition. There is no hard and
fast evidence or again, no “smoking gun” that we can point to and say, “There it is!” There is
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some limited anecdotal evidence regarding the role that some flag officers have played in the
system design and acquisition463 but it is just that unofficial anecdotal evidence – some might
even say it is hearsay. On the other hand, and pertinent to the analysis of models II and III
above, all of the interviews and discussions between the author and people involved in the
program mention the role of different organizations within the Navy. One instance involved a
reported discussion regarding the stabilized 30mm guns for the surface warfare mission package.
A “faction from the N96 staff and the LCS program office” was looking to reduce costs and use
a current MK38 Mod2 25mm gun that was already in the Navy’s inventory and would not
require research and development investments. The contrary view stated by USFF N8/N9 and
the then Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) was that the effectiveness of the new
30mm gun in a cost-weight-performance analysis more than justified the selection of these
weapons over the existing 25mm guns. In the end, USFF N8/N9 and SWDG ‘team’ won.464 No
real mention was made of the opposing individuals by name, only the organizations that they
represented. The same hold true for discussion regarding the engineering and other mission
module discussions and correspondence that the author has had with past and current
stakeholders. Other people have talked about the role of various PMS organizations e.g. PMS
420 for mission modules, PMS 505 for LCS fleet introduction, and the role of NAVSEA in the
overall process but little mention is or was made of specific individuals.465 So again, there is
little or no evidence to back-up a hypothesis regarding the influence of individuals in this or any
other procurement.
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SUMMARY
So, what has this chapter done? It placed the LCS acquisition program into an analytical
framework based on the three models of state behavior described in The Essence of Decision. It
used these models to investigate the evidence available. It also attempted to show just how
strongly or weakly the observed behavior of the Navy matched the expected behavior of an
organization predicted by these models. There is some justification to state that the Navy did
abide by the expectations of all three models and while the evidence is not overwhelming it does
provide some level of justification for this conclusion. This contributes to understanding how
the LCS acquisition went from a concept of a bunch of networked commercial platforms
working in concert to a group of more expensive naval platforms, working with other existing
naval systems with a much higher price tag and still to be verified performance. This section
also addressed the evidence available and not available for investigating LCS. There are notable
gaps in the data available and many people who might provide insight into the program either
cannot or will not discuss it because of legal, proprietary, or security reasons. This makes the
analysis more challenging but we as scholars can still draw some conclusions with some level of
confidence. Finally, this chapter addressed the original research question of who and how
individuals may have influenced or impacted the LCS acquisition program – and found little or
no valid evidence to answer this question. It also noted that there is little justifiable evidence to
even prove the validity of the question itself. At the end of the day, the best that we can do is
look at the impact of the organizations involved in the procurement and draw some conclusions
and inferences from their actions and the impact of these on the LCS acquisition program.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH FINDINGS OR THE “SO WHAT?”
There has been an almost decade’s long interval between the commissioning of the first
LCS and the first fielding of a mission module. This is, by any reasonable standard, an excessive
lag-time between initial operating capacity and fully functional capability attainment. While
categorizing the LCS as a failed acquisition program may be excessive, claims of success are
hard to justify at any level.466 While the preceding lines may be more of a statement or
recapitulation of the preceding chapters than a revelation, the delay in fielding a fully capable
system of systems is the crucial issue that continues to dog the LCS program. Even if the ships
themselves still suffered from the hull, mechanical, and to some lesser extent electrical
shortcomings that they do, having a fully functioning set of mission modules would at least
dampen the persistent critics and provide some justification for claiming at least a qualified
success. However, the LCS class remains a single mission platform and even this SUW mission
module is incomplete and does not meet the intended capability requirements for which it was
designed. The following chapter will highlight some of the reasons pertinent to explaining this
as well as re-engage the topic of grand strategy in the form of the strategic landscape or more
conventionally to DoD joint doctrine, the operational environment.
There are several key findings from this study of the LCS acquisition program. These
findings stretch across government acquisition, international relations, and defense planning

For a recent counter-argument regarding LCS program success see Carl Prine, “Once maligned, LCS program
now a model in Navy” San Diego Union Tribune, 4 Sep 17. Available online at:
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sd-me-littoral-ship-20170901-story.html. Accessed 5 September
2017, 1157 EST.
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topics, all of which represent topics of interest to scholars and practioners in these fields. There is
a distinct risk of developing a large gap in time between fielding a sea-frame and mounting all of
the intended weapons and sensors on it to make the system of systems a “full up round.” This
highlights the challenges of using Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development. The choice
of weapons systems for a predicted operational environment may or may not be suitable based
on both the accuracy of the prediction and the actions of the participants in this environment.
The case studies that follow serve to illustrate the difficulty in predicting the shape of the
international system and the transitory nature the operational environment especially when the
competitors begin acting and reacting to one another. None of these conclusions are revelations
that have not been identified by scholars, acquisition professionals, or military planners but they
do serve to add some more clarity to challenges in both acquisition and national security
planning.

EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION, SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
TIME LAG
What this study reveals is that there is a significant lag time between the IOC of the LCS
as a platform and the fielding of the weapons systems to arm it and complete its functional
capability as an integrated weapons system. Or to put it another way, the LCS system’s full IOC
has still not been achieved. This may not come as a surprise to the reader but if we look at the
factors as described in the preceding chapters that contributed to this timeline, we can understand
the how and the why of it. The dis-joint between platform or sea-/air-frame functionality and the
functionality of the complete ‘system of systems’ could serve as a template or as a warning that
may be applicable to a wider range of DoD weapons procurements especially those labeled as
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“major weapons systems.” The separation of the platform or ‘carrying frame’467 from the other
systems that when joined create a major weapon system aka ‘system of systems,’ could serve as
a cautionary tale for practitioners of both acquisition and warfare. Building a platform but not
building the actual weapons, sensors, and software needed to fulfill the intended mission of said
platform creates a risk that the platform cannot provide the capabilities required of it in a given
timeframe – creating what the military terms “gaps and seams” in capability. The development,
testing, and fielding of weapons, sensor, hulls, and propulsion need to be closely sequenced
whether the hull is a ship, an airframe or an armored fighting vehicle. Building the best fighter
aircraft in the world in terms of speed and maneuverability is wonderful until the missiles, guns,
and radars are installed, operationally tested (optested), and the speed and maneuverability are
re-tested with the added mass and weight. The physical impact of the required equipment may
significantly and negatively impact the observed performance of the stripped-down airframe.
Not only do the systems need to work as advertised but their impact on the physical capacity of
the frame carrying them to move at the intended speed and with the intended agility needs to be
tested and verified physically. Modeling and simulation and Computed Aided Design (CAD)
have made huge advances in closing the gap between designed and observed performance but the
final test always comes with the demonstrated physical performance of the entire system of
systems, in the air, on the land or on (or under) the sea.

EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION AND SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT
This case study also reveals what may represent a precautionary example for acquisition
professionals and uniformed operators of the risk inherent in spiral development acquisition
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programs.468 While the idea of developing systems in a series of stages (or spirals), integrating
and installing them as they reach a certain level of capability has notional merit, it also creates an
increased risk of failure or under-performance. The over-arching acquisition concept is labeled
evolutionary acquisition.469 It is defined as an acquisition strategy that seeks to define, develop,
produce or acquire, and field an initial hardware or software increment of operational capability
with follow-on versions intended to provide increased levels of performance.470 In turn, with
Spiral Development (SD), the final functionality cannot be defined at the beginning of the
program. Each increment of capability is defined by the maturation of the technologies and
supported with the evolving capability needs of the user and continuous user feedback.471 This
was and is usually applied to software development and procurement for the DoD.472 But as
mentioned earlier, more and more complex weapons systems are completely reliant on software
to function properly. So, even if the sensors, individual portions of the weapon, and the carrying
frame or transport platform are built and function as designed separately, without the software to

Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald O’Rourke, “Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD Programs:
Policy Issues for Congress,” (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, December 11, 2006). Brett Davis.
"House Lawmakers Skeptical of DOD Acquisition Reforms." Aerospace Daily 201, No. 45 (2002): 4. Gansler,
Jacques, and William Lucyshyn. "National Security Acquisition Challenges." Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 4
(2010): 13-31. Jesse Ellman. “The Role of Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in the Failure of the
Army's Future Combat System.” Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2009. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.
Ryan Novak, Trevor Sthultz, Timothy Reed, and Christopher Wood. "Evolutionary Acquisition: An Analysis Of
Defense Procurement And Recommendations For Expanded Use." Journal of Public Procurement 4, No. 2 (2004):
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integrate them into the ‘weapons system’ and to operate them, they are just so much high-tech
ballast. This is what LCS amounts to at this point; the transport system is functional and some of
the mission modules are functional – sort of…. So, we have a platform with one mission module,
the surface warfare one, somewhere past IOC but still lacking a key sub-system, the surface to
surface missile.473 The other two major mission area modules, the mine-warfare and antisubmarine warfare systems both remain in development. The spiral or parallel development of
the mission modules, which have been delayed because of software, physical engineering
challenges and funding issues caused by the Budget Control Act474, has resulted in what some
have called a failed procurement program. Whether this condemnation is appropriate or not,
there has been an almost decade’s long interval between the commissioning of the first LCS and
the first fielding of one semi-functioning mission module for surface warfare.475 This is, by any
reasonable standard, an excessive lag-time between initial operating capacity and fully functional
capability attainment for a weapons system.
There is an argument to be made that the LCS procurement was actually not a spiral
development but an Incremental Development approach. This, in contrast to the SD approach,
means that the final functionality can be defined at the beginning of the program, with the

Sam LaGrone, “Lockheed Martin Drops LRASM Out of Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate Missile Competition,”
USNI, 24 May 2017. https://news.usni.org/2017/05/24/lockheed-martin-drops-lrasm-frigate-missile-competition.
Jeff Martin, “Testing continues to mount Army missiles on Navy ships,” WAAYTV.com, 16 May 2017.
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content of each increment determined by the maturation of key technologies.476 The key
technologies in the LCS case are the mission modules and the sub-systems making up these
modules. Even if this definition and program approach is true, it does not mitigate the fact that
the bulk of the mission modules for LCS remain in the development stage of existence; the key
technologies remain immature. This while the 12th ship of the class completed her builder’s
trials in May 2017 and the 14th ship of the class is slated for commissioning in the first or second
quarter of calendar year 2018.477 This gap represents or should represent, a warning to the DoD
acquisition professionals and to the service operators trying to get their hands on new weapons
systems that again, the timelines for platforms, sensors, and weapons systems need to be
carefully monitored and adjusted, especially when a new and innovative major weapons system
is in the acquisition process. This is not meant to suggest that synchronizing the various systems
and sub-systems of a major acquisition program, especially if some of them are brand new
technologies being developed, is simple or easy. However, the size and cost of major weapons
systems and the accountability of the services to the civilian branches of government requires
more accountability and visibility of the success, failure, and costs of the overall program. This
makes it incumbent on the Department of Defense to manage as carefully as possible the costs
versus the capabilities of new weapons systems.
Cost increases in ships, aircraft, and other DoD systems are not independent of market
forces. Increases in the market cost of steel or aluminum or crude oil directly causes increases in
both weapons procurement and operating costs. What DoD can control are changes in the
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desired capabilities and thus what are consciously incurred cost increases vice the tyranny of the
“invisible hand” or market price increases. This writer is reminded of a potentially apocryphal
account of a design change to the ARLEIGH BURKE class of guided missile destroyers during
the final design or initial construction phase of the lead ship. The class was reportedly designed
with a standard mast standing vertically relative to the hull and waterline (see pics below) similar
to the SPRUANCE class destroyers. However, during the design or actual construction phase a
decision was made

Figure 17- USS SPRUANCE (DD 963) underway 1975. USN photo.

by the Navy to build the class with a swept back and faceted mast as shown in the figure below.
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Figure 18- USS SHOUP (DDG 86), underway 2017. USN photo.

The advantages of the design change were significant in terms of reduced radar cross-section and
the ability of crew to access the antennas and equipment mounted on the mast using internal thus
somewhat safer ladders. However, the cost was, at least anecdotally, quite significant to change
the design rather late in the procurement process. The point to this example is that trading off
cost increases for improved performance needs to be carefully and objectively done and some
determination of the cost benefit of the change made before the contract and design are changed.
The opportunity to label a change as part of adaptive acquisition or spiral development represents
a risk of unintended cost increases that acquisition professionals and operators ought to monitor
carefully.

DESIGN VERSUS REALITY: THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
What this case study also reveals is that despite or maybe because of a plethora of
governing instructions, manuals, legal and regulatory requirements acquisition programs may not
proceed with in accordance with the proscribed and described processes. As we saw in chapter
two, there are literally thousands of pages of text describing how ‘things’ are to be procured by
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the U.S. government. All of this direction does not seem to have resulted in a steady and
predictable path for the LCS class of ships. Whether this is a truism that can be applied to all
major weapons systems procurement programs is not absolutely clearly indicated through this
single study, but it can at least serve as a point of departure for further studies, especially
comparative studies of other acquisition programs like the Joint Strike Fighter or the nowcancelled Army’s Future Combat System. Another program that could serve as a basis for
further study is the current FORD-class aircraft carrier or the ARLEIGH BURKE guided missile
destroyers. The advantage in comparing and contrasting these programs with LCS is the semiunique nature of ship procurement which separates them from other acquisition programs. The
technological and engineering challenges when a service is looking to push the performance
envelope need to be considered very carefully and the required capabilities defined very clearly
before an MDAP/ACAT level I-III program is pushed into the formal acquisition pipeline. Also,
this close monitoring cannot be relaxed while the system is in the acquisition pipeline as noted in
the preceding paragraph. The quest for better performance needs to be carefully weighed against
the quest to control costs; or as the latest Defense Acquisition System instruction puts it:
“The Secretary concerned, in coordination with the Chief of the Military Service fielding
the system, will balance resources against priorities and ensure appropriate trade-offs are made among
cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance throughout the life of the program.” 478
Despite careful attention to detail, program monitoring, or any potential defense acquisition
reform effort the DoD remains bounded by the monopsonist nature of the market. The distortions
inherent on this market make it difficult and costly to adjust programs and designs to fit emergent
requirements or changes in the nature of the threat. Once the initial system design has been accepted and
DoDI 5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), Washington, DC, 02 February 2017, p. 2, para 4(d).
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the price to create and manufacture and potentially maintain the system has been agreed upon changes
will necessitate some adjustment to the contracted price, cost, or performance parameters. Statutory and
proprietary issues generally prevent the transfer of contracts from one awardee to another excepting
generally exceptional situations like bankruptcy or total failure to abide by the contract by the awarded
firm. There is always either stated or implied the right of the government to terminate a contract “at the
convenience of the government” but there are significant costs in these sorts of contract terminations.
Often the terminated firm protests within the acquisition system, sometimes the legal system, and often
the congressional delegation from the terminated company’s state starts to ask a lot of questions of DoD.
Also, contracting officers tend to be a cautious and conservative lot and are far more likely to work with
the incumbent almost beyond the pale to make a program successful. Finally, even if another firm is
awarded the contract, they will obviously be behind the schedule compared to the former contract holder.
All of this leads to a cramped market space with only a few competitors willing to provide the
technological and manufacturing expertise that the government and DoD in particular need. And there is
no guarantee that any firm will be able to deliver a system with different capabilities from the initial
design for the same budget and cost, quite the opposite.

THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OR “OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”
From the perspective of international relations and grand strategy, the LCS as a tool of
grand strategy reflects the difficulty in predicting the challenges of the future, notably in terms of
geography and in terms of the nature of the threat. This is especially pertinent in view of the
recent shift in American focus from potential regional challenges to near-peer competitors and
the so-called Pacific Pivot or shift in focus to Asia.479 The LCS was designed for combat in the
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littorals and most specifically for a set of missions to be executed in the Strait of Hormuz, the
Arabian Gulf, and the North Arabian Sea. There was some notional intent in the concept of
operations for LCS that the South China Sea would also be a likely area of operations for the
class, but the size of this area is significantly larger than the original regions envisioned in the
design and earliest CONOPs development. LCS is less suited to operations South China Sea and
the class not necessarily intended for operations in the Sea of Japan, the Northern Pacific Ocean
or the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. The shift in U.S. strategic focus has found the LCS
concept and platform wanting, especially considering the lag in developing and deploying the
mission packages. In some ways this reminds one of the aphorism that the military is always
“planning to fight the last war.” While this has some applicability, it does not do justice to the
transient nature of national interests which in turn drive state strategies. There are several case
studies that we can examine that focus on the national or service prediction of the operational
environment and the accuracy or variance of these predictions from the reality that developed.

THE ROYAL NAVY AND PLANNING FOR THE MARITIME STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT
The nearest case-study that we might apply in comparison is that of the Royal Navy in
the Twentieth Century. In the early years of that century, the “Dreadnought Revolution” was
actually just one part of what could be called the “Jackie Fisher Revolution” especially if applied
in terms of the impact that Admiral John “Jackie” Fisher had on the Royal Navy from 1904-
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1910.480 Up to Admiral Fisher’s appointment as First Sea Lord, the uniformed head of the
service in 1904, the Royal Navy was somewhat mired in the customers and traditions of the
service epitomized by the historic victory at Trafalgar and the Age of Fighting Sail. This is not
to say the British ignored the technological changes from sail to steam that occurred between
1805 and 1904 but the technologies were not adopted systematically nor were they welcomed
with open arms by a reportedly conservative service. Perhaps more dangerously, the service
itself had not adapted operationally or culturally to the new demands placed on its leadership
because of the increased speeds, longer gunnery ranges, and extended communications that were
becoming the standards by 1900. Fisher saw both the changes in technology but also the
changing strategic situation.
For almost two and a half centuries, France had been the main strategic threat facing the
British Empire. This situation was altered by the rise of the German Empire in the latter half of
the 19th century and radically altered by the first in a series of German Navy Laws in 1898. The
growing threat of a modern and powerful surface fleet in the waters immediately adjacent to the
British Isles became an issue that the Royal Navy could not safely ignore. In an interesting
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juxtaposition, the U.S. Navy saw a contrasting radical decline in the numbers and capabilities of
its main competitor, the former Soviet Red Banner Fleets after 1989.
Fisher’s reaction to the increased threat in home waters was twofold. First, he scrapped a
variety of older, less effective warships whose obsolescence made them useless in potential
combat against the new Hochseeflotte. Secondly, he significantly reduced the number of ships
that the Royal Navy had formerly had scattered across the globe at various stations and instead
concentrated the mass of the fleet in home waters or much nearer to the UK in the Mediterranean
Fleet. The reduction in hulls which freed up significant manpower and money allowed the
British government to fund the construction of new dreadnought, battle cruisers, and later superdreadnought ships to match or overmatch the new Imperial German construction. The
concentration of ships enabled the Royal Navy to train for larger fleet operations and to retain
new construction ships once commissioned as opposed to dispatching them to the various fleet
stations around the empire. The U.S. found itself again in somewhat the opposition situation
where, to maintain presence world-wide and facing the changed nature of the threat, needed to
disperse platforms to various numbered fleets around the globe. However, like the British, the
scrapping or decommissioning of ships had freed up personnel and maintenance resources to
potentially devote to new construction. The U.S. Navy suffers somewhat in comparison if we
take the LCS as a proxy for adaption because it took over fifteen years from concept to
execution. In the case of the Dreadnought Revolution, it took the Royal Navy about four years
from concept to execution, although the full shift from global presence to home waters
concentration did take roughly a decade to execute and was still, at least in some ways, a work in
progress when the First World War broke out in August 1914. However, the bulk of the reaction
to a changed operational environment was done in roughly six years. And in a more specific
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comparison, the ship who gave her name to an entire generation of ship-types, HMS
DREADNOUGHT was laid down, launched, and commissioned, as a complete and functional
weapons system, in about 14 months.
The second episode that offers some insight as a comparison is again focused on the
Royal Navy, but it occurred after the First World War and is more akin to the U.S. case, was an
issue of dispersion versus concentration. The removal of the threat from Imperial Germany
summarized with the scuttling of interned units of the Hochseeflotte in Scapa Flow in 1919
removed the immediate threat to the British Isles. However, the U.S. and Empire of Japan
remained more or less comparable naval competitors and threats to the far-flung British Empire.
The British were graced with several naval treaties, the most important the Washington Naval
Treaty of 1922 through which most of the naval powers agreed to limit ship numbers, size and
armament.481 The Royal Navy was required to scrap several older and new construction
battleships as were some of the other signatories. Though the threats may have been reduced the
British naval commitments to defend the imperial territories were not. The British governments
of the 1920s and 1930s applied the Ten-Year Rule but also took advantage of the
dreadnought/super-dreadnought building holiday.482 Instead the Royal Navy acquired cruisers
displacing less than half of the larger super-dreadnoughts and costing probably less than half to
build and certainly less to man and maintain. The “Treaty Class” cruisers provided the presence
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operations that the Royal Navy needed in the 1920s and 1930s. These ships also provided
valuable service in combat during the Second World War but the Royal Naval found itself short
of smaller anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. These types of combatants were better
suited for the specific high-intensity domains of warfare in the Second World War, namely ASW
and air warfare.

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY AND SOVIET RED FLEET
There are two potential counter-factual cases that present choices in naval systems that
were actually well suited and effective in the strategic environment for which they were intended
and in which they were employed. The first of these was the case of the Imperial Japanese Navy
between the wars.483 The Japanese were faced by two main competitors who were both likely to
field numerically superior fleets regardless of how much Japan invested in her Navy, the U.S.
and the Royal Navy. The IJN chose a strategy that focused on the U.S. primarily and intended to
attrite the attacking force as it made its approach across the vast expanse of the Pacific towards
the home islands. The weakened U.S. fleet would be engaged in a Trafalgar-like fleet action
resulting in decisive results.484 The IJN designed its surface force to be the key ingredient in the
climatic fleet action with the intent that each major unit, battleships and cruisers, would be
individually a more effective fighting unit in comparison to the enemy ships. This choice of
quality over quantity was in some ways a mandatory one based on the limited physical and fiscal
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resources that the imperial government could devote to the IJN. More importantly though, it was
a strategic and operational choice made consciously by the service and consistently adhered to
until the actual outbreak of the war in the Pacific.
The IJN did not formally abandon the strategy of attrition but it did find that the borders
of the protective zone had been stretched well beyond the distances envisioned in the formulation
of the strategy. It also found that ad-hoc commitments of forces, as in the Solomon Islands
campaign disrupted its ability to mass against the later U.S. advance in the central Pacific
because of the attrition that the IJN suffered from in the struggle over Guadalcanal and the
islands in the Solomons group. Additionally, the alternate route of approach by forces under
General MacArthur coming up the New Guinea and East Indies path created split-threat axes
which the IJN would not have had sufficient resources to resist even without the grinding losses
in the Southwest Pacific or from the Battle of Midway. One other capability gap had a
significant impact on both IJN and the overall Japanese effort to resist the allied advance; the
Japanese industrial base was too small to both maintain production of current systems and
develop, field, and produce in significant numbers new weapons. For example, the “Zero”
fighter totally outclassed the allied fighters it faced in 1941-1942 but starting in late 1942 both
improved tactics but more importantly better Allied aircraft (both fighters and bombers)
significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Zero.485 Japan did field new fighters with better
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protection (a specific weakness of the Zero) and other aircraft over the course of the Pacific
campaign but never in large numbers. The IJN surface force continued to be an efficient and
effective force but the open ocean carrier battles that followed the Solomons campaign were not
the correct operational environment for surface engagements. The IJN had a fleet that was well
suited for the operational environment for which it was intended. However, as the operational
environment evolved, and the enemy got his vote, this tactical and technological edge was
ground down and ultimately lost. This highlights the fact that operational environments can be
envisioned, and systems designed to perform well in them. However, it also highlights the
transitory nature of the operational environments and the importance of adaption and the ability
to evolve for weapons systems after a conflict has begun.
The other case study that may apply is that of the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. The
various Red Banner Fleets were intended to choke the NATO countries in Western Europe by refighting, successfully this time, the submarine campaigns of the two world wars in the North
Atlantic and Western Approaches. The platforms that the Soviet Union designed and fielded in
the 1950s through the 1980s were well suited to execute this intended strategy in the envisioned
operational environment. The surface fleet was designed quite intentionally to support the
submarine fleet through attacking and reducing NATO’s anti-submarine escorts. The expansion
of the Soviet fleet in the 1960s and 1970s was designed to negate or at least reduce the threat
from U.S. carrier-borne aviation to protect surface units so that they could, in turn support the
submarine force attacking Atlantic re-supply convoys. If one examines the design of the
MOSKVA class helicopter cruisers, the number of surface-to-air missile launchers and antiaircraft guns indicates the threat posed by NATO aircraft to Soviet surface ships and their design
to defend against this threat. Another telling design feature was found on the Modified KASHIN
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class destroyers and earlier classes of Soviet destroyers, where the surface to surface missiles
were mounted to be launched from aft section of the ship. This was purportedly so that they
would be facing away and steaming away from the aircraft carriers which were their primary
targets while launching their surface-to-surface missiles.486 In addition to this, all Soviet surface
combatants mounted some type of air-to-air defense, mostly missiles but sometime guns,
regardless of how small the ships were; this speaks directly to the threat that the Soviet Navy
considered naval aviation to be. It also reflects Soviet efforts to design their ships to be effective
and survivable in the operational environment that they thought would obtain in the North
Atlantic in a war with NATO. The Soviet naval strategy was overtaken by economic events
much as the RN and IJN suffered but resulting from the relatively peaceful implosion of the
Soviet Union in 1989-1991 versus major global conflicts. Funding dried up and the ships,
submarines, and aircraft of the former Red Banner Fleets were laid up, sold, or scrapped. Soviet
designs however had been well suited to perform and potentially survive in the operational
environment that the Soviet (and NATO) high command expected in a conflict during the Cold
War. This is admittedly a hypothetical assessment because unlike the observed performance of
the IJN systems in 1941-1943, there was no actual combat period from which we could assess
the actual effectiveness of the Soviet naval systems. In contrast to the Royal Navy cases, these
two examples show that operational environments can be predicted with some level of accuracy,
but they reinforce the idea of the transitory nature of the operational environment. Even if a state
designs its weapons and strategy to succeed in a predicted strategic landscape the landscape will
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change because as mentioned earlier the enemy gets a vote or competitor states act and react to
moves by others.
The Royal Navy and the British governments before both World Wars were not poorly
served by the tools of grand strategy that they thought met their strategic needs but these
platforms, dreadnoughts and cruisers respectively, were not ideal for the threats that developed
during the wars, submarines and later aircraft and submarines. These weapons platforms were
not new but the improvements in performance, range, and weapons between 1918 and 1939
created a new level of threat from both aircraft and submarines. The ships that the British had on
hand fulfilled their missions and were adaptable enough to provide some of the required mission
capabilities but the operational environment that successive governments and the RN had
predicated their planning on, besides even the notorious Ten-Year Rule and the various disarmament conferences was not exactly as they had foreseen. Neither of the wars against
Germany and her partners was unforeseen, though the first was maybe a bit more overt in its
nascence but the ferocity and longevity of the both struggles took British political and naval
leadership by surprise. The nature of these wars and the technological development that was
applied by both sides caused significant and somewhat unexpected losses among RN warships.
The emergence of the submarine and the mine as effective weapons in 1914, again while not
unexpected, created additional threats to the British battle-line. In 1939, the aircraft was added
to this threat matrix and in both historical cases, the RN’s major ship type suffered significant
losses that might not have occurred if the environment for which they had been designed did not
morph into a much deadlier one. This is the true key issue of these case studies and the
application to LCS, predictions, even very good ones, of future strategic landscapes may miss
intricacies or complexities that make the chosen tools of grand strategy less effective or increase
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the cost of using them in ways or under conditions for which they were not designed. Alongside
this is that weapons development and tactics are never stationary, to use a favorite military
aphorism that seems oft forgotten, “The enemy gets a vote.” Threats will increase and change as
combat occurs and as operators gain more experience. The missiles, torpedoes, mines, and
ordnance that the LCS is designed to confront are likely to be either more effective or supplanted
by some other, unexpected weapon.
The preceding paragraph is a bit of a statement of the obvious but the point that the tools
of grand strategy are designed for a future that is at best estimated and at worst flat-out not
considered. The reality will likely only bear a passing resemblance to the estimate whether it is
done by the U.S. DoD or a science fiction author. The point is not so much to reiterate “We
cannot know the future” but to state that the defense equipment purchased today may or may not
be as successful as intended because conditions change. These changes can be tactical as pointed
out in the preceding chapters or they could be truly strategic as for example the shift in British
strategic focus from the French as the most likely enemy to the German Empire.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?
First and foremost, military and political planners need to realize that the operational
environment, military, political, meteorological, etc. is by its very nature, transitory. The facts
that obtain today may or may not do so tomorrow. In the military, the planning term used to
describe how planners deal with this is “branches and sequels.” The main plain has branch plans
that are activated if a certain set of conditions applies or if and as conditions changes. Sequels
are follow-on to branches and are used if the conditions remain stable. If not, one revisits the
branches to select a more appropriate and hopefully effective model. From a weapons systems
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perspective, designing in ‘room’ for upgrades whether mechanical or electronic is one way to
address changes in threat systems or mission requirements.
In point of fact, the basic concept that LCS was designed to embody is another path to
mitigate changes in the operational environment. Developing platforms that can be reconfigured
to conduct a range of missions, with varying suites of weapons and sensors installed and
swapped to fit the mission is another conceptually sound method of risk mitigation. It is
however, as noted earlier dependent on the availability of functioning mission packages. There
are other drawbacks to this approach as well. The time required to change mission modules and
the geographic location of those modules and a facility in which the equipment can be off- and
on-loaded represents a risk to quick execution. It may take longer to remove, install, and align
new modules or take longer to get required modules to the ship’s location than expected.
Understanding these temporal and physical risks allow planners and operators to adjust
scheduling and operations accordingly but the so-called ‘tyranny of distance’ remains a
challenge for naval planners despite the U.S. Navy persistent forward presence globally.
Another option in contrast to a platform capable of performing multiple missions one at a
time is the concept of fielding truly multi-mission platforms. As noted earlier, this had been the
U.S. naval tradition for many years, at least since the beginning of the First World War. Ships
were generally designed and equipped to carry out missions in several different areas, notably
destroyers and frigates, the nearest analogs to the LCS. These ships were generally optimized
for one mission, ASW but they were designed to have some capacity to perform surface and antiair warfare to survive in the operational environment. It seems that the latest intended Navy ship
acquisition program the frigate program (RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate
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Replacement Program487) will return to this design paradigm. Having a ship equipped with
various systems capable of performing different warfare missions makes it more effective
potentially per unit but as we noted earlier, it also exponentially increases the per-unit cost. This
is a solution to the risk, but the fiscal climate and available resources do not make this an optimal
choice.
From the political perspective, managing conflict by adjusting the timing of conflicts and
working to control the sequencing is another potential method for mitigating risk in the
operational environment. While not always possible this at least offers some buffer for military
forces if required to move to the threatened area or theater, often called “posturing” in DoD
parlance. This returns us to the concept of grand strategy and utilizing all of the tools of national
power, here in general the diplomatic skills and resources of the government. This may also
serve to highlight the importance of diplomacy to both military and political leadership to gain
time for a proper and proportional response in the military sphere if required. This potential
solution is much more reliant on national level resources that may or may not be available or
effective. It also pre-supposes that the diplomats can have some influence on the outbreak of
hostilities.
Another possible method of adjusting to change in the operational environment is to take
advantage of it by adjusting one’s operational approach or TTP. Things as basic as changing the
geometry of physical approach to the scene of combat, hiding behind weather fronts, using
alternate weapons or sensors or different platforms to execute missions form some examples of
adapting or leveraging change in the operational environment. This is in many ways an echo or a
487
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parallel to the idea of asymmetric warfare.488 While asymmetric warfare has been more broadly
applied to terrorism and insurgency in the recent past for obvious reasons, it still has application
to more conventional, force-on-force military engagements. Many experts consider the Iranian
military to have developed an asymmetric approach to deterring and potentially fighting the U.S.
Navy in the Persian Gulf. Specifically, the Iranian armed forces have developed numerous
small, high-speed boats, backed by anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, and mines to threaten
the U.S. Navy in areas where it lacks the weapons, tactics, or the operational space and time to
effectively counter the threat.489 In turn, the U.S. can adopt asymmetric tactics and operational
maneuver to adapt to changes in the operational environment, whether more accurate hostile
weapons, expanded threat sensor coverages, or changing alliance members to cite just a few
examples. The other option that has recently raised cries of alarm from DoD leadership because
of the threat to U.S. systems is the idea of cyber-attack.490 The challenge here is that it
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Content Provider, and Neittaanmäki, P. Cyber Security [electronic Resource]. Intelligent Systems, Control and
Automation: Science and Engineering. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. Jayson M. Spade, Jeffrey L.
Caton. China's Cyber Power and America's National Security [electronic Resource] (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College, 2012). United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats Capabilities, Author, United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, Capabilities, and United States. Congress. House. Committee
on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats Capabilities. Cyber Operations [electronic
Resource] Improving the Military Cybersecurity Posture in an Uncertain Threat Environment: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of

218

presupposes that hostile systems are as reliant on software to operate as U.S. and allied weapons,
sensors and communications systems. The DoD’s joint doctrine system cautions against
assuming away an enemy strength and by extension one ought not assume away an enemy
vulnerability. Based on this, cyber-warfare, attacking the software and computers that enable the
command and control of weapons systems offers another possibility of mitigating or addressing
change in the operational environment. This potential adaption policy is however potentially
more susceptible to the transitory nature of the environment as it is very likely that a hostile force
will notice when its radars do not detect aircraft or when missiles fail to explode. But again,
warfare is often about moves, counter-moves, counter-counter-moves and so on; it represents an
opportunity to address the shifting landscape of the operational environment however fleeting the
opportunity may be.
One final approach to adapting to a changing battlespace to use the term in vogue
previous to operational environment,491 the DoD has pursued what were called non-material or
non-technological solutions. These were included in the rather bulky term DOTMLPF-P492 or
Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and
Policy. In the late 1990s and through the early 2000s, the emphasis, at least in the DoD and
former-Joint Forces Command was on the doctrine and training headings of this term. The Army
focused to an extent on the Leadership piece as they began investigating and working on what
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ents/20150212%20Approved%20JCIDS%20Manual%20with%20errata%20through%2020150327.pdf&action=defa
ult&DefaultItemOpen=1. Accessed 05 September 2017, 0922 EST.
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was called mission-type orders, telling subordinates what needed to be done but not how to do it.
All of the services and the National Defense University looked at the joint professional military
education at the various staff and war colleges to investigate potential non-material solutions to
waging war and peace. While material remained one of the terms this was supposed to be
focused on non-acquisition things that could be purchased commercially and either weaponized
or adapted to military requirements often called ‘Commercial-off-the-Shelf’ (COTS). Utilizing
this analytical framework to look for efficiencies so to speak could offer some ways of dealing
with changes in the operational environment. The areas that this author would highlight for the
best possibilities are Training and Leadership and education. Any weapons system is only as
good as the people that employ and operate it. Teaching operators, leaders, and followers that
“the enemy gets a vote” and “No plan survives first contact with the enemy” could potentially
provide a buffer against human surprise as the battlespace changes. While these pithy phrases
seem just another set of buzz-words or phrase so adored by the U.S. DoD, there are some deepseated lessons to be learned from them and developing officers and men who are flexible and
adaptable would go a long way to making the instability of the operational environment less of a
threat and more of an opportunity.
In an attempt to answer a perennial question, “What is the optimal match between a
weapons system and the operational environment?” there are three main attributes of a weapons
system to address. First the system ought to be flexible enough to perform under the predicted
conditions of the expected operational environment while retaining sufficient performance to
operate in an expanded or changed operational environment. This could be a reserve of speed,
extra range, or back-up computers to name a few that with changes in weather, target range, and
counter-measures still enable the system to find, fix, and kill the enemy. The second attribute
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that a weapons system requires is the ability to adapt to the changing operational environment.
This equates to sufficient volume, mass, control systems, and overall design features that enable
upgrades when changes in the operational environment are so significant that the systems
flexibility just will not achieve the intended and desired effect upon the enemy. The final
attribute that would mark the optimal match between a weapons system and the operational
environment is dependability. This means that regardless of weather, enemy actions, countermoves, the weapons system works as advertised. The challenge is getting all of these
characteristics into a weapons system with a definite budget and delivery schedule. Real world
threats, dead-lines, and fiscal resources force weapons system designers, operators, and
acquisition professionals to accept some lesser combination of flexibility, adaptability, and
reliability.

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODELS REVISITED
One another level, this case study could serve as a very strong example of government or
state actions as the output of processes. The transition of LCS from the initial concept of a series
of cheap but fast networked platforms operating in concert with one another and other maritime
assets to the current platform and mission module configuration could shed light on how the
process morphs ideas based on both internal and external variables. The internal variables are
rather clear from the Navy perspective, most notably the rejection of commercial material
specifications for the ships and the adoption of modified Navy material standards for firefighting
and damage control. The other variable addressed in the preceding paragraphs highlights an
external variable, the perceived change in the strategic environment that impacted the current
acquisition. This recent shift to a more traditional geo-strategic or geo-political challenge from
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near-peer competitors has had significant impact on the DoD and on the Navy’s acquisition
execution and planning. This has directly impacted the Navy’s LCS acquisition program and
contributed to the decision to curtail the entire LCS procurement and replace it with a frigate
acquisition program.493 The previous historical case studies highlight another potentially
interesting path for future research, examining weapons acquisition programs in light of
changing strategic perspectives. How does a perceived shift in the nature or the scope of threat a
state thinks it is facing impact the weapons that it acquires and what significance does this have
for political and military leaders? Or in some ways more topical, framed in terms of the defense
market, what impact(s) do changes in the strategic landscape have on commercial defense firms?
Has the nature and speed of technological development changed the very nature of change in the
international system?
From the acquisition perspective one interesting question that this program raises is
whether or not there is a “point of no return” where the investment in the procurement and
expected return on investment outweighed or began to outweigh the institutional incentive to
abandon a program? Despite collecting a large amount of data there is again no smoking gun that
provides a specific and definitive answer to this question. We can hypothesize that the point of
no return in this case was when the Navy decided that the follow-on sea frame acquisition should
be cancelled and re-issued. The Navy could have abandoned the whole program at this point but

Megan Eckstein, “Stackley: More Capable Frigate Requires Full and Open Competition, But LCS Builders May
Have Cost Advantage.” USNI, 12 May 2017. Available online at: https://news.usni.org/2017/05/12/stackleycapable-frigate-requires-full-open-competition-lcs-builders-may-cost-advantage. Accessed 28 June 2018. Sydney J.
Freedberg, Jr., “Beyond LCS: Navy Looks To Foreign Frigates, National Security Cutter.” Breaking Defense, 11
May 2017. Available on line at: http://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/beyond-lcs-navy-looks-to-foreign-frigatesnational-security-cutter/. Accessed 28 June 2017. Bill Riales,”Austal Looks at LCS Redesign for Frigate,” WKRG,
18 May 2017. Available online at: http://wkrg.com/2017/05/18/austal-looks-at-lcs-redesign-for-frigate/. Accessed 28
June 2018. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “LCS: HASC Seapower Chair Praises Frigate Delay.” Breaking Defense, 4
May 2017. Available online at: http://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/lcs-seapower-chairman-praises-frigatedelay/?_ga=2.197073772.1538672250.1493964904-671527529.1483508113. Accessed 29 June 2017.
493
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instead chose to re-address the intended long-term production plan and in the short-term, reprogram some of the money to other acquisition programs. Unfortunately, there is no evidence
besides the new RFQ for production from both Austal and Marinette issued by the Navy to
indicate that this really was a point of no return for the program. The evidence in the form of
budgetary and capabilities memoranda, meeting minutes, point papers, and PowerPoint briefs
from within OPNAV itself and between OPNAV and the other Navy stakeholders are not
currently available. This is definitely an opportunity for further study by both acquisition
professionals and naval historians to see if there is a discernable point in the Navy’s LCS
acquisition where there was no turning back.

SUMMARY
To steal an oft-quoted phrase attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, “Ask me for anything but
time.” This is extremely apropos for this study because we have seen how the time difference
between fielding a ship and fielding the systems required for that ship has contributed to a gap in
mission capabilities for the LCS. We have also seen how the transitory nature of the strategic
landscape impacts even the ‘correct’ weapons procurement plans of military services and states.
The impact of Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development has contributed to the disjoint
between the launching of the sea-frames and the installation of the intended weapons and sensor
systems. In turn, this time-lag has definitely reinforced the perception of the LCS as a failed
acquisition program and a less-than stellar addition to the Navy’s surface force. The selection of
this tool of grand strategy and its focus on mission capabilities in one geographic area has
revealed a level of risk based on the evolving nature of the operational environment, especially
when we look at just how quickly this environment changes once ‘battle is joined’ and the
contestants begin struggling to dominate a battle space. As General André Beaufré put it:
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“These unquestionably complex problems [national security] have a double nature; on the one
hand they are current and require each day practical decisions of considerable moment; on the
other hand, they are related to hypothetical future situations.” 494

There are also a couple of interesting questions regarding the design compared to the reality of
procurement and the determination of a cancellation point for a major acquisition program – “Is
it too Big to fail?” None of these revelations are exactly earth-shattering but they are interesting
and do represent topics of interest for students of acquisition and international relations to
potentially investigate further.

494

André Beaufré. Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Crane, Russack, & Co., Inc., 1972) x.
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APPENDIX A
THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

Interviewing Process
The researcher applied Snowball sampling, requesting that interview subjects identify
other likely subjects to interview. The proposal for conducting research using human subjects
was reviewed and approved according to the ODU Procedures for Review of Human Subjects
Research. After the ODU Arts & Letters Human Subjects Review Committee reviewed and
approved (#95026201) my interview intent and process, I used or leveraged people I had served
with in the Navy, the Navy Reserve or worked with as a contractor since 1989. The initial
question was addressed to a former ship-mate who was still working for the Navy and he pointed
me towards several folks who had potentially been involved in the LCS procurement and
continuing fleet introduction program. I then contacted subjects using e-mail, telephone and
Linked-In© to ask if they had experience in the LCS procurement and were willing to talk with
me about it. I also used personal contacts, Linked-In© and google to locate contact information
for Admirals Mike Mullen and Gary Roughead and several former Commanders, Naval Surface
Forces to ask them if they would be willing to be research subjects. I was not however able to
identify anyone in the contracting organization that would be willing or able to discuss LCS
because of legal, proprietary, and contractual issues.
Those subjects who were willing and able to discuss the procurement received a copy of
the survey sheet and a physical or phone interview meeting was scheduled. The meetings were
done one on one with only the researcher and the interviewee in the room or on the phone. Once
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the survey questions were addressed, the discussion shifted to a more general question and
answer session about the LCS. After the interview, I typed up a set of notes and observations
and provided these to the interviewee for review and correction as desired. Once a final set of
notes was complete, the researcher used these as reference material for writing the dissertation.
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APPENDIX B
THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Interview Schedule
Introduction
The following questionnaire is presented as part of academic research into the U.S.
Department of Defense/Department of the Navy (DoD/DON) acquisition procurement system,
focusing on a case study on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The study will examine the balance
in procurement decisions between organizational behavior models based on Allison and
Zelikow’s 1991 edition of the book The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the observed, recorded or perceived role of individuals in the on-going procurement
program for the LCS class for the U.S. Navy. The specific intent of the questionnaires and
interviews is to collect anecdotal and contemporaneous data concerning how organizations and
individuals and which specific organizations and individuals have been involved in LCS
procurement decisions.
The specific intent of the questionnaires is to leverage the respondents’ knowledge of and
expertise in the LCS acquisition program to identify key organizations and/or individuals who
may have had significant influence on the program at any stage. The focus is not to identify
“good” or “bad” roles in this specific procurement but to identify key stakeholders and how they
interact within the DoD and DON’s acquisition program structure. The underlying research goal
is to compare the influence of organizations with the influence of individuals and then to
compare this influence with the more generally accepted theoretical models of organizational
behavior used by Allison and Zellikow in Essence of Decision. The deeper goal is to potentially
provide some insight to the services and to the acquisition community about how the acquisition
process works, how generic organizations and generic individuals with the acquisition
community and services may interact, and to identify potential recommendations for adjusting
the DoD/DON acquisition process.
Your participation as a respondent is completely voluntary, you may withdraw from
participation at any time, and all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential. If any
information or observations that you provide are cited in the resulting dissertation, you will not
be identified by name, rank, or specific billet. A set of generic titles, e.g. senior defense official,
naval officer, government contractor, etc. will be used along with the time and date of the
interview or correspondence when the information was provided. Please note that while every
effort will be made to protect your specific identity and those of the individuals to whom you
refer and who were or are acquisition process participants, there is some risk that readers may be
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able to identify both your identity as a respondent and the identities of the individuals referred to
in the interview.
If you are willing to participate, the following set of questions serve to set the framework
within which a phone or face to face interview would take place. The interview is intended to
take no more than 45 minutes of your time at your convenience. It is also not intended to be
merely a recitation of the questions below but to present you the opportunity, as a Subject Matter
Expert (SME) to discuss the acquisition program and process for the Navy’s newest combatant
class. Again, your participation is completely voluntary, you may withdraw from participation at
any time, and your time and attention are greatly appreciated.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Procurement Questionnaire
1) How were or are you involved in LCS procurement?
a) Specific billets?
b) In what organizations (NAVSEA, OPNAV, PEO, etc.)?
2) What are or were some of the key Navy organizations involved in the initial decision to
procure LCS?
a) What are or were some of the key Navy organizations involved in the decision(s) to procure
Mission Packages (modularity)?
b) What were the Navy organizations involved in these decisions?
c) What other procurement decisions, either major program or major system, have been made
over the course of the program esp. since IOC and deployment to the fleet?
d) How has the IOC and first deployment(s) of LCS impacted procurement?
3) Were there some stakeholders -meaning organizations - that you perceived to have greater
impact on design and/or procurement decisions?
a) Were there specific people – pls identify by using a generic title or job description or rank/rate
& pseudonym i.e. LCDR “Jones” or CAPT “Smith” – whom you perceived to have had a greater
impact on design and/or the procurement process compared with other individuals or to
organizations?
b) What is the balance between organizational inputs and inputs from specific people?
c) Where does the balance change through the procurement process?
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4) How closely did or has LCS procurement follow the notional procurement process - from
requirement definition through source selection to award?
a) How did the number of competitors impact the process?
b) How did the Navy's actions impact the process?
5) Who else should I or could I talk to IOT gain some insight and get other perspectives on the
questions above?
6) If you could ‘fix’ the process – what are three critical things to change?
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